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CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES:
INSTITUTIONAL, JUDICIAL, AND SOCIETAL
INDIFFERENCE TO THE LIVES OF
INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS
Nicole B. Godfrey*
INTRODUCTION
It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by
taking stock of its prisons. That is all the truer in this pandemic,
where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and
often powerless to protect themselves from harm. May we hope
that our country’s facilities serve as models rather than
cautionary tales.1
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, issued the above-quoted clarion call to protect the lives
of incarcerated people on May 14, 2020.2 At that point, the
COVID-19 pandemic had brought American society to a
standstill for a little more than two months, and it had begun to
wreak havoc on American prisons nationwide.3 Despite Justice
*

Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Special
thanks to Rebecca Aviel, John Bliss, Bernard Chao, Alan Chen, Ian Farrell, César
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Sam Kamin, Tamara Kuennen, Margaret Kwoka, Kevin
Lynch, Viva Moffatt, Govind Persad, and Laura Rovner for their insight on a very early
version of this Article. I also want to thank Benjamin Barton, Mira Edmonds, Fanna Gamal,
Randy Hertz, Zina Makar, and Maneka Sinha for their feedback on an earlier draft of this
piece presented at the 2020 Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop. Finally, I want to
thank Sara Hildebrand, Tamara Kuennen, Jesse Loper, Sarah Matsumoto, and Tania N.
Valdez for their thoughtful feedback and encouragement as this piece moved into its final
form. Additional thanks to the editors of the Arkansas Law Review for their careful
proofreading and edits. All errors are my own.
1. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., statement
respecting the denial of application to vacate stay).
2. See id.
3. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Inmates on Covid-19 Prevention (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (May 14, 2020, 6:00 PM), [https://perma.cc/7CZF-FSCJ] (noting that more
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Sotomayor’s hopes that the nation’s prisons might avoid
becoming cautionary tales, the realities of and legal doctrines
governing the American system of mass incarceration all-butinsured that American prisons would become a site of mass
casualty to the COVID-19 pandemic. This Article explains why.
Let’s start by looking at how the pandemic impacted one
prison—Arkansas’s Cummins Unit—among the nation’s
approximately 2,000.4 Established in 1902, the Cummins Unit is
an Arkansas prison that sits on nearly 18,000 acres of farmland
that used to be a cotton plantation.5 Built to incarcerate 1,876
men, the prison confines 1,950 today.6 The men incarcerated at
Cummins work in all manner of prison jobs; some work the fields
in a manner all-too reminiscent of the slaves who worked the
plantations during the antebellum era.7 More than 100 men living
in the Cummins Unit go to work each day as part of what is known
as the “Hoe Squad.”8 Unpaid, these men “pile into an open
trailer” each morning, sitting side-by-side, “shoulder to shoulder,
hip to hip” as “a tractor pulls them deep into the prison’s fields”
where they “pull weeds, dig ditches, and pick cotton, cucumbers,

than 20,000 incarcerated people had been infected and more than 300 had died at that point
in the pandemic).
4. HOMER VENTERS, LIFE AND DEATH IN RIKERS ISLAND 9 (2019) (noting that “[t]here
are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000 prisons in the United States”).
5. Molly Minta, Incarcerated, Infected, and Ignored: Inside an Arkansas Prison
Outbreak, THE NATION (June 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/L7L9-2D5B]. Like many states
in the South, Arkansas used the post-Reconstruction era to repurpose its antebellum-era slave
plantations into prisons that would set the stage for the continued subjugation of Black
people. See, e.g., CALEB SMITH, THE PRISON AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 136 (2009)
(“In the aftermath of Reconstruction and the Civil War amendments, Southern states
dismantled the old structure and recomposed its elements into a kind of hybrid, the ‘prison
farm,’ at sites like Angola, Cummins, and Parchman.”).
6. Minta, supra note 5.
7. See Rachel Aviv, Punishment by Pandemic, THE NEW YORKER (June 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/37EY-X3KT] (describing the unpaid labor of the “Hoe Squad” and the
patrol provided by the “field riders”). While today the “field riders” patrol is made up of
“officers on horseback,” id., Arkansas ran its prisons using a “trusty” system until well into
the 1960s. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
313 (1993). The “trusty” system allowed Arkansas to inexpensively run its prisons by
granting power to certain “favorite[]” incarcerated people who would be charged with
overseeing the rest of the incarcerated population. Id. (“In Cummins prison, in Arkansas,
for example, there were ‘only 35 free world employees’ for ‘slightly less than 1,000 men.’
This was a cheap way to run a prison, but hardly enlightened penology.”) (footnote omitted).
8. Aviv, supra note 7.
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and watermelons.”9 When one man asked an officer why the men
working the fields had to use “gardening tools rather than modern
farming technology,” the prison official told him, “[w]e don’t
want your brain. We want your back.”10 After returning from the
fields or other warehouse jobs, the incarcerated men live in open
barracks, with beds that are about three feet apart.11 Prison
officials send them to the chow hall “three to four barracks’ worth
of men” at a time.12 In short, the men living in the Cummins Unit
are forced to live and work in extremely close quarters—an
environment ripe to incubate any highly infectious disease like
COVID-19.13
By early-to-mid March 2020, prison officials knew that,
before long, the coronavirus would enter the Cummins Unit,
infecting a large swath of the incarcerated population, yet still
insisted that the Hoe Squad report to work in the crowded trailer
without any safety precautions.14 As the men living in Cummins
Unit learned of the COVID-19 pandemic and its risks in late
March, some refused to report to work.15 In response, the prison
disciplined them,16 even though by the time of the work strike,
“Asa Hutchinson, the governor of Arkansas, had asked that
businesses cease ‘nonessential functions.’”17 Meanwhile, in
seeming recognition of the coming impact of the pandemic on the
prison, the director of Arkansas’s prisons instructed the facility
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Minta, supra note 5 (describing how one incarcerated person, who is 5’9”, was able
to touch the beds next to him when laying on his back and extending his arms outward).
12. Id.
13. Martin Kaste, Prisons and Jails Worry About Becoming Coronavirus ‘Incubators,’
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RHJ5-W3DF].
14. Minta, supra note 5. By late March, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) issued interim guidance meant to assist prison officials seeking to protect
the health and safety of incarcerated persons, prison staff, and the general public. See CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON MANAGEMENT OF
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN CORRECTIONAL AND DETENTION FACILITIES
(Mar. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/86QN-UTAQ]. That interim guidance included a
direction about the importance of personal hygiene, social distancing, and masks in the
prevention and management of COVID-19 cases. Id. at 3, 10.
15. Aviv, supra note 7 (describing how the group of men assigned to the “Hoe Squad”
lay down on their beds when officers called their names for work).
16. Id. (recounting that the “men were disciplined for ‘unexcused absence’—a
violation that carries a punishment of up to fifteen days in isolation”).
17. Id.
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wardens to “prepare a portion/area of [their] punitive isolation
areas to house inmates effected by the CoronaVirus,”18 and the
incarcerated people required to work in Cummins’s garment
factory began to “manufacture masks that would be distributed
throughout the state’s prison system.”19
This contradictory behavior on the part of prison officials
continued even after the first Cummins staff member tested
positive for the virus on April 1, 2020.20 Despite the positive test,
prison officials did not administer mass tests to Cummins’s
incarcerated population, nor did they track “which or how many
of its employees had tested positive.”21 Even when incarcerated
people began exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19, the prison
failed to take steps to limit an outbreak.22 Instead, prison officials
ignored the complaints of symptomatic people, all but
guaranteeing the rapid spread of the virus among the incarcerated
population.23 For example, on April 10, 2020, a man incarcerated
at Cummins “went to the infirmary with a severe headache and
other symptoms he feared were signs of Covid-19.”24 After
informing prison officials that he had a “real bad case of diarrhea”
and had lost his senses of smell and taste, prison officials gave
him two Tylenol and sent him back to his crowded barracks.25
Four days later, as the number of symptomatic prisoners
increased, Arkansas prison officials finally began mass testing at
Cummins.26 But even in the face of mass testing, prison officials
ignored public health guidance on necessary safety precautions to
limit the spread. For example, in one barracks, four nurses
administered forty-six tests without regularly changing their
gloves.27
Unsurprisingly, then, by April 25, 2020, 826

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Minta, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minta, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Aviv, supra note 7.
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incarcerated men and 33 staff members tested positive for the
virus.28
But prison officials did not inform all prisoners of their
positive result right away or take steps to quarantine infected
people. One person reported that after mass testing in his
barracks, “a sergeant later shouted into the barracks, ‘Y’all are
negative.’”29 This person, who noticed he could not smell
anything when another man “defecated a few feet away from
him,” remained skeptical and asked a family member to call the
prison to find out the true results of his test.30 “He was positive.”31
Despite the mass outbreak at Cummins, incarcerated people,
former staff members, and current staff members reported a
shocking level of indifference to the health of those infected.32
Former staff members confirmed a practice of shredding sick call
requests rather than responding to them,33 and current staff
members reported seeing prison grievances in bathroom trash
cans.34 One former nurse of the Arkansas prison system
confirmed: “[t]he mentality of the infirmary is: these individuals
are worthless.”35 One incarcerated person, twenty-nine-year-old
Derick Coley, saw a nurse at Cummins on April 15; the nurse
“noted that he was too weak to walk and his blood-oxygen level
was ninety, which would typically indicate that a patient should
be hospitalized.”36 Rather than send Mr. Coley to the hospital,
the nurse sent him “to the Hole, where he remained for seventeen
days. His vitals were never recorded again.”37 The men confined
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Aviv, supra note 7.
33. Id.
34. Id. A grievance is a formal complaint lodged by an incarcerated person related to
conditions within a carceral facility. An incarcerated person is required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Exhaustion generally requires the filing of a
grievance using the prison system’s requirements and following the prison system’s
procedures through to completion. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (cautioning
that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion” as defined by
administrative law).
35. Aviv, supra note 7.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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next to Mr. Coley in the segregation unit begged staff to take him
to the infirmary because he couldn’t breathe, but staff members
just kept walking by his cell, ignoring him.38 When officers
finally came to his cell—“not to check on him but to clear it so
that someone else could move in”—Mr. Coley collapsed.39
Prison officials handcuffed him, placed him in a wheelchair, and
took him to the infirmary, where he “was ‘worked on and then
passed away,’” according to the coroner’s report.40 At the time
of his death, the prison had no doctor on duty, so the infirmary
staff called the doctor on call, William Patrick Scott, whose
“medical license ha[d] been suspended three times.”41
Unfortunately, Mr. Coley’s story is neither unique to him, to
the Cummins Unit, or to the Arkansas prison system. By May 3,
2020, just one month after the first Cummins staff member tested
positive for COVID-19, four incarcerated people had died of
COVID-19 complications and nearly half of the incarcerated
population tested positive for the disease.42 By June 9, 2020, just
a month later, eleven people had died in the Cummins Unit
alone,43 and by September 2020, thirty-nine people had died
throughout the Arkansas prison system.44 By July 1, 2021, 11,425
people incarcerated in Arkansas prisons had contracted COVID19, and fifty-two people had died.45 Across the country, 398,627
people incarcerated in American prisons have contracted
COVID-19, and 2,715 people have died.46
Prisons across the country have faced outbreaks like the
outbreak at Cummins. At the Marion Correctional Institution in

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Aviv, supra note 7.
41. Id.
42. 4 Cummins Unit Inmates Die Due to COVID-19, 4029 NEWS (May 3, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TUF8-74JB] (noting the deaths of four incarcerated people at Cummins);
see also Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 811 (E.D. Ark. 2020) (finding that 856
people (of the 1,950) in Cummins contracted COVID by April 27, 2020).
43. Anna Stitt, COVID-19 Inside Arkansas Prisons: The Death of Derick Coley,
KUAR (June 9, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GBX5-E93Z].
44. John Moritz, Virus Deaths at 39 in State’s Prisons; 11 Inmates Were Eligible for
Parole, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Sept. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HVM6-J5RT].
45. A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/6AK9-RF37], (July 1, 2021, 1:00 PM).
46. Id.
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Ohio, more than 80% of the incarcerated population tested
positive for COVID-19.47 In Wisconsin, nearly 8% of the
incarcerated population—more than 6,700 people—in the state
Department of Corrections contracted COVID-19 by November
2020.48 By June 2021, that number had risen to 10,989 people
(one in two) in Wisconsin’s prisons, a rate four times greater than
the rate in Wisconsin overall.49 In all, the COVID-19 case rate
for incarcerated people reached 5.5 times higher than the national
case rate in the United States by June 2020.50 Incarcerated people
have faced a mortality rate that is 45% higher than the overall
rate.51
In addition to the illness and death that accompanies an
outbreak, conditions in prisons that are experiencing an outbreak
are often abysmal. For example, at Sterling Correctional Facility
in Colorado, outbreaks have been accompanied by extensive
lockdowns, during which incarcerated people are locked down in
their cells without access to showers or the bathroom.52 At times,
these lockdowns last seventy-two hours without access to a
shower and with limited meals.53 Colorado is not alone in
utilizing lockdowns as a tool to manage the pandemic in its
prisons.54 Moreover, in those facilities facing rampant infection
rates, incarcerated people who fall ill are not receiving the care
47. Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of Covid-19, 115 NW. UNIV. L.
REV. 59, 63 (2020) (noting that health experts warned “that the contagion ha[d] begun to
spread to the communities surrounding the prison where guards and other staff live”).
48. Rich Kremer, More Than 8 Percent of State’s Prison Population Currently Infected
with COVID-19, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/VWD4-UDZ9].
49. THE MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 45. For comparison, the infection rate for
the incarcerated population in Arkansas is 5.7 times the rate in Arkansas overall, while the
rate in Ohio’s prisons is 2.1 times the overall rate for the state. Id.
50. Brendan Saloneret et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State
Prisons, JAMA NETWORK (July 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/FK6M-23ZV].
51. Moe Clark, Vaccination Rates in Colorado Prisons Remain Low as COVID-19
Cases Spike Across the State, COLO. NEWSLINE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/Q6PT29Z2].
52. Moe Clark, ‘It Was Just Chaos’: Former Sterling Prison Guard Says COVID
Protocols Were Not Enforced, COLO. NEWSLINE (Nov. 12, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6YCFBW6C].
53. Id.
54. See Nicole B. Godfrey & Laura L. Rovner, COVID-19 in American Prisons:
Solitary Confinement is Not the Solution, 2 ARIZ. ST. L.J. ONLINE 127, 135-36 (2020) (noting
that prison systems are turning to solitary confinement to address the harms posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic).
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necessary to adequately treat COVID-19 and its attendant
comorbidities.55 In short, American prisons have become
cautionary tales in both their lack of preparation and their
response to the pandemic, at a cost of thousands of lives and the
untold suffering of hundreds of thousands of incarcerated people.
This Article posits that American prisons were doomed to be
cautionary tales from the start of the pandemic due to three
interwoven strands of indifference faced by incarcerated people
in this country. First, the sheer enormity of the American carceral
state56 has led to an institutional indifference to the lives of
incarcerated individuals.
American prisons are crowded,
57
unhygienic, and violent. Prison officials focus their energy on
security and control rather than rehabilitation and health.58 While
the past half century has seen a rapid expansion in incarceration,59
prison systems have done little to account for “the many ways in
which incarcerated people face new risks of injury, sickness, and
death behind bars. The deaths, injuries, sickness, and trauma
caused by incarceration” are wholly ignored.60 The COVID-19
pandemic has brought this institutional indifference to the fore
55. Carlos Franco-Paredes et al., Imprisoned on the COVID-19 Death Row, BMJ
BLOGS (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/RA8D-C9GJ] (noting that once incarcerated people
become ill, “they are unable to receive adequate and timely medical care”).
56. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 9 (“There are currently about 3,000 jails and 2,000
prisons in the United States.”).
57. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that “prisons are infamous for
overcrowding”); Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1579, 1580 (2019) (noting the overcrowding inherent to the American prison system);
Amanda Klonsky, An Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction
Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E8QD-5ESL] (explaining that
toilet tanks double as sinks “for hand washing, tooth brushing and other hygiene”).
58. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 6 (warning that “[h]ealth care is not a top priority in
prison” because “health systems in jail and prison are usually designed and controlled by
people who aren’t health experts”); see also id. at 2 (noting that prisons and jails “are
paramilitary settings, where the group that has the health data is usually under the control of
the security service”).
59. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580 (recounting the “familiar” story of the U.S.
incarceration rate: “The United States incarcerates more people than anyone else in the
world, both in absolute terms and per capita. The United States has less than 5% of the
world’s population but 20% of the world’s prison inmates. There are 2.1 million people
behind bars in this country, which is almost one in every 100 adults. Many prisons are
overcrowded, at times unconstitutionally so. Given these facts, it is not surprising that the
phrase ‘mass incarceration’ is routinely used to describe the American approach to crime and
punishment.”).
60. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 3.
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and highlighted the myriad ways prisons as institutions ignore the
plight of the incarcerated.
Second, the muddled Eighth Amendment doctrine applied to
claims challenging prison conditions61 is the result of
overwhelming judicial indifference to the lives of the
incarcerated. This judicial indifference arises in part from the
overwhelming deference the judiciary affords to prison officials62
and in part from a misdirected focus on punishment—and a
concomitant focus on intent—in cases challenging prison
conditions.63 By examining the series of cases in which the
Supreme Court developed the modern Eighth Amendment
doctrine that is applied in prison conditions cases, I demonstrate
that the doctrine developed from an undue judicial concern in
61. Nicole B. Godfrey, Institutional Indifference, 98 OR. L. REV. 151, 153 (2020).
62. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-43.
63. Id. at 137-40. Incarcerated people seeking to enjoin ongoing harms posed by prison
conditions must meet an exacting, two-part test colloquially known as the deliberate
indifference standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). First, the prisoner must
demonstrate that the condition being challenged is “sufficiently serious” in order to satisfy
the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id. at 834. A sufficiently serious
condition is a condition that results in the deprivation of basic human needs, see Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981), like “food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)). Incarcerated people need not
wait for harm to befall them before seeking judicial relief from unsafe prison conditions—
the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment protects against the risk of
future harms. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Second, in order to satisfy the
subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, an incarcerated person must prove that
the person or entity being sued exhibited deliberate indifference to the serious condition
being challenged. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In other words, an incarcerated plaintiff must
prove that the defendant being sued knew of the risk posed by the challenged condition but
disregarded that knowledge by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Id. at
847.
In prior work, I have argued that application of this standard is nearly impossible in cases
seeking injunctive relief. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 153. In particular, I argued that the type
of proof necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference of an entity is unclear, and I
proposed the courts look to certain categories of proof to demonstrate the entity’s knowledge
of the risks posed by a challenged condition. Id. at 186-95. Here, I seek to build upon this
prior work by examining how the federal courts arrived at the deliberate indifference
standard for prison conditions claims. In so examining, I demonstrate that the standard grew
out of an undue focus on the word “punishments” in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and
unusual punishments clause. By focusing too much on the word “punishment,” the Court
ignored the reality that incarceration is the punishment at issue in conditions case. The only
true question before the Court in a conditions case is whether the conditions at issue in a
particular prison are such that incarceration has become an unconstitutional punishment.
See infra Part II.
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protecting prison officials at the expense of incarcerated lives.
The net result of this undue protection of prison officials is that
courts are willing to leave horrific prison conditions undisturbed
so as to avoid prison officials’ liability.64
Finally, the reason that the institutional and judicial
indifferences described above have been allowed to proliferate is
a general societal indifference to the lives of the incarcerated. In
part, this indifference is just a continuation of the societal
indifference to the poor and minorities, traditionally disfavored
groups who are disproportionately entangled in the American
criminal system.65 But societal indifference to the incarcerated
also stems from a general attitude that prison should be harsh
because incarcerated people deserve the cruelty they experience
in American prison systems.66 Compounding these attitudes,
American prison systems are notoriously resistant to
transparency,67 leaving the American public with little idea of
what really goes on behind prison walls.68
64. See infra Part II.
65. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1582 (noting that “high levels of imprisonment
disproportionately affect the poor and minorities” and positing that “criminal justice policies
. . . are created and enforced because they have this effect—imprisonment as a form of social
control of disfavored groups.”); see also James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead:
Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003,
1063 (1997) (hypothesizing that the “warehouse prison” reflects a “paradigm shift” that
“changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his personhood. By
subjecting inmates to coerced and regimented idleness, the warehouse prison signifies that
offenders are unworthy of activities imparting social value and self-esteem.”).
66. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1585 (noting that “[p]rison is harsh, but we have taken
most of the other punishment options (shaming, banishment, corporal) off the table, leaving
the remaining choices as either being inapplicable in many cases (economic sanctions,
restorative measures), too expensive (intensive rehabilitation), or not sufficiently harsh to
satisfy retributive or deterrence goals (community supervision, home confinement,
community service) . . . many believe that the harshness of incarceration is a feature rather
than a flaw—the worse the prison conditions, the greater the incentive for people to avoid
the underlying behavior.”).
67. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that “[t]he resistance to transparency [is the]
product of [both] the paramilitary nature of the setting [and the] role of litigation in
improving jail conditions.”).
68. See generally Shaila Dewan, Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the
Violence of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/23AB-FATR]
(discussing lack of transparency in American prisons); Nicole B. Godfrey, “Inciting a Riot”:
Silent Sentinels, Group Protests, and Prisoners’ Petition and Associational Rights, 43
SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (2020) (discussing the importance of hearing the
voices and stories of those living inside prison walls in discussions of criminal system
reform); Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax:
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This Article proceeds in three parts. First, the Article
describes the institutional indifference inherent to modern
American prison systems and how the modern, bureaucratic
prison state strips incarcerated people of their identities in an
effort to maintain its indifference. Part II provides a historical
overview of the text and purpose of the Eighth Amendment and a
survey of the cases creating the current Eighth Amendment
doctrine as applied to prison conditions. Through this survey,
Part II demonstrates that the current Eighth Amendment doctrine
is the result of an undue focus on the subjective intent of prison
officials rather than the harm experienced by prisoners. This part
concludes that this undue focus arises from long-standing judicial
indifference to incarcerated lives. Finally, Part III examines how
both the institutional and judicial indifferences described in Parts
I and II result from a general societal indifference to the lives of
the incarcerated. This Article concludes with a call for reform of
the American carceral system to overcome the institutional,
judicial, and societal indifference discussed to create a system that
is truly just.
I. INSTITUTIONAL INDIFFERENCE: THE
BUREAUCRATIC PRISON STATE
One of the inherent difficulties in talking about the American
prison system as an institution is that there is not one American
carceral system.69 Rather, each state and the federal government
operate separate systems of incarceration.70 However, there are
some common features that permeate each of these systems, and
it is those common features that create the institutional
indifference that made American prisons ripe for disaster when
the COVID-19 pandemic began.

Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 460-64 (2018) (discussing
the invisibility of prisons as compared to other aspects of the criminal system); Andrea C.
Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal Institutions,
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462-66 (2014) (discussing problems inherent to the lack of
transparency in penal institutions).
69. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 162-63.
70. Id. at 163 (discussing the expansion of the federal and state prison systems in the
late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century).
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First, many prison systems are overcrowded and have been
for decades.71 Even those that are not operating at full or greater
than full capacity, are still crowded, even if not “overly” so.72
According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “41 states are currently
operating at 75% of their capacity, with at least nine of those state
prison systems and the federal Bureau of Prisons are still
operating at more than 100%. Only one state—Maine—has a
current prison population below 50% of their capacity.”73
Importantly, some prison systems have changed the way they
calculate their capacity in recent years.74 Rather than report their
capacity as a measurement of the number of prison beds
anticipated in the original design of a prison, these systems
instead report capacity as a measurement of the number of beds
that “can be squeezed into a facility.”75 But no matter the method
of measurement, one thing is certain: most American prisons
have nowhere near enough space “to allow for adequate social
distancing or medical isolation and quarantine.”76
Second, prison systems operate as paramilitary
bureaucracies where medical care, mental health care, education,
and housing classifications decisions are made in a manner that
fails to account for the incarcerated person as an individual.77 The
prison bureaucratic state allows prison systems to ignore systemic
problems by attributing tragic outcomes either to incarcerated
people themselves or “a few bad apples” among the prison staff.78
In the COVID-19 pandemic, the flaws in this approach are
obvious when one examines the individual stories of the men and
71. Emily Widra, Since You Asked: Just How Overcrowded Were Prisons before the
Pandemic, and at This Time of Social Distancing, How Overcrowded Are They Now?,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/MQW5-2FDW] (noting that
nine states’ and the federal government’s prison systems “were operating at 100% capacity
or more” before the pandemic).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (2015).
75. Id.
76. Widra, supra note 71.
77. See, e.g., VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20 (noting how the “paramilitary nature of
health care in jails and prisons” leads prison officials to “do [their] best to link the death [of
an incarcerated person] to a personal failing by the deceased patient or chalk it up to a few
bad apples when staff abuse or neglect is clearly implicated”); see also infra Section I.B.
78. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 20.
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women who have died in prison after being infected with the
coronavirus.79
Finally, prison systems operate to strip incarcerated people
from any sense of individualized identity by creating routinized
patterns of daily life.80 Endemic to this routinized system is a
tribalism that further solidifies the only identities that matter as
prison officials on the one hand and incarcerated people on the
other.81 This tribalism leads to an institutionalized unwillingness
to identify and reform systemic failures in order to protect the
health and safety of individual people who are incarcerated.82
The following three sections discuss each of these three
common features of American prisons and how those features
help create the institutionalized indifference inherent to systems
of incarceration in this country. Part I.A. discusses how America
grew to become the world leader in incarceration, locking up
more of its citizens than any other nation in the world. Part I.B.
then examines the bureaucratic prison state and how prison
bureaucracy normalizes indifference to serious harms suffered by
the incarcerated population. Finally, Part I.C. analyzes how the
purposeful stripping of identity that occurs in American prisons
perpetuates the institutional indifference to individual lives.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41 (discussing the death of Mr. Coley at
Cummins Unit); Mahita Gajanan, Federal Inmate Dies of Coronavirus After Giving Birth
While on Ventilator, TIME (Apr. 29, 2020), [https://perma.cc/E2UG-DR88] (describing the
plight of Andrea Circle Bear who died at a federal medical center in Fort Worth, Texas after
contracting the coronavirus); Jack Rodgers, Texas Geriatric Prison Ravaged by Virus
Dodges Injunction, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R746TG3Y] (recounting how nineteen incarcerated people died in 116 days in the Pack Unit in
Texas, including Alvin Norris, who died before prison officials “took any proactive measures
to suppress Covid-19 infections”); Lance Benzel, Before Dying of COVID-19, Sterling
Prison Inmate Deprived of Care, Former Resident Says, THE GAZETTE (May 23, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/7RRV-KTC8] (describing how eighty-six-year-old David Grosse had only
other incarcerated people to care for him in his final days in the prison’s ward for military
veterans and explaining that prison officials “declined to bring him to the clinic” because he
did not have a fever, despite that he was soiling himself and not eating).
80. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman, eds., 1995) (describing modern prisons as places of
“deadening routine punctuated by bursts of fear and violence” and places of “a relentlessly
unchanging, grimly gray routine”).
81. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10 (describing tribalism as a universal feature of
jails where correctional officers and inmates look out for their own).
82. See id. (describing prison tribalism as creating a system wherein allegiance to a
particular group supersedes the greater good, particularly in times of conflict or friction).
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A. Incarceration Nation

The United States first began to turn to incarceration as its
primary system of punishment in the decades following the
American Revolutionary War.83 This new mode of punishment
derived from a sense that society must separate its deviants in
order to root out the causes of crime, and most states opened at
least one penitentiary in the decades leading up to the Civil War.84
After the Civil War, states sought to design prisons that could
maximize the number of people confined while saving money on
administration.85 The results of this focus on maximizing prison
beds at the lowest possible monetary cost remains visible in
American prison systems today.
By the 1930s, most states and the federal government
operated prisons known colloquially as the “Big Houses” because
of the sheer number of men confined inside the prison gates.86
But within a few decades, those Big Houses proved insufficient
to house the country’s exploding prison population.87 Between
1970 and 1980, the prison population doubled; between 1981 and
1995, it doubled again.88 And the population growth continued,
creating the “story [that] is now sadly familiar. The United States
incarcerates more people than anyone else in the world, both in
absolute terms and per capita.”89 This population growth led to
severe overcrowding, leading prison officials to begin placing
two or three people into prison cells built for just one person.90
While recent years have begun to see a slight decrease in the

83. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 160-61.
84. See id.
85. Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY,
supra note 80, at 170 (explaining that states constructing new penitentiaries were driven “by
how to confine the largest number of [people] at the lowest possible cost”).
86. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 163 n.61 (citing Rotman, supra note 85, at 185) (“Big
Houses were prisons that held, on average, 2,500 men, prisons such as San Quentin in
California, Sing Sing in New York, Stateville in Illinois, and Jackson in Michigan.”).
87. Morris, supra note 80, at 236 (noting the crisis of overcrowding that followed the
population growth in American prisons).
88. Id.
89. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1580.
90. Morris, supra note 80, at 237.
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prison population,91 many prison systems remain operating at or
near capacity, as discussed above.92
The harms associated with the crowded living conditions of
modern prisons are well-known.93 Crowded conditions lead to
increased violence, and prison studies confirm that prison
overcrowding can lead to detrimental impacts for particularly
vulnerable incarcerated populations (“e.g., those in bad health or
having severe psychiatric disorders, older people”).94 Crowded
prisons also have problems providing adequate medical care to
people behind bars.95 Prison crowding limits the programming
and educational opportunities available to incarcerated people,96
and it reduces the availability of visitation for people confined
behind prison walls.97 The decrease in programming and
education often occurs despite engorged budgets allegedly
responsive to the larger prison population.98
91. Leipold, supra note 57, at 1581, 1620 (cataloguing reform efforts undertaken by
the state and federal governments and the concomitant decrease in prison population and
crime rate). While overall incarceration has begun to decrease, “[i]ncarceration of women
has increased dramatically in recent decades, growing at twice the pace of men’s
incarceration.” Andrea James, Ending the Incarceration of Women and Girls, 128 YALE L.J.
F. 772, 775 (2019). Many of the harms associated with this increase in incarceration fall
disproportionately on Black women and children. Id. at 775-77.
92. Widra, supra note 71.
93. Id.
94. See id.; see also Stéphanie Baggi, et al., Do Overcrowding and Turnover Cause
Violence in Prisons?, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY (Jan. 24, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NWX44BSX].
95. Widra, supra note 71; see also Amy Miller, Overcrowding in Nebraska’s Prisons
is Causing a Medical and Mental Health Care Crisis, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 16,
2017), [https://perma.cc/T93Z-UGLV] (recounting “inexplicable failures of the most basic
medical care,” including “a man with epilepsy who has landed in the hospital several times
because he didn’t receive seizure medication” and a rape victim who reported her rape upon
entering prison, was given a routine physical exam, but “staff somehow missed the fact she
was pregnant until she unexpectedly went into labor”).
96. Widra, supra note 71; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-743,
BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES,
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 19-20 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-743] (recounting the
decrease in programming and educational opportunities, “resulting in waiting lists and
inmate idleness,” caused by federal prison population growth).
97. GAO-12-743, supra note 96, at 21 (explaining that Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
facilities have “visiting space to accommodate the number of inmates that the facility was
designed to house and a visitor capacity to enable staff to manage the visitation process. The
infrastructure of the facility may not support the increase in visitors as a result of the growth
of the prison population.”).
98. See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System,
128 YALE L.J. F. 791, 793 (2019) (explaining that the “federal prison population increased
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Thus, prison officials knew of the harms associated with the
sheer number and close proximity of people living in carceral
facilities well before the pandemic. In fact, public health officials
have known for decades that prisons made for easy “breeding
grounds for all sorts of communicable diseases.”99 Despite this
knowledge, prison systems proved ill-equipped to handle the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incarcerated
population. In September 2020, incarcerated people were
experiencing an infection rate four times higher than the general
population and a death rate twice as high.100 The import of these
statistics, particularly on marginalized communities, can be
slightly misleading, however, because they fail to account for
three important facts: first, Black Americans are twice as likely
to die from COVID-19.101 Second, Black Americans are
“incarcerated . . . 5.1 times [more often than] white
Americans.”102 Finally, “incarcerated individuals are much
younger, [and] more likely to be male” than non-incarcerated
individuals.103
In sum, there can be no doubt that American prisons are
“COVID-19 hotspots”104 and that the pandemic has been
devastating to the incarcerated population, particularly Black
incarcerated men.105 Stuck inside overcrowded facilities, these
people had no control over whether and when they might be
exposed to the virus. Their safety remained in the hands of their
captors, prison officials who work within the prison bureaucratic
from 24,640 in 1980 to 185,617 in 2017” and that even though the budget “has grown,
‘crowding out’ other Department of Justice (DOJ) priorities, the federal prison system has
still largely failed to implement evidence-based rehabilitation programs”).
99. Widra, supra note 71; see also James Hamblin, Mass Incarceration is Making
Infectious Diseases Worse, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/7AL6-DKQ9]
(noting the prevalence of infectious diseases among the incarcerated population—“4 percent
have HIV, 15 percent have hepatitis C, and 3 percent have active tuberculosis”—and pointing
to the carceral system as “a primary reason that these diseases can’t be eliminated globally”).
100. Widra, supra note 71; see also Kevin T. Schnepel, Covid-19 in U.S. State and
Federal Prisons, NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., 3 (Dec. 2020),
[https://perma.cc/F4UM-QDH2].
101. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 18.
102. See Nicole Puglise, Black Americans Incarcerated Five Times More Than White
People-Report, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2016), [https://perma.cc/3BAP-A9S5].
103. Schnepel, supra note 100, at 7.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 18, 20.
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state that developed in response to the exploding prison
population in the latter half of the twentieth century.106 The
impact that prison bureaucracy has on the lives of incarcerated
people is the focus of the next section.
B. The Prison Bureaucracy
As the incarcerated population grew, so too did the need for
people to run the prisons.107 This prison population explosion
also transformed prison systems into modern bureaucracies,
replete with overarching “rules and regulations that bind the
organization[s] together.”108 Many viewed this move toward
bureaucratization of the carceral state as a good thing, and it is
hard to argue that prisons should operate without written rules and
regulations.109 However, the structures of bureaucracy can also
allow individual officials to skirt responsibility when things run
amok, thereby allowing harms to individuals subject to the
bureaucratic state to go unchecked.110
Before turning to these dangers of bureaucracy, however, it
is first important to have a basic understanding of features of
bureaucracies in general and prison bureaucracies in particular.
Malcom M. Feeley and Van Swearingen have succinctly

106. See Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE
L. REV. 433, 456 (2004) (discussing the growth of the number of prisons and guards in the
final three decades of the twentieth century).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 456-57. Civil rights litigation focused on protecting the rights of the
incarcerated also contributed to the creation of the modern, bureaucratic, penal
administrative state. Id. at 455 (explaining that different prison reform efforts “were part of
a process designed to drag pre- and under-bureaucratic (and at times, feudal) criminal justice
institutions into the modern administrative world”). See also Godfrey, supra note 61, at 16465 (discussing the beginning of the modern prisoners’ rights litigation movement).
109. Feely & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 455 (quoting James B. Jacobs, The
Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-1980, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 458
(Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1980)) (noting that prison systems in the 1960s and 1970s had
“no written rules and regulations” but instead used “daily operating procedures . . . passed
[on] from one generation to the next,” resulting in an “ability of the administration to act as
it pleased,” ensuring “its almost total dominance of the mates”).
110. See Dan Luban, et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2348, 2352 (1992) (discussing the reoccurring epistemological excuse of “I didn’t
know” that comes naturally “to those who commit wrongs in a bureaucratic setting”).
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described Max Weber’s summary of the key elements of
bureaucracy:
Compared to other forms of organization . . . modern
bureaucracy is defined by a rationalized set of rules and
regulations that bind the organization together. Every office
is arranged in a clear hierarchy of superordination and
subordination, with employees subject to a rigid and
systematic set of policies designed to maintain control and
discipline when necessary. Offices within the bureaucracy
are characterized by their fixed and definite division of
organizational responsibility, and are staffed by highly
trained officials who are appointed by merit, have set salaries
and pensions, secure careers, and duties that are clearly
separated from their private life.111

Feeley and Swearingen also aptly summarize Victor
Thompson’s application of Weber’s ideas to the American
administrative state and identify several additional characteristics
of the modern American bureaucracy.112
In total, this discussion will focus on five characteristics of
bureaucracies identified by Weber and Thompson and applicable
to the modern American carceral state. First, the American
carceral state has a clearly defined organizational structure with
clear divisions of power and responsibility.113 Every state prison
system and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have a hierarchy of
prison administration.114 At the top of the prison hierarchy is the
director of the prison system, a position usually appointed by the

111. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456 (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT
GESELLSCHAFT 650-78, 957, 973 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim
Fischoff et al. trans., 1968)).
112. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 456-57 (citing VICTOR A. THOMPSON,
MODERN ORGANIZATION 10-24 (1961)). Four of those additional characteristics are
relevant to this discussion: (1) routinization of organizational activity, (2) classification of
persons, (3) slowness to act or to change, and (4) “preoccupation with the monistic ideal—
the system of superior and subordinate relationships in which the superior is the only source
of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.” Id. at 457. The other American characteristics
of bureaucracy identified by Thompson are factoring the general goal into subgoals,
formalistic impersonality, and categorization of data. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Morris, supra note 80, at 226.
UND
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governor or, in the case of the federal system, by the President.115
The organizational structure that each system director commands
varies slightly depending on the size and responsibility of each
particular system.116 For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
is organized into separate divisions focused on subject matter as
well as separate geographical regions meant to provide oversight
and support to the prisons within that region.117 Most state
systems, in contrast, are organized into divisions based on
specific subject matter.118
Below this broad administrative structure sitting atop the
prison system as a whole are the people responsible for running
particular prisons, usually known as wardens.119 Wardens are
responsible for the staff members who actually work in the
prisons: the administrative, custodial, and programming staff.120
The vast majority of prison officials are custodial, or security,
staff, but the division between those responsible for security and
those responsible for programming or administration is largely
farcical.121 Indeed, the most important divisions within the prison
115. Morris, supra note 80, at 226; see also Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (discussing
the federal prison system’s transition from no central organizing body to a civil service
system).
116. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457-58.
117. See Organizational Structure, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, [https://perma.cc/565P8PMR] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
118. See, e.g., Organization Chart, ALA. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/9LVT67VB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Attachment L: State Organization Charts, STATE OF
ALASKA-DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/B7K4-JVWZ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021);
Rehabilitation & Reentry, ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORRS., [https://perma.cc/6FM2-DATL] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021); Division of Correction Organizational Chart, ARK. DEP’T OF
CORRS., [https://perma.cc/5NUR-DBBQ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); Organizational
Chart, COLO. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Feb. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/6XEQ-6XJC].
119. Morris, supra note 80, at 226.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 226-27; see also Eric Katz, Federal Prison Employees Fear Staff Shortages
and Mass Reassignments as COVID-19 Cases Spike, GOV’T EXEC. (Dec. 1, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/TK23-M9Y2] (noting the federal prison system’s practice of
augmentation, whereby non-custodial staff are “augment[ed]” to perform duties of security
staff and justifying such practice by pointing to the fact that “all staff are trained as
correctional officers”). Prison officials have an overwhelming us vs. them mentality,
wherein it remains of utmost importance that they remain separate from “the criminal
element they supervise.” See Anthony Gangi, Yes, Corrections Officers Are Law
Enforcement Officers, CORRECTIONS1 (Sept. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/FD4J-WLKU]
(explaining that in the correctional officers’ view, the lack of acceptance by the broader law
enforcement community functions as a separation “from their brothers/sisters in blue [that]
brings them closer to the offenders in their charge”).
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itself are those created by the prison’s top-down, hierarchical
structure that is modeled off of paramilitary organizations.122
Accompanying this structure is an understanding that a
subordinate staff person’s only legitimate source of direction
must come from his, her, or their superior.123 This can create
confusion in prison systems, however, when administrative
supervisors—e.g., those responsible for running the medical or
mental health programs—issue orders to security staff related to
an individual’s treatment.124 This type of confusion can also
contribute to the tendency to pass the blame when something goes
wrong for a particular incarcerated individual in a prison facility,
discussed in more detail below.125
The second and third characteristics of bureaucratic systems
that can be seen in the American carceral state are interrelated.
Second, the American carceral state is theoretically bound by a
set of rules and regulations.126 Third, these rules and regulation
are, in theory, used to routinize organizational activity.127 The
reason I use the terms “theoretically” and “in theory” to describe
these two characteristics are important. While it is true that
almost every corrections system in the country has a codified
system of rules meant to govern the operation of the system, many
systems have found ways to “circumvent” the rules and their
processes by implementing specific practices at their facilities
that are unique to the specific security and programming concerns
of a particular facility.128 What this means, practically speaking,
is that while prison systems can often enact rules and regulations
that, on their face, are meant to protect the health and safety of
individuals who are incarcerated, those rules may not always be
122. Marvin Preston, What is “Paramilitary”?, CORRECTIONS.COM (Apr. 26, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/KA68-AA7Z] (describing the established ranking system in most prison
systems as including line staff (corrections officers), supervisors (corporals and sergeants),
and managers (lieutenants, captains, and majors)).
123. See id. (explaining one corrections officer’s experience in the necessity of
following orders); see also Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457 (stating prisons
utilize a hierarchal structure to assign clear duties to subordinates within the organization).
124. Preston, supra note 122 (noting that “Line Staff” can be confused about the
necessity of following orders from non-security staff).
125. See VENTERS, supra note 4, at 10.
126. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 459.
127. Id. at 464.
128. Id. at 460.
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fully followed at the institutional level. This problem can be
compounded by the fluid nature of who is occupying leadership
positions at any given time. Because the commissioners or
directors of prison systems are appointed positions, whomever is
filing those positions is necessarily influenced by the political
whim of the current executive.129 This means that a reformminded leader may struggle to find buy-in from lower-level staff
when implementing any changes to the system, or, conversely, a
reform-minded lower-level staff may not be able to implement
reforms without buy-in from the current prison administration.130
Fourth, the American carceral state relies upon the
classification of incarcerated individuals.131 The federal prison
system became the first prison system to create a classification
system for incarcerated people.132 Classification systems allow
prisons to assign people “to specific institutions, units, and cells
according to their propensity for violence, length of sentence,
criminal history, and the like.”133 While in some instances
classification may afford more protection to incarcerated
individuals,134 it has also led to the creation of so-called “prison[s]
of last resort,” where so-called intractable people can be sent
when the prison system cannot find another place for them.135
129. Morris, supra note 80, at 227 (describing the problem inherent to the “lack of
continuity in leadership” at the director level).
130. See, e.g., Michelle Theriault Boots, ‘It was Working’: The Rise (and Fall) of an
Alaska Prison Reformer, THE CRIME REP. (Mar. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6V42-KJFS]
(detailing the experience of a prison superintendent in Alaska who had backing to try an
experimental re-entry unit from one prior commissioner only to have that backing dropped
upon entry of the new commissioner).
131. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 463.
132. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (noting that the first director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons implemented “a number of important improvements,” including developing a
system that “made classification far more systematic in federal [than] in state facilities”).
133. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 464.
134. Id.
135. Rotman, supra note 85, at 167 (describing the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ first
last-resort prison, Alcatraz).
In 1934, Alcatraz was awarded this distinction. Its purpose was to isolate the
criminal of the “vicious and irredeemable type,” those with no hope of
rehabilitation. Prisoners for Alcatraz were selected from other federal prisons
and were transferred back to other prisons before their release. Alcatraz
inmates had virtually no privileges and little contact with the outside world.
To prevent secret messages, officials never allowed prisoners to receive
original copies of their mail, only transcribed ones. In the early years,

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:43 PM

386

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

While these so-called supermax prisons were meant to reduce
violence in prison systems,136 recent studies have demonstrated
that these facilities did not reduce misconduct or violence.137 This
means that tens of thousands of individuals have languished in
conditions of solitary confinement with little penological
justification simply as a result of prison systems’ classification
schemes.138 These classification schemes also prevented swaths
of incarcerated people from securing release during the pandemic
because prison systems classified them as high risk.139
Fifth, the American carceral state is slow to reform.140
Whether through litigation or legislation, reforms to carceral
systems are usually incremental, contentious, and remain
ongoing.141 That means that when faced with a new threat like
conversation among inmates was prohibited except when indispensable. To
compensate for these restrictions, Alcatraz had a fairly extensive library with
many classics, and its food was above the average. Although the rest of the
federal system was overcrowded, Alcatraz maintained its original purpose as
a jail for the worst of the worst, a purpose that resulted in a surplus of beds.
During the thirty years Alcatraz was in use, it housed a total of only 1,557
prisoners, with the highest average of daily prisoners occurring in 1937 at 302.
Because of deterioration of the physical plant, Alcatraz was closed in 1963 and
was replaced by the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois.
Id. at 167-68. In the early 1990s, the ADX in Florence, Colorado, replaced Marion as the
BOP’s prison of last resort. See Raymond Luc Levasseur, Trouble Coming Every Day:
ADX—The First Year 1996, in THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS: (NEO)SLAVE NARRATIVES AND
CONTEMPORARY PRISON WRITINGS 47, 50 (Joy James, ed., 2005) (describing the
construction of ADX, slated to replace Marion); see also Robertson, supra note 65, at 1023
n.92 (1997) (describing ADX as “a ‘high tech’ concrete dungeon [that] houses inmates in
cells that prevent them from having eye contact with other inmates”).
136. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1341-42 (2003).
137. Benjamin Steiner & Callie M. Cain, The Relationship Between Inmate
Misconduct, Institutional Violence, and Administrative Segregation: A Systematic Review of
the Evidence, in RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 165, 179 (2016).
138. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 130-33 (cataloguing the harms of solitary
confinement); see also Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary
Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 747-49 (2015)
(discussing the overuse of solitary confinement in American prisons).
139. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May
27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5RJE-LK9P] (explaining that government release orders
prioritized “low-level offenders,” among others, and excluded many who “could be released
without risk to public safety”).
140. Feeley & Swearingen, supra note 106, at 457.
141. Id. at 465; see also Michelle Chen, The Growing Fight Against Solitary
Confinement, THE PROGRESSIVE (Jan. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9ZPK-ABPJ]
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the COVID-19 pandemic, prison systems are slow to find ways to
respond in a way that will save lives.142
Overall, these five characteristics of the bureaucracies of the
American carceral state all too often cause individualized harms
to the people subject to the whims of those bureaucracies—
incarcerated people—that are not readily attributable to any
individual prison officials.143 In other words, the bureaucratic
system itself allows for the “compartmentalization, mutual buckpassing, and deniability” necessary to allow people operating
within bureaucracies to stand idly by as real, concrete, serious
harms befall other human beings.144 These harms can result from
officials’ mechanical adherence to duty, process, or policy
without regard for “what the fulfillment of his or her duty might
entail.”145 In other words, the characteristics of bureaucracy
inherent to American prison systems—the clearly defined
organizational structure with specific divisions of power and
responsibility and specific rules and regulations that govern that
power and responsibility—result in situations where individual
bureaucrats feel bound to follow rigid structures and policies
rather than respond to individualized problems or harms that
present themselves.146 Thus, the harms that befall people who are
incarcerated are not always, or even usually, attributable to rogue
prison officials but rather to the failures of the system itself.

(cataloguing the long fight in several states to curb the use of solitary confinement in the
prison system).
142. Covid-19 Prisoner Releases Too Few, Too Slow, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 27,
2020), [https://perma.cc/5YYE-45WU] (criticizing prison systems worldwide for delaying
releases, thereby “contributing to preventable suffering and death”).
143. See Luban, et al., supra note 110, at 2355 (attributing lack of individual
accountability for organizational harms to the “fragmentation of knowledge and
responsibility” that occurs in bureaucratic organizations).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2354. The paradigmatic example of the horror that can follow rigid
adherence to bureaucratic duty is, of course, Nazism: “perhaps the single most salient
characteristic of the Nazi crimes was their bureaucratic nature. They were committed, not
by a lawless gang of criminals, but by a regularly functioning state bureaucracy executing
official policies.” Id.
146. Cf. id. at 2359 (“The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic
pattern of organizations that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmaking is
common to large institutions throughout contemporary society.”).
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Take, for example, the death of Mr. Coley in the Cummins
Unit in Arkansas discussed above.147 A series of systemic
failures, not wholly attributable to the actions of individual prison
officials, worked together to cause his death: the failure of the
system to set up protocols to protect incarcerated people from the
virus’s spread, the failure of the system to find ways to treat rather
than isolate people who contracted the virus, and the failure of
any number of line staff to check-on Mr. Coley in his isolation
cell.148 These types of systemic failures are what I call
institutional indifference: the ways in which the prison
bureaucracy allows individual prison officials to claim ignorance
of the plight of individual incarcerated people by hiding behind
bureaucratic norms.149
This institutional indifference is compounded by the prison
system’s prioritization of “control and security over humanity.”150
The precedence of security over all else is evident in any number
of common, modern prison practices, including the prevalence of
supermax prisons,151 the intrusive and frequent nature of body
cavity searches,152 the ban on unions of incarcerated workers,153
and the wide-ranging book, speech, and communications bans
that deprive incarcerated people of participation in political
discourse and the marketplace of ideas.154 Because most prison
147. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
148. See supra notes 13-31, 36-41 and accompanying text.
149. Professor Luban and his co-authors call the ability of individual bureaucratic
officials to claim they did not know about the harms occurring around them the
“epistemological excuse.” Luban et al., supra note 110, at 2352. They “argue (1) that
bureaucracies function (often by design) to permit their functionaries to truthfully plead the
excuse ‘I didn’t know!’; (2) that traditional accounts of moral responsibility typically
recognize this epistemological excuse; and (3) that it is therefore very difficult to find a
workable account of moral responsibility within bureaucratic institutions.” Id.
150. Angel E. Sanchez, In Spite of Prison, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1650, 1673 (2019)
(noting that moderate efforts to reform prisons will always fall short because they do not
address the “structural and cultural transformation[s]” required to support change).
151. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 65, at 1017 n.92.
152. See, e.g., Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a
Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU 857, 910 (1992) (doubting the veracity that visual body
cavity searches are only for security and “not also to purposefully demoralize and humiliate
the inmate”).
153. See Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1132-35 (describing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Lab.
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977)).
154. See generally Evan Bianchi & David Shapiro, Locked Up, Shut Up: Why Speech
in Prison Matters, 92 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 3 (2018) (describing the implications of limiting
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policies are developed in secret,155 are justified by vague
references to maintaining a prison’s “social order” when
exposed,156 and are largely free from judicial review,157 “prison
officials inevitably err on the side of too little freedom.”158
In sum, the institution’s prioritization of security over
humanity solidifies the authoritarian nature of the modern
American carceral bureaucracy.159 When prison systems limit
both the speech that may leave a facility and the speech that may
enter a facility, they are both monopolizing the sources of public
information about prisons160 and limiting the sources of
information and knowledge for the people inside.161 The net
effect of these types of restrictions is to create a system of forced
idleness in that prison becomes not only a place that physically
separates incarcerated people from the outside world but also
removes them from broader societal conversations.162 This latter
the speech of incarcerated people in light of the most common rationales that justify free
speech—the marketplace of ideas, democracy legitimation, the checking power of free
speech, and self-fulfillment). The net effect of prison censorship policies “is that in the
aggregate, people who are richer, whiter, and not incarcerated, will enjoy greater access to
the marketplace of ideas than others.” Id. at 20; see also James Tager, Literature Locked
Up: How Prison Book Restriction Policies Constitute the Nation’s Largest Book Ban, PEN
AM. 2, 3-4 (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/D2WL-BW4U].
155. Tager, supra note 154, at 1 (noting the lack of “public visibility into how [prison
censorship] policies are considered, adopted, and implemented”).
156. Id. at 5.
157. See infra Section II.B. (discussing judicial deference to prison officials). The
“central evil” of this lack of judicial review is the unchecked “administrative discretion
granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal directly with prisoners.” Gutterman, supra
note 152, at 900.
158. Tager, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. 119 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
159. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 441, 458 (1999) (noting that prisons, by their very nature, are the
“places where serious abuses of power and violations of rights are likely to occur”).
160. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 22 (“Without prisoners’ speech, public
information about prisons would come primarily from prison officials themselves. Speech
in prisons is especially fragile because limited checks on officials’ behavior increase[s] the
risk of retaliation.”); see also infra Section III.B.
161. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1673 (noting the importance of education
to incarcerated people and the view of prison staff that education interferes with their “job”).
To Sanchez, “college education is to the imprisoned what learning to read and write was to
the enslaved—it is central to the abolition movement.” Id.
162. See Robertson, supra note 65, at 1063 (noting the “paradigm shift” in American
punishment that “changed the target of punishment from the body of the offender to his
personhood”).
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removal signals to incarcerated people that they “are unworthy of
activities imparting social value and self-esteem,”163 and leads to
the last feature of institutional indifference I want to discuss: the
systematic deprivation of identity inherent to the American
carceral state.
C. Stripping Incarcerated People of Identity
By separating people from society in self-contained minisocieties (a.k.a., prisons), the United States has already created a
whole new class of other (a.k.a., the incarcerated). In so doing,
American society has added an identity label onto the people it
locks up, but the more insidious impact of this identity label is
that it is meant to supersede all other identity labels a person may
hold.164 It is also meant to be a stigmatic identity,165 an identity
that makes the dehumanizing features of the prison seem justified
to those responsible for maintaining the system of
incarceration.166 In the early days of the American penitentiary
system, this identity was intricately interrelated with the legal
concept of “civil death—the legal and ritual processes that
produced the figure of the prisoner as the living dead.”167
[C]ivil death reduced the criminal citizen to the condition of
an abject “other,” the negative image of the citizen-subject.
The citizen was free; the prisoner was bound and contained.
The citizen was a transcendent spirit or a reasoning mind; the
prisoner was an offensive body vulnerable to violence and
deprivation. The citizen belonged to the human community;
the prisoner was a monstrous exile, beyond the pale of
humanity, without a claim to legal personhood. Divested of
rights and exiled from the body politic, he was unprotected,
163. Id.
164. James, supra note 91, at 774 (explaining how the “criminal legal system threatens
even one’s identity as a mother”).
165. Robertson, supra note 65, at 1033 (noting that the “coerced and regimented
idleness” of the warehouse prison becomes a “‘stigma symbol,’ a sign that represents the
debased identity of the inmate population”).
166. See, e.g., PATRICK ELLIOT ALEXANDER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO SUPERMAX:
MASS INCARCERATION, PRISONER ABUSE, AND THE NEW NEO-SLAVE NOVEL 112 (2018)
(describing Mumia Abu-Jamal’s description of the U.S. supermax prototype as
“dehumanization by design”); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 29 (“Dehumanization, then, is
no excess or exception; it is the very premise of the American prison.”).
167. Smith, supra note 5, at 39.
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infinitely vulnerable and pliable. He could be whipped or
gagged, confined to solitude, deprived of food, or subjected
to whatever other torments prison officials deemed
necessary either to his correction or to the orderly
functioning of the institution . . . . Civil death justified a
virtually unlimited exploitation and discretionary violence
against the living entombed.168

And while the notion of civil death of the incarcerated has
largely been abandoned as courts began to recognize that
imprisoned people retained some rights,169 the general attitude
underlying the concept continues to pervade the institutional
culture and practices of many American prison systems.170
Thus, while the theoretical rights of the incarcerated
expanded in the final decades of the twentieth century, the
perception of the incarcerated held by institutional actors remains
largely the same—incarcerated individuals are a mere number
amidst the thousands of numbers subjected to the social control
of the state.171 But what gets lost in the institutional bureaucracy
of the prison is the individual and his, her, or their stories and
voice.172
168. Id. at 39-40.
169. See, e.g., Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 3 (“[A]s Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote: ‘When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his human
quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not cease to feed on a
free and open interchange of opinions . . . .’”) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
170. See, e.g., Laura Rovner, “Everything is at Stake if Norway is Sentenced. In that
Case, We Have Failed”: Solitary Confinement and the “Hard” Cases in the United States
and Norway, 1 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 77, 85 (2017) (noting that the practice of solitary
confinement “violates the sacredness of the human person”); Philip Fornaci et al., Criminal
Justice in the Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 62 HOW. L.J. 125, 139 (2018) (commenting
on how the prison system “necessarily and irrevocably leads to the deprivation of the
humanity of prisoners, guards, and the community”).
171. See Morris, supra note 80, at 227-28 (describing how he created the “diary of
prisoner #12345” detailing “one day and one night in the life of a typical prisoner in a typical
prison adjacent to a typical industrial city”).
172. Cf. Sanchez, supra note 150, at 1654 (discussing the need for scholars to account
for the personal stories, narratives, and perspectives of people impacted by prison in order to
“shed light on the inhumanity that goes on inside of prison, the social problems that lead to
prison, and the humanity of those impacted by prison”); see also Gutterman, supra note 152,
at 906 (“Today, as at the beginning, the most serious social consequence of the prison system
is the disintegration of the human personality of those committed to its confines.”); Colin
Kaepernick, The Demand for Abolition, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/HDX86TB9] (“The young men there [on Rikers Island] explained the dehumanizing conditions in
the prison that range from denial of literature to physical assault. They have been
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***
The exploding prison population of the last half-century has
led to the creation of a bureaucratic carceral state that sacrifices
the identities of the individuals incarcerated for purported
institutional security and order.173 By prioritizing institutional
order over individual welfare, the modern prison bureaucracy
operates in a state of institutional indifference to the lives of the
people held captive behind prison walls.174 In times of emergency
or uncertainty, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this indifference
inevitably leads to individual harms that are above and beyond
the anticipated harms attendant to incarceration.175 For people
like Mr. Coley in Arkansas, who could not seem to fight through
the bureaucratic maze of the Arkansas Department of Corrections
to obtain adequate protection and medical care, such institutional
indifference leads to the ultimate harm: loss of life. It is for those
harms that one might think the judiciary should stand at the ready
to halt and correct, but for reasons discussed in the next section,
the legal doctrines protecting the incarcerated ignore those harms
to protect the institutionalized indifference of prison officials.
II. JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE: JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE AND THE PROHIBITION ON CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
Despite the lack of care afforded Mr. Coley and others like
him confined to the Cummins Unit in Arkansas, a lawsuit filed by
the Arkansas American Civil Liberties Union, Disability Rights
Arkansas, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
has been thus far minimally successful.176 In requesting
criminalized and caged, in most cases, for being redlined into economic despair. Forever
emblazoned in my memory are the words of one of the young Black men: ‘You love us
when no one else does.’ The young brother was seeking love. He was seeking care. He was
seeking a space that valued his life.”).
173. See supra Part I.
174. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Minta, supra note 5.
176. Aviv, supra note 7 (noting that the lawsuit argued “that the Arkansas prison
system had displayed deliberate indifference to prisoners’ welfare”). While the United States
District Court for the District of Arkansas denied the plaintiff class’s request for emergency
preliminary relief, the court later denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, so the case
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preliminary injunctive relief, advocates pointed to the following
facts, among others, to request that “the prison system
immediately take more precautions, including releasing some
people to home confinement”:
Cummins has had the tenth-largest coronavirus outbreak in
the nation—nine hundred and fifty-six people, including
sixty-five staff members, have tested positive—but the
Division of Correction has made only minimal steps to
contain it. The [incarcerated people] aren’t given access to
alcohol-based hand sanitizer, even though the medical
director of infectious diseases for the state’s Department of
Health has advocated for its use. “Maybe science will take
precedence now in current situation,” he wrote, in an e-mail
to the secretary of the department. Men are still sleeping in
open barracks, less than three feet apart.177

In response to the advocates’ request, the Arkansas attorney
general “argued that the risks to prisoners were not ‘so great that
they violate standards of decency,’ nor were they ‘ones that
today’s society does not tolerate.’”178 United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas Judge Kristine Baker agreed,
denying the request for emergency relief and cautioning that
“federal courts should ‘approach intrusion into the core activities
of the state’s prison system with caution.’”179 Such a result is not
surprising when viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence governing the constitutionality of
prison conditions and federal courts’ general policy of deference
to prison officials.
The text of the Eighth Amendment is a mere sixteen words:
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

remains ongoing. See, e.g., Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL1236990, at
*18 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part the state defendants’
motion to dismiss); Frazier v. Graves, 4:20-cv-00434-KGB, 2021 WL4502150, at *15 (E.D.
Ark. Sept. 30, 2021) (granting in part and denying in part private medical provider’s motion
to dismiss).
177. Id. (“A spokesperson for the Department of Corrections told [the reporter] in an
e-mail that if [prisoners] in every other bed follow new instructions to sleep with their feet
in the spot typically occupied by their heads, their faces will be ‘separated by 6 feet from the
next [prisoner’s] pillow.’”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”180 The
Eighth Amendment doctrine governing claims challenging prison
conditions derives from the last six words of the Amendment: the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.181 While federal courts
declined to entertain constitutional claims challenging prison
conditions for more than a century after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights,182 the Supreme Court articulated and developed the
modern doctrine in a series of cases beginning in 1976 and ending
in 1994.183 Since then, lower courts have struggled to uniformly
apply the doctrine, and scholars have almost unanimously
criticized it as illogical, inconsistent, and unjust.184 As I explain
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
181. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (explaining that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause both places restraints and imposes duties on prison officials).
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, drawn nearly verbatim from Article Ten of the
English Bill of Rights, “became part of the American Bill of Rights in 1791.” COLIN DAYAN,
THE STORY OF CRUEL & UNUSUAL 6 (2007). While scholars debate the intention of the
English parliamentarians in drafting Article Ten, most scholars accept that the American
Framers intend for the clause to prohibit certain methods of punishment. See Godfrey, supra
note 61, at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both
England and the United States).
182. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 165 (describing the “hands-off” doctrine that governed
federal courts’ review of prison conditions).
183. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (leaving undisturbed district court’s finding that conditions in
Arkansas’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346-48 (1981) (focusing on objective effects of double-celling to determine that practice did
not violate the Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding,
in the context of an excessive force case, that “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1991) (confirming
that a two-part test, consisting of objective and subjective components, characterized every
Eighth Amendment claim); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (upholding the rule
that “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment”) (internal quotations omitted); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)
(confirming that Eighth Amendment protects against future harm); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 84041, 847 (defining deliberate indifference as those instances where a prison official knows of
a risk of harm attendant to a prison condition but fails to take reasonable steps to abate the
risk).
184. Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (criticizing the application of the current doctrine
in cases seeking injunctive relief); Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of
Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 428-29 (2018) (criticizing the
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s focus on the subjective intent of prison officials rather than
the objective harms inflicted on the incarcerated); Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment
Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405,
426 (2016) (criticizing Eighth Amendment doctrine for failing to fully account for the
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below, part of the challenge with the standard is that it developed
out of a judicial refusal to acknowledge that, in prison conditions
cases, the punishment at issue is incarceration itself.
A. Ignoring Incarceration as Punishment
The Supreme Court first considered how the Eighth
Amendment might apply to prison conditions claims in the 1976
case of Estelle v. Gamble.185 Estelle, viewed by many as an
improvident grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court,186
established that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”187 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court identified four types of punishments
“repugnant to the Eighth Amendment”: (1) those “incompatible
with ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society;’”188 (2) those “which ‘involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;’”189 (3) those which
are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime;”190 and
contextual history of punishments utilized in early America); Brittany Glidden, Necessary
Suffering?: Weighing the Government and Prisoner Interests in Determining What is Cruel
and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1820-21 (2012) (criticizing the unpredictability
of application of current Eighth Amendment doctrine); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 890 (2009) (criticizing
Eighth Amendment doctrine’s undue focus on what constitutes punishment rather than what
is cruel). John F. Stinneford, in a series of articles, has also criticized current Eighth
Amendment doctrine for being untethered to the original meaning of the words comprising
the clause. See John F. Stinneford, Experimental Punishments, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39,
48-55 (2019) [hereinafter Stinneford, Experimental Punishments]; John F. Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 502 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford,
Original Meaning of Cruel]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The
Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1753-54 (2008)
[hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual].
185. 429 U.S. 97, 102-04.
186. See, e.g., id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing puzzlement at the Court’s
decision to grant certiorari); Schlanger, supra note 183, at 369 (noting that Estelle “was quite
a low-profile case—no amicus briefs were filed, and the New York Times described the
majority opinion as ‘generally stat[ing] the law as it has been developing in the lower Federal
courts’”) (quoting Lesley Oelsner, Prison Medical Care Assayed by Justices, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 1976), [https://perma.cc/3HSR-5BJ4]).
187. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
188. Id. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
189. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
190. Id. at 103 n.7 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
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(4) those which transgress the “substantive limits on what can be
made criminal and punished.”191 The Court determined that
Estelle did not involve the last two types of punishment and
therefore focused its inquiry on the first two.192 Turning to the
first two types of punishment, the Court determined that when the
government is punishing someone by incarceration, it must
provide medical care to that person because failing to do so will
result in, at worst, “physical ‘torture or a lingering death’” or, at
best, “pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.”193
Importantly, the Court appeared to recognize that the
“punishment” at issue in Estelle was incarceration itself, and the
question posed to the Court was whether the pro se prisoner’s
allegations of inadequate medical care were cruel and unusual
such that the punishment became unconstitutional.194 However,
this recognition becomes muddled by the Court’s decision to
reassure prison officials that not “every claim by a prisoner that
he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation
of the Eighth Amendment.”195 To make this reassurance, the
Court analogized the inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care to the circumstances at issue in Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber.196 In Resweber, Louisiana had sentenced
Willie Francis, a Black man, to death, but a mechanical
malfunction “thwarted” the State’s first attempt to electrocute
him.197 Mr. Francis “petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that
a second attempt to execute him would be unconstitutionally
cruel,”198 and the Court denied Mr. Francis’s petition, reasoning
that because the failure of the first attempt was an “unforeseeable
accident,”199 trying again did not amount to cruel and unusual
191. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
192. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7.
193. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (first quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890);
and then citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83).
194. Id. at 103, 106.
195. Id. at 105.
196. Id. at 105-06 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464,
470 (1947)).
197. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27; see also Estelle, 428 U.S. at 105.
198. DAYAN, supra note 181, at 27.
199. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
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punishment even though “it [might] produce added anguish.”200
Similarly, according to the Court, an act of mere negligence with
regard to medical care could not be cruel and unusual under the
Constitution.201
Presciently, Justice Stevens, in dissent, predicted that the
Estelle majority’s focus on “the accidental character of the first
unsuccessful attempt to electrocute the prisoner in” Resweber,
and “its repeated references to ‘deliberate indifference’ and the
‘intentional’ denial of adequate medical care” would attach
unwarranted significance to the “subjective motivation of the
defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel and
unusual punishment has been inflicted.”202 While Justice Stevens
hinted that the remedies available against a particular defendant
might depend on his subjective intent, he insisted that the question
of “whether the constitutional standard has been violated should
turn on the character of the punishment rather than the motivation
of the individual who inflicted it.”203 Referencing a prisoner-ofwar camp from the civil war, Justice Stevens pointed out:
“[w]hether the conditions in Andersonville were the product of
design, negligence, or mere poverty, they were cruel and
inhuman.”204
Two years after Estelle, in 1978, the Supreme Court again
considered a case involving an Eighth Amendment challenge to
prison conditions.205 Hutto v. Finney arose from a series of cases
challenging the conditions of the Arkansas prison system—
including the Cummins Unit discussed above206—during the
1960s.207 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the
200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
201. Id. at 106.
202. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 116-17.
205. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
206. See supra notes 5-46 and accompanying text.
207. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 680 n.2 (noting that the case at issue in Hutto began as Holt v.
Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I], a sequel to Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) and Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
1967), vacated 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968)). Judge Jesse Smith Henley, the Chief Judge of
Eastern District of Arkansas when the cases began in 1965, handled all these cases, even by
special designation after his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in 1975. Id.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
had issued a series of remedial orders meant to correct the
unconstitutional conditions it characterized as creating “a dark
and evil world completely alien to the free world.”208 While the
Supreme Court’s inquiry focused on the propriety of two aspects
of the relief ordered by the district court,209 the district court’s
orders rested on a finding that the conditions in Arkansas’s
prisons violated the Eighth Amendment.210 In reaching its
decision on the remedial issues before it, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is
a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards.”211 Again, then, the Court implicitly
acknowledged that the punishment examined by the district court
was incarceration, and the district court found that the conditions
of that incarceration rendered the punishment of imprisonment
cruel and unusual.212
Because Hutto presented an issue related only to remedy, the
Supreme Court did not directly consider the question of when
prison conditions render the punishment of incarceration
unconstitutional until the 1981 case of Rhodes v. Chapman.213
208. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 681 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark.
1970) [hereinafter Holt II]).
209. Id. at 680-81.
210. Id. at 681-83.
211. Id. at 685.
212. Id.; see also Holt II, 309 F. Supp. at 372-73. Indeed, the district court’s conception
of the Eighth Amendment supports this conclusion:
It appears to the Court, however, that the concept of “cruel and unusual
punishment” is not limited to instances in which a particular [person] is
subjected to a punishment directed at him as an individual. In the Court’s
estimation confinement itself within a given institution may amount to a cruel
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Constitution where the confinement
is characterized by conditions and practices so bad as to be shocking to the
conscience of reasonably civilized people even though a particular [person]
may never personally be subject to any disciplinary action. To put it another
way, while confinement, even at hard labor and without compensation, is not
considered to be necessarily a cruel and unusual punishment it may be so in
certain circumstances and by reason of the conditions of the confinement.
Holt II, 309 F. Supp. 372-73. Thus, the question considered by the district court involved
not whether the challenged conditions amounted to punishment but rather whether the
conditions could be understood as cruel and unusual such that the punishment of
incarceration became unconstitutional.
213. 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981) (noting the case presented the first time the Court
would consider “the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States
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Relying on Hutto, the Court reiterated that incarceration “is a
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment standards,”214 and it defined the dispute at issue as a
question of whether “the conditions of confinement at a particular
prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment.”215 Drawing on
Eighth Amendment standards articulated in other contexts, the
Court reiterated that federal courts must rely on “objective
indicia” when determining whether a particular punishment is
cruel and unusual.216 Underscoring the “flexible and dynamic”217
nature of the Eighth Amendment inquiry, the Court maintained
that no “static ‘test’” could be applied to “determine whether
conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.”218 Reiterating
the four types of punishment identified in Estelle as violative of
the Eighth Amendment,219 the Court held that “[c]onditions [that]
. . . deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure[s] of life’s
necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment.220
Applying this new rule to the case before it, the Court
examined whether the system of double-celling utilized by the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility created cruel and unusual
conditions of confinement.221 To make this determination, the
Court examined whether the “double celling made necessary by
the unanticipated increase in prison population” led to
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” (i.e.,
the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities).222 The Court
concluded that the findings of fact articulated by the district court
amounted to no such deprivations.223 The Court then went on,
however, to recognize that the practice of double celling did
through the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . imposes upon the conditions in which a State may
confine those convicted of crimes”) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
214. Id. at 345 (emphasis added) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 346-47 (first citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976); and then
citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
217. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171).
218. Id. at 346 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
219. Id. at 346 n.12; see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
220. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
221. Id. at 339-40, 347-48.
222. Id. at 348. The Court also included safety among its list of life’s necessities. Id.
at 364 (noting the lack of increased violence).
223. Id. at 348.
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deprive incarcerated people of job and educational
opportunities.224 The Court concluded that such deprivations,
however, did “not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and wanton
pain.”225 Seemingly, then, the deprivations could not be deemed
cruel and unusual. Rather than draw this conclusion, though, the
Court instead concluded that “deprivations of this kind simply are
not punishments.”226 This conclusion muddled the issue
presented to the Court, which focused on whether the conditions
at issue were cruel and unusual,227 not whether the conditions
amounted to a punishment above and beyond the punishment of
incarceration itself. This type of confusion—as to whether the
issue presented in cases challenging prison conditions involves a
question of what is cruel and unusual versus what is
punishment—continued to shape Eighth Amendment doctrine
over the course of the next decade and muddles the current
doctrine’s application today.228
224. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
225. Id.
226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 345.
228. See generally id. Importantly, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rhodes
cautioned that the majority opinion may be read “as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny
of prison conditions.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353, (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, reiterated the importance of judicial intervention
to correct unlawful prison conditions in order to ensure “constitutional dictates—not to
mention considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the prisons.” Id. at 354.
Acknowledging the pressing problems posed by “[o]vercrowding and cramped living
conditions,” id. at 356, and the “[p]ublic apathy [toward] and [] political powerlessness of
inmates,” id. at 358, Justice Brennan noted the important role judicial intervention plays in
remedying, albeit slowly, unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Id. at 359. Justice
Brennan also recognized the federal courts’ role “[i]n determining when prison conditions
pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel and unusual.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
364 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). To fulfill that role, Justice Brennan
suggested that the focus of the Court’s inquiry should be on the conditions’ “effect upon the
imprisoned.” Id. (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)). To
Justice Brennan, “[w]hen the ‘cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens
the physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration,’” the conditions at issue violate the
Constitution. Id. (quoting Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 323). Finding that the evidence
considered by the district court failed to demonstrate serious harm to the prisoners confined
to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Justice Brennan ultimately concurred in the
judgment of the Court. Id. at 368. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurrence to caution
against the adoption of “a policy of general deference” to prison administrators. Id. at 369
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Marshall, in dissent, cautioned that the majority
decision may “eviscerate the federal courts’ traditional role of preventing a State from
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The next Supreme Court decision to consider the Eighth
Amendment’s application in the prison setting further
compounded the confusion inherent in the majority’s decision in
Rhodes. In the 1986 Whitley v. Albers case, the Court considered
what standard governs a prisoner’s claim that a prison official
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment through the use of
excessive force.229 While the Whitley Court acknowledged that
prior Eighth Amendment precedent refused to require “[a]n
express intent to inflict unnecessary pain” to find a constitutional
violation,230 the Court ultimately deviated from this maxim when
it articulated the excessive force standard.231 Citing Ingraham v.
Wright232 for the proposition that “[n]ot every governmental
action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject
to Eighth Amendment scrutiny,”233 the Court once again
conflated the inquiry into what the punishment being challenged
is with the inquiry into whether that punishment is cruel and

imposing cruel and unusual punishment through its conditions of confinement.” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 375 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Finding that the district court and court of appeals
had faithfully discharged their roles in redressing deplorable conditions, Justice Marshall
would have left the injunction entered by the district court requiring single-celling
undisturbed. Id. at 377.
229. 475 U.S. 312, 314 (1986). Justice O’Connor, who wrote the five to four majority
opinion, framed the question presented to the Court a little differently: “[t]his case requires
us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to
quell a prison riot.” Id. at 314. The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, took issue with this framing, and accused the majority of
conflating questions of fact that “are likely to be hotly contested” with the choice of a legal
standard. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting). “It is inappropriate, to say the least, to
condition the choice of a legal standard, the purpose of which is to determine whether to send
a constitutional claim to the jury, upon the court’s resolution of factual disputes that in many
cases should themselves be resolved by the jury.” Id. Despite the dissent’s narrow view of
the question decided by the Whitley majority, lower federal courts have since uniformly
applied Whitley’s “malicious[] and sadistic[]” standard to cases involving the use of
excessive force by prison officials. See, e.g., Kapfhammer v. Boyd, 5 F. Supp. 2d 689, 69293 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Estrada v. Smart, 514 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1275-76 (D. Colo. 2021);
Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2013).
230. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
231. Id. at 319, 327.
232. 430 U.S. 651, 653-54, 683 (1977) (involving a challenge to the use of corporal
punishment at a junior high school in which the Court concluded that such a challenge could
not fall under the purview of the Eighth Amendment); see generally Raff Donelson, Who
Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259 (2017).
233. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
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unusual.234 In Whitley, the Court articulated that the Eighth
Amendment standard in cases challenging the use of force
involves the question of “whether [the] force was applied in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”235 The
Court identified several factors relevant to the malicious and
sadistic inquiry, including the need for the application of force,
the relationship between the need for force and the amount of
force used, the extent of the injury, the threat to the safety of staff
and prisoners, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response.236
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent in Whitley
would have maintained a focus on objective indicia to determine
whether a particular punishment (i.e., incarceration) has been
rendered cruel and unusual by internal prison conditions.237 To
the dissenting justices, the correct Eighth Amendment standard to
apply in a case of excessive force would have been “the
‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard,”238 the application of which
would require consideration of the “circumstances of the
plaintiff’s injury, including whether it was inflicted during an
attempt to quell a riot and whether there was a reasonable
234. This may not be the exact same analytical problem identified in this Article’s
discussion of Rhodes (and subsequent conditions cases). See supra Section II.A. In general,
the problem with the Eighth Amendment doctrine is that it has developed an unnecessary
focus on intent because it has been focused (erroneously) on whether the conditions being
challenged are punishment rather than whether the incarceration (i.e., the punishment) is
cruel and unusual because of certain conditions. See id. But it may be in cases of excessive
force that the punishment inquiry is not wrong because the force is not necessarily attendant
to the punishment (incarceration), whereas with conditions challenges, the conditions are
attendant to the incarceration. So, in excessive force cases, there may be a necessary inquiry
into the intent of the force, and there is a need to draw on how the Court defines punishment
in cases like Ingraham and Bell v. Wolfish. See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. 651; Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). This could also require an inquiry into whether the doctrine
should be different when the challenge involves “conduct” of a prison official rather than
mere “conditions” within a prison. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 ( stating that “[t]o be cruel
and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety”). This inquiry,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
235. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
236. Id. at 321.
237. Id. at 329, 334 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 329.
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apprehension of danger[.]”239 While the dissent did not fully
articulate how the “‘unnecessary and wanton’ standard” would
apply beyond the facts at issue in Whitley, it is clear that the focus
of the inquiry for those justices would be the totality of the
objective circumstances and not the subjective intent of prison
official defendants.240
The 1991 decision in Wilson v. Seiter brought to a head the
question of whether an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison
conditions required a subjective showing as to the intent of prison
officials.241 The case involved a challenge lodged by Pearly L.
Wilson, a man incarcerated by the State of Ohio at the Hocking
Correctional Facility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.242 Mr. Wilson
challenged HCF’s “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and
physically ill [prisoners].”243 The question presented involved
whether Mr. Wilson had to demonstrate “a culpable state of mind
on the part of prison officials, and, if so, what state of mind [wa]s
required” in order to prove his Eighth Amendment claims.244
In a five to four decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley “mandate inquiry into a
prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.”245 To support its
conclusion, the majority highlighted that the Eighth Amendment
“bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id. at 329.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329.
See 501 U.S. 294, 296, 300 (1991).
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298-99.
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inflicting officer before it can qualify.”246, 247 To the majority,
then, the conditions attendant to incarceration could only be
challenged under the Eighth Amendment if they amounted to
punishment above and beyond the punishment of incarceration
itself.248
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, concurred only in the judgment249 and criticized the
majority’s understanding of the punishment at issue in prison
conditions cases.250 Justice White first pointed to the Hutto
Court’s acknowledgment “that the conditions of confinement are
part of the punishment that is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.”251 The concurrence then drew on the Court’s analysis
in Rhodes to conclude that
Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth
Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are to
be treated like Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment
that is “formally meted out as punishment by the statute or
the sentencing judge,” . . . we examine only the objective
severity, not the subjective intent of government officials.252
246. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300. The Court made this point as support for its disregard
of an argument put forth by Mr. Wilson and the United States as amicus curiae that suggested
conditions claims could be distinguished into two categories: (1) “‘short-term’ or ‘one-time’
conditions (in which a state-of-mind requirement would apply)” and (2) “‘continuing’ or
‘systemic’ conditions (where official state of mind would be irrelevant).” Id. The Court saw
no logical or practical use in such a distinction but recognized that “[t]he long duration of a
cruel prison condition may make it easier to establish knowledge and hence some form of
intent.” Id.
247. The Wilson Court also clarified that prisoners could not lodge challenges to
something “so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’” unless those conditions create a “specific
deprivation of a single human need.” Id. at 305. Thus:
[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a
low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.
Id. at 304.
248. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.
249. The majority vacated the decision of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case for
reconsideration. Id. at 306. The Sixth Circuit had previously affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to prison officials, concluding that Mr. Wilson had to meet
Whitley’s obduracy and wantonness requirement. Id. at 296.
250. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 307.
252. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 309 (White, J., concurring).
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In addition to criticizing the departure from precedent
inherent in the majority’s adoption of an intent requirement, the
concurrence predicted (rightly) that intent may be impossible to
prove in many prison conditions cases,253 in part because of the
institutional indifference outlined in Part I.254
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of
cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials
inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period of
time. In those circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent
should be examined, and the majority offers no real guidance
on this issue. In truth, intent simply is not very meaningful
when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system . . . . [H]aving chosen [] imprisonment as a
form of punishment, a State must ensure that the conditions
in its prisons comport with the “contemporary standards of
decency” required by the Eighth Amendment.255

Citing to the United States’ brief as amicus curiae, Justice
White cautioned that inhumane prison conditions would be
insulated from judicial review because of the majority’s
requirement that the prisoner-plaintiffs engage in “an unnecessary
and meaningless search for ‘deliberate indifference.’”256
Notably, neither the majority nor concurrence defined what is
meant by deliberate indifference, instead leaving that question for
another day.257
In the term following Wilson, the Supreme Court heard
another Eighth Amendment case; this one focused on the inquiry

253. Id. at 310.
254. See generally supra Part I.
255. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 310-11 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989)).
256. Id. at 311. The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that “[s]eriously
inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be insulated from constitutional challenge
because the officials managing the institution have exhibited a conscientious concern for
ameliorating its problems, and have made efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to that end.” Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991)
(No. 89-7376). A relic of another era, the United States’ position in Wilson stands in stark
contrast to the position taken by the Solicitor General in the COVID-19 cases. See
Application for a Stay of the Injunction Issued by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio and for an Administrative Stay at 32, William v. Wilson, 455 F.
Supp. 3d 467 (N.D. Ohio 2020), vacated 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020).
257. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 294, 297, 302, 303, 305, 306, 311.
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relevant to a claim of excessive force.258 In Hudson v. McMillian,
Keith Hudson alleged that three officers at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, used excessive force on him
during the early morning hours of October 30, 1983.259 Mr.
Hudson claimed that one officer punched him in the mouth, eyes,
chest, and stomach while the second officer held him in place and
the third officer, a supervisor, looked on, telling the first two
officers “not to have too much fun.”260 As a result of the beating,
Mr. Hudson “suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face,
mouth, and lip,” and he had loosened teeth and a cracked dental
plate.261 The district court found the three officers violated Mr.
Hudson’s rights and awarded him $800 in damages.262 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Mr. Hudson “could not prevail on
his Eighth Amendment claim because his injuries were ‘minor’
and required no medical attention.”263 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.264
The Hudson Court announced three important rules in
support of reversal. First, the Court made clear that the standard
articulated in Whitley—”whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm”—applies in all prison excessive forces
cases.265
Second, the Court determined that because
contemporary standards of decency are violated whenever “prison
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” a
prisoner can bring an excessive force claim, whether or not he
suffered significant injury.266 Third, the Eighth Amendment does
not protect de minimis uses of physical force, so long as the “force
is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”267
Notably, in announcing these rules, the Court declined to
consider the prison officials’ argument that “their conduct [could]
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 5, 12.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
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not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because it was
‘isolated and unauthorized.’”268 In other words, the Court refused
to consider whether rogue acts of prison officials fall outside the
purview of the Eighth Amendment because such acts cannot fall
within “the scope of ‘punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.”269 This refusal is inconsistent with the Court’s
singular focus on what constitutes punishment in Wilson.270
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, penned a dissent in
Hudson focused on the majority’s “expansion of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause beyond all bounds of history and
precedent.”271 Once again harkening back to the perceived
distinction between punishment meted out by statute or judge
versus punishment attendant to incarceration, Justice Thomas
reminded us that the Eighth Amendment traditionally did not
apply “generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner
during incarceration.”272
Therefore, because the Eighth
Amendment only applies to “that narrow class of deprivations
involving ‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with
a culpable state of mind,” Justice Thomas would hold that a use
of force that causes only insignificant harm does not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment.273 In Justice Thomas’s view, then,
“our society . . . has no expectation that prisoners will have
‘unqualified’ freedom from force, since forcibly keeping
prisoners in detention is what prisons are all about.”274 Therefore,
the Hudson dissent points to the inconsistency in Eighth
Amendment doctrine that requires a showing of seriousness of
harm in medical care cases but not in excessive force cases.275
In the Court’s next term, it heard the Helling v. McKinney
case, which involved a Nevada prisoner’s claim that prison
officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by
housing him with another prisoner who smoked.276 Mr.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 11-12.
Id.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18, 20.
Id. at 26.
Id.
509 U.S. 25, 28 (1993).
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McKinney, the Nevada prisoner, reached trial on two issues: “(1)
whether [he] had a constitutional right to be housed in a smokefree environment, and (2) whether [the prison officials] were
deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs.”277 At
trial, the district court granted the prison officials’ motion for a
directed verdict, concluding that Mr. McKinney had no
constitutional right to be housed in a smoke free environment and
that he had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate
“medical problems that were traceable to cigarette smoke or
deliberate indifference to them.”278 The Ninth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court, holding that the court “erred by
directing a verdict without permitting [Mr. McKinney] to prove
that his exposure to [cigarette smoke] was sufficient to constitute
an unreasonable danger to his future health.”279 The prison
officials sought Supreme Court review of this decision, but, in the
interim, the Court decided Wilson and, therefore, remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Wilson.280
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Wilson added a subjective
element to Mr. McKinney’s claim, but it did not otherwise change
its prior decision, which concerned the objective component of
the Eighth Amendment claim (i.e., whether a prisoner-plaintiff
might be able to meet the objective component of the claim by
demonstrating an unreasonable risk to his future health).281 The
prison officials again sought review from the Supreme Court.282
The Court granted certiorari and affirmed in an opinion by
Justice White (who wrote the dissent in Wilson), holding that the
Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated people from future
harm.283 In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated that “the
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.”284 Implicitly, then, the Court harkened back to the
pre-Wilson days when it viewed conditions claims as challenging
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 28-9.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
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not the punishment of incarceration itself but whether the
conditions at issue rendered such punishment unconstitutional.285
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented once
again.286 This time Justice Thomas strongly intimated that he
would overturn Estelle if presented the opportunity, and he
reiterated and expanded upon his belief that prison conditions are
not and cannot be punishment protected by the Eighth
Amendment.287 He criticized the Court’s prior decisions,
beginning with Estelle, for never examining whether the Eighth
Amendment’s text and purpose supported the conclusion that the
amendment’s protections should protect against prison
deprivations.288 To Justice Thomas, “the text and history of the
Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it,
support the view that judges or juries—but not jailers—impose
‘punishment.’”289 Therefore, the entirety of the Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence with regard to prison conditions
claims should be overturned.290
The final case that forms the Supreme Court’s doctrine
around Eighth Amendment claims challenging prison conditions
is Farmer v. Brennan.291 Farmer reached the Court in 1994 and
involved a challenge to prison conditions brought by Dee Farmer,
a transgender woman living in men’s prisons operated by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).292 Ms. Farmer sued the BOP
and several individual prison officials after being brutally raped
and assaulted in the spring of 1989.293 In her complaint, Ms.
Farmer alleged that the prison official defendants transferred her
to a high security penitentiary “or placed [her] in its general
population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent
environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite
knowledge that petitioner, as a [transgender woman] who
‘projects feminine characteristics,’ would be particularly
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 40, 42.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-42.
511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830.
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vulnerable to sexual attack by” other people incarcerated in the
penitentiary.294 Ms. Farmer claimed that these allegations
demonstrated deliberate indifference to her safety and therefore
stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment.295
After the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, finding that Ms. Farmer needed to show they had
“actual knowledge” of a potential danger, and the Seventh Circuit
summarily affirmed without opinion, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to finally define the test for deliberate indifference.296
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, first reiterated that Eighth
Amendment prison conditions cases require a showing that a
prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which
means “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”297
The Court then went on to define the “proper test for deliberate
indifference.”298
After first describing how the Court used the term deliberate
indifference in the cases described above,299 the majority opinion
concluded that the term must mean “something more than mere
negligence” and “something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.”300 Settling on the conclusion that deliberate indifference
must mean something akin to recklessness, the Court ultimately
determined that prison officials can only be held liable for
disregarding conditions or risks of which they are subjectively
aware.301 In reaching this conclusion, the Court again focused on
the idea that the Eighth Amendment only “outlaws cruel and
unusual ‘punishments.’”302
294. Id. at 830-31.
295. Id. at 831.
296. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 831-32.
297. Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 302-03).
298. Id. at 835.
299. Id. at 835-36.
300. Id at 835.
301. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841-42.
302. Id. at 837 (“The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).
An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm
might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result
society might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects
such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. But
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Justice Blackmun, concurring, recognized the Court’s undue
focus on the word punishment and reiterated that, in his view,
“inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment even
if no prison official has an improper, subjective state of mind.”303
Concerned with the pervasive violence in American prisons,
Justice Blackmun highlighted his concern that, for many
incarcerated people, the punishment of incarceration
“degenerates into a reign of terror unmitigated by the protection
supposedly afforded by prison officials.”304 He then went on to
criticize Wilson’s conclusion that “only pain that is intended by a
state actor to be punishment is punishment.”305 Rather than
recognize that incarceration is the punishment in prison
conditions cases, Justice Blackmun instead focused his criticism
on the idea that someone cannot experience punishment unless a
state actor intends for it to be so.306 He also took issue with the
Wilson Court’s “myopic focus on the intentions of prison
officials,” which he saw as plainly ignoring the type of
institutional indifference that can arise from the modern
American system of punishment.307 Justice Stevens wrote a short,
paragraph-long, separate concurrence reiterating his belief that
cruel and unusual punishment does not require a specific
subjective motivation from a prison official.308
an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837-38 (citations omitted).
303. Id. at 851 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun went on to criticize the
Court’s holding in Wilson, “to the effect that barbaric prison conditions may be beyond the
reach of the Eighth Amendment if no prison official can be deemed individually culpable, in
my view is insupportable in principle and is inconsistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.” Id.
304. Farmer 511 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
305. Id. at 854.
306. Id. at 854-55 (citation omitted) (finding the Wilson Court’s analysis
“fundamentally misguided,” explaining that “‘[p]unishment’ does not necessarily imply a
culpable state of mind on the part of an identifiable punisher. A prisoner may experience
punishment when he suffers ‘severe, rough, or disastrous treatment,’ regardless of whether
a state actor intended the cruel treatment to chastise or deter.”).
307. Id. at 855-56 (pointing to Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan’s observations on the
Framers’ concern “with the cruelty that came from bureaucratic indifference to the
conditions of confinement”) (quoting Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1544 (9th Cir.
1993)); see also supra notes 143-489and accompanying text.
308. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence,
agreeing only in the judgment of the Farmer majority.309
Reiterating his view that only judges and juries inflict
punishment, Justice Thomas once again asserted that
“[c]onditions of confinement are not punishment in any
recognized sense of the term.”310 To him, then, Farmer presented
an easy case: “[b]ecause the unfortunate attack that befell
petitioner was not part of [her] sentence, it did not constitute
‘punishment’ under the Eighth Amendment.”311
As in Wilson, the Farmer Court’s focus once again ignores
that the punishment at issue in prison conditions cases is
incarceration itself, and the only question truly being presented
is whether or not the conditions at issue in any given case have
evolved such that they can now be deemed cruel and unusual.312
However, the Court’s continued failure to recognize that
incarceration is the punishment prisoner-plaintiffs are concerned
with in conditions cases is no surprise when viewed in light of the
overwhelming deference it and the broader federal judiciary have
afforded prison officials for the past half-century.
B. Deference to Prison Officials
While not explicitly part of the Eighth Amendment prison
conditions test, judicial deference to prison officials permeates
federal court decisions applying the doctrine.313 This is no doubt
a consequence of the explicit deference that is written into the
other doctrines governing constitutional claims brought by
incarcerated people.314 In non-Eighth Amendment constitutional
challenges to prison policies, the Supreme Court has gone to great
pains to explain the complexity and intractability of the problems
309. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
310. Id. at 859.
311. Id.
312. See Dolovich, supra note 184, at 890. The Farmer Court also goes one to explain
why, in its view, the “objective” deliberate indifference test developed in City of Canton v.
Harris is inapplicable in prison conditions cases. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 172-74, for
a discussion of the Farmer Court’s treatment of Harris.
313. Glidden, supra note 184, at 1832-33 (describing how and in what frequency
federal courts defer to the judgment of prison officials in prison conditions cases).
314. Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 140-42 (discussing the doctrine of deference
in certain constitutional claims brought by incarcerated people).
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confronting those who run American prisons.315 Using those
justifications, the Court has developed a doctrine that explicitly
accounts for its desire to largely defer to the choices made by
prison officials in running American prisons.316
In the context of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has
expressly rejected a doctrine that openly incorporates deference
into the relevant standard.317 Nonetheless, “in practice, both it
and the lower courts often defer to prison officials in analyzing
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”318 Moreover, the
deliberate indifference standard itself—even if only implicitly—
developed from a clear concern that a standard that did not require
a showing of intent might lead to increased liability of prison
officials and increased judicial intrusion into the operation of
prisons.319 As the prior section outlines, the current Eighth
Amendment doctrine places undue focus on the subjective intent
of prison officials because of a misplaced concern of ensuring that
conditions being challenged in prison conditions cases amounted
to punishment.320 But this undue focus can create situations
where ongoing harms inside prisons go uncorrected either
because an incarcerated person cannot prove the subjective intent

315. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (explaining the
policy justifications that inform the doctrine of deference as follows: “the problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and . . . not readily susceptible of resolution
by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government . . . . Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal
courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
316. Bianchi & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 7 (describing the Turner standard and the
Court’s view of the need for a deferential standard); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89-91 (1987).
317. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 141 (noting that “the Court has expressly
rejected reasonable-relationship review for Eighth Amendment claims, finding that ‘the full
protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in prison]. The whole
point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.’ Accordingly, ‘deference
to the findings of state prison officials in the context of the eighth amendment would reduce
that provision to a nullity in precisely the context where it is most necessary.’”) (quoting
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005)).
318. Id. at 141-42.
319. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 844-45 (1994).
320. See supra notes 299-306, 310 and accompanying text.
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of an individual prison official or the institutional intent of the
prison system itself.321
The problem of uncorrected ongoing harms in prison
conditions cases is playing out acutely in judicial responses to
Eighth Amendment claims relating to the COVID-19
pandemic.322 A close look at the decisions of federal courts in
these cases reveals a judiciary concerned with maintaining its
deference to prison officials, even in the face of ongoing harm and
suffering.323 Take, for example, the decision of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the
Arkansas prison system’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
in the Cummins Unit, discussed at the beginning of this Part.324
In that case, Judge Kristine Baker explicitly acknowledged that
the number of infected people in Arkansas’s prisons (incarcerated
people and staff alike) had increased during the “few weeks” the
case had been pending prior to her decision on the plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction.325
Despite this
acknowledgment, and a recognition that the plaintiffs had
presented evidence of staff not wearing masks and gloves,326
incarcerated people not wearing masks as directed,327 a
prohibition on alcohol-based hand sanitizer,328 a months-long
delay in implementing guidance from the Centers for Disease
Control on social distancing,329 the denial of care and testing of
incarcerated people displaying COVID-19 symptoms,330 a lack of
follow-up care for those with COVID-19,331 a lack of aid from
prison staff who observe incarcerated people “too weak to care

321. See Glidden, supra note 184, at 1833-37 (describing the problems with ongoing
harms and institutional intent under the current Eighth Amendment conditions test); see also
Godfrey, supra note 61, at 186 (discussing the difficulty of proving institutional intent in
Eighth Amendment conditions cases seeking injunctive relief).
322. See Godfrey & Rovner, supra note 54, at 142.
323. Id. at 142 n.99 (detailing cases wherein courts explicitly deferred to prison
officials’ judgment and response to the pandemic, despite rising infection and death rates).
324. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
325. Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 842 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
326. Id. at 838.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 839.
329. Id. at 839-40.
330. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 841.
331. Id.

1 GODFREY.MAN.FIN COPY 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

CREATING CAUTIONARY TALES

12/13/21 2:43 PM

415

for themselves or to seek medical care,”332 and the presence of
positive, asymptomatic staff at work,333 the court declined to
grant the incarcerated plaintiffs preliminary relief.334 In reaching
this conclusion, the court determined the plaintiffs could not meet
their burden to establish deliberate indifference335 and declined to
intrude “into the core activities of the state’s prison system.”336
At the time Judge Baker issued her order on May 19, 2020, at
least four incarcerated people had already died in Arkansas’s
prisons.337 Less than a month later, seven more people had
died.338 And while the incarcerated plaintiffs are still litigating
their case, the death rate in Arkansas prisons has continued to rise,
with more than fifty people now dead.339
***
Eighth Amendment doctrine is built to sustain judicial
indifference to the suffering, harm, and death of the
incarcerated.340 The doctrine ignores the Eighth Amendment’s
textual purpose: to prevent cruel and unusual punishments by the
State.341 In our current criminal system, criminal courts mete out
punishment as a sentence of incarceration, usually for a term of
years.342 That term of years is meant to be served in selfcontained societies created by the state—i.e., prisons.343 While
those sentences do not have to be comfortable,344 the conditions

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 846.
335. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (noting that “the Court concludes that plaintiffs
have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the subjective prong of their Eighth
Amendment claims”).
336. Id. at 846.
337. See generally id.; see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
340. See Godfrey, supra note 61, at 157.
341. Id. at 158-59 (discussing scholarly debate around the intent of the drafters in both
England and the United States); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing
scholars’ acceptance that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to
prohibit certain methods of punishment).
342. Glossary of Federal Sentencing- Related Terms, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, (Sept.
2021), [https://perma.cc/M6AZ-UGV5].
343. Id.
344. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
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in which they are served cannot be inhumane nor can they
fundamentally alter the punishment meted out by the state.345
However, under current doctrine, inhumane prison
conditions will be found perfectly constitutional by the federal
courts so long as an incarcerated plaintiff is unable to prove that
prison officials knowingly imposed those conditions despite
knowledge of the risk of harm.346 This outcome can be seen in
the myriad of cases around the country challenging prison
conditions since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In
those cases, plaintiffs have presented ample evidence that the selfcontained societies created by the State have become so toxic that
they are acting as death traps, thereby transforming the statesanctioned punishment into an extrajudicial death sentence for
some incarcerated people, even in prison systems where officials
are taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by the virus.347
Such a result should not be sustained under the Eighth
Amendment. But the COVID-19 pandemic has seen this result
upheld time-and-again because Eighth Amendment doctrine
encapsulates an inherent indifference to suffering that cannot be
attributed to the intentions of an individual defendant.348 Even
where prison officials are well-motivated individuals, conditions
that pose a risk of death should be unconstitutional. Under our
current system, they are not because the doctrine governing
conditions claims is inherently indifferent to the suffering of
incarcerated people. Thus, the doctrine creates the second strand
of indifference that primed American prison systems for disaster
during the COVID-19 pandemic: judicial indifference.
III. SOCIETAL INDIFFERENCE: APATHY TO THE
INCARCERATED
The final strand of indifference that has allowed for the
harms experienced by incarcerated people during the course of
the COVID-19 pandemic is the general societal apathy toward
people behind bars. The causes of this indifference are myriad
345.
346.
347.
348.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Id. at 829, 834.
See supra Section III.B; see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 837 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
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and complex but can in part be attributed to three overlapping
realities of the American carceral system. First, American prisons
are opaque institutions, and the lack of transparency of most
American prisons means that society remains largely ignorant of
what is going on behind bars at any given time. Second,
American prisons are filled with people who are generally
marginalized by society. Finally, the culture of fear that
permeates the American imagination allows society to take the
view that people behind bars “are bad guys, just getting what they
deserve.”349
A. A Lack of Transparency
Mainstream American society has little understanding of
what goes on inside American prison walls due to the prison
system’s lack of transparency.350 While the United States
incarcerates nearly 2.2 million people, “the indignities suffered
each day by the human beings living in American prisons and jails
occur largely out of sight from the general public.”351 This lack
of transparency deprives the American public of the ability to
critically assess whether the societal attitude of “they deserve
what they get” actually withstands scrutiny when the public learns
what “what they get” actually means for incarcerated individuals.
In other words, the American public has little means to examine
whether the punishment occurring through incarceration matches
the imagined punishment meted out at a criminal sentencing. For
example, as Andrea Armstrong acutely observes:
[i]t would be barbaric for a judge to order a person to be
sexually violated as a consequence of a crime. Is it any less
barbaric if it happens incidental to lawful imprisonment?
The same could be said for people denied medical and
mental health care. Serving a certain amount of time in jail

349. VENTERS, supra note 4, at 1.
350. Andrea Craig Armstrong, The Missing Link: Jail and Prison Conditions in
Criminal Justice Reform, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that “[j]ail and prison
conditions matter because they are involuntary homes for millions of people without
meaningful public oversight, transparency, or accountability”).
351. Godfrey, supra note 68, at 1115.
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or prison is the intended punishment, not death or injury by
neglect.352

While we can of course not know how the American public
might react if it knew of the true conditions within the nation’s
prisons, we may never learn if prisons remain “the black boxes of
our society.”353
One thing we have learned, however, from the Black Lives
Matter movement, is that when brave passersby record police
officers and make those recordings public, people start to pay
attention.354 “But what about places in the United States where
people can’t have cellphone cameras and the state-sponsored
violence against Black people is often ignored or never revealed
to the public? This happens in prisons all the time.”355 What is
going on in prisons is not visible to the public in the same way
that the tragic killings of Black and brown men has been in recent
years, but it is equally as problematic.356 But society has granted
itself “permission to look away from the truth” because it views
incarcerated people as “disposable.”357
B. The American Underclass
The reason incarcerated people are often viewed as
“disposable” stems from the country’s long-standing belief that
social problems arise from individual moral failings rather than
structural and societal problems.358 By attributing social
problems to individual faults, American society has long turned
to segregation and detention to remove these so-called “inferior”

352. Armstrong, supra note 353, at 18.
353. Dewan, supra note 68.
354. Johnny Perez, As We Work to Make Black Lives Matter, Let’s Remember That
Incarcerated Lives Matter, Too, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/GN8FYGJK].
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Laura I. Appelman, Pandemic Eugenics: Discrimination, Disability, & Detention
During COVID-19, 67 LOYOLA L. REV. 329, 335 (2021) (noting that “[e]ugenic theory was
closely intertwined [in] the late nineteenth century idea that social problems, including
insanity, dependency, poverty, and disability, were fundamentally individual and moral in
nature.”).
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populations from mainstream American society.359 This trend
continues today: it is no secret that the vast majority of people
that we lock up in this country are poor people and people of color
who belong to historically disadvantaged groups.360
Class and classism matter here; this isn’t something that
springs up out of nowhere. We treat being poor, being from
the inner city, being from the country as reasons to be
ashamed even though no one controls the circumstances of
their own birth. We look at places that are being starved of
resources, where being tough is a matter of survival, and then
we say, “[i]n order to have safety, financial stability, housing
that isn’t subpar, you have to be willing to cut away
everything that made you,” and when some people can’t or
won’t do that we punish them for it. It’s assimilation, not
acculturation, that is demanded of people who are already
sacrificing, already making hard choices.361

By creating this class of other—of groups of people who are
faulted for the circumstances of their birth—American society has
created an underclass of people who are viewed and treated as
less valuable by society as a whole.362 Because incarcerated
people fall squarely within this underclass, society has remained
largely indifferent to their plight during the COVID-19 pandemic.
To the extent the incarcerated underclass saw any reprieve
during the pandemic, the amnesty was limited to only those who
could be viewed as “non-violent.” This limitation is driven by the
359. Id. at 336, 108 (“From the very beginning of the United States, segregation and
detention have been used to control those on the margins: the poor (in almshouses,
workhouses, and ghettos), minorities (in convict labor farms and correctional institutions),
and those who are disabled (in cages, asylums, and hospitals).”); see also Sharon Dolovich,
Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID-19, 11/16/20 U. CHI. LAW REV. ONLINE *4, *6-*7 (2020)
(noting that the individualist nature of our narratives around who is deserving of punishment
leave “us collectively unable to reckon with the [] drivers of criminal activity” and “blind us
to the community costs of a default carceral response”).
360. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 74, at 4 (noting that the “carceral state has
disproportionately hurt African American men. But it also has been targeting a rising number
of people from other historically disadvantaged groups,” including women, Hispanics, and
poor whites); Dolovich, supra note 363 at 5 (noting that it “is impossible to disentangle . . .
the structural racism that has driven the glaring overincarceration of African Americans and
other people of color and helped shape the brutality of the American carceral experience”).
361. MIKKI KENDALL, HOOD FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE WOMEN THAT A
MOVEMENT FORGOT 139 (2020).
362. Appelman, supra note 358, at 331-33 (attributing our lack of care for this
underclass during the COVID-19 pandemic to long-standing American eugenic philosophy).
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longstanding dichotomy made between “violent” and
“nonviolent” crime, a dubious distinction that is driven in large
part by the American culture of fear.
C. A Culture of Fear
While some incarcerated people were able to secure release
during the COVID-19 pandemic through compassionate release
efforts, executive clemency actions, expedited parole
proceedings, and home confinement orders, mass release efforts
were often stymied by fear of releasing people who committed
“violent” crimes.363 But the “violent” versus “nonviolent”
dichotomy that characterizes much of the American criminal
punishment system is largely misleading, and it reinforces the
racial stereotypes upon which the criminal punishment system is
built.
First, the label “violent” is often applied to crimes that many
people might not actually believe to be violent.364 For example,
in some jurisdictions “failing a urine test repeatedly” is classified
as a violent crime.365 Moreover, even for those individuals who
did commit a violent crime, “data shows that most people age out
of ‘violent crime,’” and recidivism rates for older people are
diminishingly low.366
Not only is the “fearmongering” rhetoric used to describe
people accused of violent crimes unsupported by data, it can also
be used to reinforce racial stereotypes.367 Social science research
demonstrates that Black people are not only more likely to be
stopped by police, but they are also more likely to be detained
pretrial, charged with more serious crimes, and sentenced more
363. April Rodriguez, We Won’t Address Our Mass Incarceration Crisis Until We
Rethink Our Approach To “Violent Crime”, ACLU (June 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/4T7W-9C5W] (explaining how “many judges have dismissed release as a
viable option for people accused or convicted of violent charges”).
364. Eli Hager, When “Violent Offenders” Commit Nonviolent Crimes, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3LSB-DTSJ] (explaining that “many
of the ‘violent offenders’ in U.S. prisons are there for crimes not everyone would classify as
violent,” including “purse snatching,” “manufacture of methamphetamines,” and “theft of
drugs”).
365. Rodriguez, supra note 363.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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harshly than white people.368 While these disparate outcomes
may not always “be the result of overt racism,” they often arise
from the implicit bias of prosecutors, judges, and juries.369 “This
means that what society chooses to prosecute as violent is heavily
influenced by race. Standard definitions of what and who we
consider dangerous are not natural or self-evident; they are
made.”370
Thus, unless and until society works to overcome the false
dichotomy created by speaking of incarcerated people in terms of
those who committed “violent” offenses and those who
committed “non-violent” offenses, the culture of fear that
surrounds “violent” crimes will prevent societal recognition of the
humanity of all people behind bars.371 Unless and until we can
overcome this culture and rhetoric of fear, societal indifference to
the lives of incarcerated people will continue to flourish by
allowing society to ignore the individualized harms being
suffered by people behind bars.
***
The institutional and judicial indifference described in Parts
I and II of this Article is allowed to perpetuate because of an
overarching societal indifference to the harms suffered by people
behind bars. That societal indifference is driven in part by the
lack of transparency inherent to prison systems. But even as
advocates and journalists have made strides in recent years to
expose what is happening behind bars,372 greater transparency has
not fully eradicated this societal indifference. This is because
such indifference is tied to broader cultural attitudes toward
marginalized groups and the culture of fear created by and which
sustains unwarranted racial stereotypes. Until this indifference is
addressed, the other strands of indifference that created a carceral
368. Elizabeth Hinton, LeShae Henderson, & Cindy Reed, An Unjust Burden: The
Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA EVIDENCE
BRIEF 1-9 (May 2018).
369. Id. at 7.
370. Rodriguez, supra note 363.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Nicole B. Godfrey, Suffragist Prisoners and the Importance of
Protecting Prisoner Protests, 53 AKRON L. REV. 279, 280 n. 7 (2019) (providing examples
of recent exposés about what is happening behind bars).
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system ripe for widespread harm in the face of emergencies like
the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to persist.
CONCLUSION
From the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, incarcerated
people and their advocates knew that the pandemic would prove
devastating to the incarcerated unless the prisons, the courts, and
society took dramatic and immediate steps to depopulate the
prisons.373 Yet, the institutional indifference of the prison
systems themselves, the judicial indifference of the doctrine
governing incarcerated people’s requests for emergency relief,
and the societal indifference of the American public and its
attitude toward the incarcerated combined to make depopulation
efforts nearly impossible.
In describing these three interwoven causes of the failure to
protect incarcerated lives during the pandemic, I used the term
indifference purposefully. Derived from the constitutional
doctrine meant to protect people from cruel and unusual
incarceration (the punishment most utilized by the American
criminal system), the word indifference holds special meaning in
the carceral context. Under the current state of the law, an
incarcerated person can only gain protection from cruel and
unusual prison conditions when they can demonstrate that the
cause of those conditions is the deliberate indifference of prison
officials.374 But what I’ve tried to demonstrate in the above
discussion is that the entire carceral system is built upon and
sustained by these three strands of indifference: institutional,
judicial, and societal. And because these three strands of
indifference are structural in nature, it can be no surprise that they
operate to create cruel and unusual results—i.e., unnecessary
harms—in the face of an emergency like the pandemic.
Ultimately, the continued existence of these three strands of
indifference—despite demonstrable evidence of the daily
suffering occurring within our modern punishment regime—

373. Kaste, supra note 13; see also Stacy Weiner, Prison Should Not Be a COVID-19
Death Sentence, AAMC (Aug. 27, 2020), [https://perma.cc/QLN4-DYFZ].
374. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1994).
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lends itself to the conclusion that they are nothing short of
deliberate.
While this Article has been largely diagnostic and
descriptive in its assessment of the strands of indifference that
combined to create the cautionary tales of American prisons, I
plan to provide prescriptive policy and jurisprudential reforms in
future work aimed at eliminating these strands of indifference.
But, any reform efforts must be informed by the lessons of
abolitionists, who have explained to us that reform efforts “must
be a cultural intervention,”375 that the modern prison developed
from reform efforts rooted “in the paradigmatic national power
relations of racial chattel” and has remained “stubbornly brutal,
violent and inhumane” through successive reform efforts,376 that
conceptions of justice must expose hypocrisy “entrenched in
existing legal practices,”377 and that a radical reorganization of
American society is necessary to truly dismantle the “issues of
systemic and structural racism [that] should have been addressed
more than 100 years ago.”378 If we are to truly dismantle the
strands of interwoven indifference that allowed American prisons
to become the epicenters of the pandemic, we must take seriously
the calls of these abolitionists and think critically about how we
can build a system of justice that might allow us to avoid future
cautionary tales.

375. Patrisse Cullors, Abolition and Reparations: Histories of Resistance,
Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1694 (2019).
376. Dylan Rodríguez, Abolition as a Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 1575, 1582, 1597 (2019) (quoting Mariame Kaba, Prison Reform’s in Vogue and
Other Strange Things . . ., TRUTHOUT (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/T5HP-CXSN]).
377. Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1615 (2019).
378. Angela Y. Davis, Why Arguments Against Abolition Inevitably Fail, MEDIUM
(Oct. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/SE9S-8SV9].
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Mark A. Graber*
Mark Killenbeck’s Korematsu v. United States1 has
important affinities with Dred Scott v. Sandford.2 Both decisions
by promoting and justifying white supremacy far beyond what
was absolutely mandated by the constitutional text merit their
uncontroversial inclusion in the anticanon of American
constitutional law.3 Dred Scott held that former slaves and their
descendants could not be citizens of the United States4 and that
Congress could not ban slavery in American territories acquired
after the Constitution was ratified.5 Korematsu held that the
military could exclude all Japanese Americans from portions of
the West Coast during World War II.6 Both decisions
nevertheless provided progressives with important doctrinal tools
that they later employed when building a more egalitarian future.
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott advanced a
particularly robust notion of citizenship that Republicans, after
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cited when vesting
newly freed persons of color with a substantial array of rights.7
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test into American law

*
Mark A. Graber is the Regents Professor at the University of Maryland Carey School
of Law. He is grateful for the help provided by the Arkansas Law Review at the University
of Arkansas, most notably by Keaton Barnes, Taylor Spillers, and Tyler Mlakar, the
comments given by Associate Peter Danchin and his colleagues at the University of
Maryland Carey School of Law, and other comments by Mark Killenbeck, Sandy Levinson
and Jack Balkin.
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406-12, 422-27 (2011);
Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV.
151, 151-52 (2021).
4. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 423.
5. See id. at 452.
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
7. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 101 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1231 (1866).
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that the Warren and Burger Courts relied on when striking down
numerous laws that discriminated against persons of color.8
Killenbeck celebrates strict scrutiny as a remarkable advance
on the doctrines that structured the constitutional law of racial
equality in the racist past of the United States.9 Federal and state
courts before the Civil War provided almost no protection for
persons of color, even in the few instances when judges
acknowledged that persons of color might be state or federal
citizens.10 At the turn of the twentieth century, federal and state
courts did almost nothing to oppose the redemption of the South
and the establishment of Jim Crow.11 Plessy v. Ferguson
sustained legislation mandating separate but equal.12 Giles v.
Harris announced courts could do little when states adopted
subterfuges that disenfranchised almost all black citizens.13
African Americans fared better in federal courts in the decades
before Korematsu.14 Still, most judicial successes before World
War II were confined to particularly egregious facts and easily
evaded.15 The strict scrutiny test was the first occasion in which
a Supreme Court majority announced a broad standard of review
that could be wielded against white supremacy more generally
rather than merely against discrete instances of white
supremacy.16
This essay explores how the constitutional law of race
equality has evolved in the United States in ways that provide
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). For the development of the strict scrutiny test in race cases, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275-78 (2007).
9. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201.
10. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.
11. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-60 (2004).
12. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
13. 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903).
14. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 11.
15. The judicial decision outlawing state mandated residential segregation in
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), was effectively undermined by the judicial
decision sanctioning racially restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 332
(1926). The judicial decisions in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927), and Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932), striking down state laws prohibiting persons of color
from voting in Democratic primaries were effectively undermined by the judicial decision in
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1935), which permitted the Democratic Party to
prohibit persons of color from voting in Democratic primaries.
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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greater context for the strict scrutiny test and the Korematsu
decision. The contemporary Korematsu regime is structured by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
judicial supremacy, and strict scrutiny.17 The Equal Protection
Clause provides the textual hook for evaluating the
constitutionality of race conscious measures, the Supreme Court
of the United States is the institution primarily responsible for
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, and strict scrutiny is
the test or standard the Supreme Court uses to determine whether
race conscious measures pass constitutional muster.18 Other
regimes have been structured by different textual hooks,
alternative conceptions of institutional authority, and other tests
or standards for evaluating race conscious measures. The Turner
regime of the mid-1860s regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as
the foundation for the constitutional law of racial equality.19 The
Turner regime and the successor Strauder regime of the 1870s
and 1880s vested Congress with the primary responsibility of
determining how to implement the constitutional obligation to
end the slave system and make persons of color full citizens.20
The Strauder regime and successor Plessy regime of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries banned, at least
officially, all race discriminations.21
The Korematsu regime is clearly more egalitarian than the
Costin/Manuel regime that structured the constitutional law of
race equality before the Civil War, but the former has features that
make that regime arguably less egalitarian in certain
circumstances than the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes.
The Turner regime that based the constitutional law of racial
equality on the Thirteenth Amendment was more open than the
Korematsu regime to race conscious measures designed to benefit
persons of color and had no state action limit on federal laws that
mandated racial equality.22 The Turner and Strauder regimes that
17. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201.
18. Id.
19. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339-40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
20. Id.; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879).
21. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310-12; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
22. Compare Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40, with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
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required Congress to be the first mover when implementing
constitutional commitments to racial equality were more
conducive to racial equality than the Korematsu regime whenever
the national legislature had a more expansive understanding of
racial equality than the national judiciary. The Strauder and
Plessy regimes would, at least in theory, have declared
unconstitutional the military order sustained in Korematsu
because those regimes prohibited all race discriminations.
The following pages contextualize rather than praise or bury
the Korematsu regime. Whether one particular regime better
promotes racial equality than another depends on the particular
problem, the balance of power in different institutions at a
particular time, and particular perspectives. Strict scrutiny might
be a better approach than a per se ban on race classifications when
regulating racial gangs in prisons. The Supreme Court could not
have decided Brown v. Board of Education when the Turner and
Strauder regimes structured the constitutional law of racial
equality because those regimes required Congress to be the first
mover when implementing the post-Civil War Amendments.
Whether a regime that permits affirmative action is better than
one that does not depends on contested beliefs about whether
affirmative action promotes race equality. The argument below
is simply that the Korematsu regime is one way of structuring the
constitutional law of racial equality, not the only way. That
Americans committed to racial equality have adopted different
regimes in the past opens questions about whether Americans
might adopt different regimes in the future.
Strict scrutiny is a standard only for race conscious measures
such as the military order banning Japanese Americans from the
West Coast. That standard does not help determine whether a
military order in 1943 banning disloyal citizens would have been
considered a race discrimination if implemented only in
California or, for that matter, whether the executive order at issue
in Trump v. Hawaii23 that Killenbeck explores with great
sophistication24 was a “Muslim ban.” Korematsu’s ancestors

23. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
24. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 201-23.
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include such cases as Costin v. Washington,25 In re Turner,26
Strauder v. West Virginia,27 and Plessy v. Ferguson.28 These
decisions considered whether explicit race conscious measures
passed constitutional muster.29 Although Killenbeck and the
major opinions in Trump debated whether Korematsu belonged
on Trump’s family tree,30 Trump’s more legitimate lineal
ancestors include United States v. Cruikshank,31 Williams v.
Mississippi,32 and McCleskey v. Kemp.33 The Justices in these
instances refused to see or find race discrimination lurking behind
laws or actions that on their face were not race conscious.34
This essay explores the constitutional law of explicit race
conscious measures. This myopia admittedly exaggerates the
egalitarian commitments of the Turner, Strauder, Plessy, and
Korematsu regimes. Racial hierarchies in the United States in the
past and at present are as often structured by the refusal to
acknowledge race as by what Americans do when they
acknowledge race. Americans, this essay documents, have often
shamefully justified their willingness to use race conscious
measures that discriminate against persons of color. Americans
have even more shamefully refused to see race discrimination
when government employs ostensibly neutral measures in ways
that oppress, often by intention, black Americans and other
persons of color.
I. THE COSTIN/MANUEL REGIME
Judge William Cranch’s opinion in Costin v. Washington
articulated the principles that structured the status of citizens of
25. 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
26. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. See Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613-14; Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40; Strauder, 100 U.S.
at 303; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540.
30. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 152-159.
31. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
32. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
34. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; Williams, 170 U.S. at 225; McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 319.
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color under antebellum constitutional law.35 The issue in that
case was the constitutionality of the onerous restrictions that the
corporation governing Washington D.C. placed on persons of
color.36 Persons of color were required to register, provide bonds
for good behavior, and obtain certificates from three white
persons vouching for their character and employment.37 In sharp
contrast to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred
Scott,38 Cranch’s opinion in Costin assumed that persons of color
were citizens of the United States entitled to the rights of citizens
of the United States.39
Costin acknowledged that “the
constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the United
States.”40 Cranch insisted, however, that governing officials
could make legal distinctions among citizens. Race was one
important basis for legal distinctions. Costin stated:
In all the states certain qualifications are necessary to the
right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to
hold certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of
the African color is among those qualifications. Every state
has the right to pass laws to preserve the peace and the
morals of society; and if there be a class of people more
likely than others to disturb the public peace, or corrupt the
public morals, and if that class can be clearly designated, it
has a right to impose upon that class, such reasonable terms
and conditions of residence, as will guard the state from the
evils which it has reason to apprehend.41

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel
relied on similar principles when the judges concluded black
citizenship was consistent with substantial race discrimination.42
A unanimous court ruled that persons of color convicted of crimes
could be hired out, even though white persons convicted of the

35. 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
39. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613.
40. Id. But cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (holding that persons of color were not
citizens of the United States and were therefore not entitled to the rights of United States
citizens).
41. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613.
42. 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).
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same crimes could not suffer this sanction.43 Judge William
Gaston declared, “[h]is color and his poverty are the aggravating
circumstances of his crime.”44 Gaston insisted that real
differences between the races justified punishing citizens of color
more severely than white citizens:
Whatever might be thought of a penal Statute which in its
enactments makes distinctions between one part of the
community and another capriciously and by way of
favoritism, it cannot be denied that in the exercise of the
great powers confided to the legislature for the suppression
and punishment of crimes, they may rightfully so apportion
punishments according to the condition, temptations to
crime, and ability to suffer, of those who are likely to offend,
as to produce in effect that reasonable and practical equality
in the administration of justice which it is the object of all
free governments to accomplish.45

That William Manuel was a citizen of North Carolina did not
immunize him from discriminatory punishments because he was
in a racial class that the state legislature had determined needed
more severe sanctions to deter them from crime.
The constitutional law of race equality in antebellum
America was indistinguishable from the constitutional law of
equality, more generally. The Costin/Manual regime emphasized
arbitrary laws rather than suspect classifications.46 No legal
distinction was inherently more suspect than another or required
legislators to meet a higher standard of proof—either as the end
to be achieved or the relationship between the discrimination and
that end. John Marque Lundin points out that while antebellum
law respected principles of “equality, reasonableness,
impartiality, and protection of fundamental rights, the prohibited
classification principle” dates from Reconstruction.47 Laws that
singled out persons of color were constitutionally no different

43. Id.
44. Id. at 35.
45. Id. at 37.
46. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55 (Duke Univ. Press
1993); John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1999).
47. Lundin, supra note 46, at 1139.
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than laws that singled out bankers, taverns, women, or residents
of E street.
The constitutionality of legal distinctions and
discriminations depended on whether they were based on real
differences between the regulated and unregulated classes and
whether the distinction or discrimination served the public
interest.48 Any legislative distinction that served the public
interest and was based on real differences between persons was
constitutional. Howard Gillman notes that the master principle of
nineteenth century constitutional law was that when “a statute is
enacted applying only to a particular class, it must appear that the
public welfare demands such legislation by reason of the
distinguishing characteristic of the class.”49 Abolitionists and
antislavery advocates aside,50 no one considered race
discriminations the paradigmatic example of an unconstitutional
arbitrary distinction. Most successful equality claims concerned
property rights51 rather than discrimination based on race, gender,
or ethnicity.52 No state court opinion issued before the Fourteenth
Amendment indicated that a central purpose of any constitutional
provision mandating equality was to limit race discriminations,
that race discriminations were particularly offensive in light of
constitutional commitments to equality, or that race
discriminations required a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than
other legislative discriminations.53
Costin and Manuel were structured by this understanding of
constitutional equality. Neither treats race distinctions as any

48. Id. at 1184–85.
49. GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 93 (quoting Anonymous, Some Restrictions upon
Legislative Power, 43 ALB. L.J. 25, 25–27 (1891)).
50. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 95, 96-97 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1951); Howard Jay Graham, The Early
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part I, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 491,
506 (1950); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Part II, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 610, 613 (1950); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988).
51. See Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 325 (1848) (“This is . . . very
invidious legislation, when applied to classes or to particular kinds of property before
allowed to be held generally. Legislation for particular cases or contracts . . . is of very
doubtful validity.”).
52. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1141.
53. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1181.
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more or less offensive to the law than other distinctions. Both
explore whether real differences exist between the races and
whether the law based on these differences serves the public
interest. Both conclude that racial differences exist that justify
laws in the public interest.54 Neither assumes a different mode of
analysis would be appropriate if white persons were being legally
burdened. Both treat constitutional equality as requiring justices
to make fact judgments rather than rely on categorical analyses.55
Many antebellum judicial decisions justifying racial
discrimination did so by claiming that the main difference
between white persons and persons of color was that only white
persons were citizens.56 The Supreme Court of Tennessee, when
sustaining a ban on black immigration to the state declared, “free
negroes . . . are not citizens in the sense of the Constitution; and
therefore when coming among us are not entitled to all the
‘privileges and immunities’ of citizens of this State.”57 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina, in White v. Tax Collector of
Kershaw District, determining that free blacks were subject to a
special tax, declared, “[a] firm and wise policy has excluded this
class from the rights of citizenship in this and almost every State
in which they are found.”58 Slaves gained few rights, the Supreme
Court of Georgia declared, when freed by their former masters.59
Bryan v. Walton decreed, “the act of manumission confers no
54. Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston engaged in similar analysis when
holding that segregated schools were consistent with the equality and citizenship rights
enjoyed by persons of color because separating the races promoted the public welfare. He
claimed, the school board could reasonably conclude that “the good of both classes of schools
will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and for white
children . . . .” 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849).
55. See Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266);
State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (N.C. 1838).
56. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 512, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (1846); Aldridge v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (declaring that persons of
color were not “comprehended” by the state “Constitution or Bill of Rights”); Bryan’s Heirs
v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, 453–54 (1852) (declaring that free persons of color are “neither
freemen nor slaves”); Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 344 (1822); see also MARK A.
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
57. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 341 (1838); see Pendleton, 6 Ark. at 509,
___ S.W.3d at ___ (sustaining a state ban on black immigration because persons of color
could be neither citizens of the United States nor citizens of Arkansas).
58. 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1846).
59. See Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201-02 (1853).
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other right but that of freedom from the dominion of the master,
and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not and cannot
confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or political,
incident to citizenship.”60 Florida case law maintained that free
persons of color could not claim any rights at all as a matter of
constitutional grace.61 “[T]he rights of free negroes,” Clark v.
Gautier stated, “depend entirely upon municipal regulations.”62
Costin and Manual established that black citizenship was no
bar against race discrimination. Jacksonians were convinced that
real differences existed between white persons and persons of
color. Chancellor James Kent’s extraordinarily influential
Commentaries on American Law declared that “[t]he African
race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior
rank and condition in society.”63 Sidney George Fisher, a leading
northern political and constitutional commentator, maintained:
These races are distinguished by clearly defined and
different organic physical structure, and also by different
mental and moral traits, more especially by inequality of
mental and moral force, and have been so distinguished,
without change, in all ages.64

The same principles, at least in theory, governed actual laws
that discriminated against persons of color as hypothetical laws
that discriminated against white persons. The crucial issue in
both circumstances was whether racial differences were real and
whether the law served the public interest. This inquiry required
justices to make fact inquiries. Constitutional decision makers
had to determine whether a real difference existed between the
races. They then had to determine whether the law based on that
real difference served the public interest. Such laws, providing
benefits to black Americans denied to their white neighbors, did
not exist before the Civil War because neither Jacksonian
legislators nor Jacksonian judges could imagine a real difference
60. Id. at 198.
61. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 362 (1859).
62. Id. at 363.
63. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (John M. Gould ed.,
Little, Brown, & Co., 14th ed. 1896). See, e.g., Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 346 (1834).
64. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE LAWS OF RACE, AS CONNECTED WITH SLAVERY
10 (Philadelphia, Willis P. Hazard 1860).
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between white persons and persons of color that might justify a
law that placed special burdens on white persons or gave special
benefits to persons of color.65
Judges enforced the constitutional law of equality during the
Costin/Manual regime. By the Civil War, a well-developed state
jurisprudence existed establishing the basic parameters of
constitutional equality.66 The Supreme Court of Tennessee,
which was quite deferential in Manual when sustaining race
discriminations against persons of color, was a judicial leader in
setting the standards for scrutinizing discriminations between
different classes of white persons. Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy,
when striking down a law that forbade courts from hearing certain
lawsuits brought for the benefit of other persons, insisted that
“every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording
remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and
void.”67 Justice Nathan Green elaborated on the judicial
responsibility for implementing constitutional “law of the land”
clauses, declaring, “[d]oes it not seem conclusive then, that this
provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting
any law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at
the same time the rights of all others in similar circumstances
were equally affected by it?”68
An examination of race cases only would barely detect this
commitment to judicial power. Courts sustained almost all race
conscious measures that were adjudicated before the Civil War.
With the exception of a California decision holding that a state
65. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–54 (1997).
66. See GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 54; Saunders, supra note 65, 252–54; see also
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (citing numerous cases from numerous
state courts decided before 1865 for the “principle of constitutional law which prohibits
unequal and partial legislation upon general subjects . . . .”).
67. 10 Tenn. 554, 555 (1831); see Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 260, 269-70 (1829)
(“That a partial law, tending directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual
or rights to property, or to the equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land, is
unconstitutional and void, we do not doubt.”); James v. Adm’rs of G.W. Reynolds, 2 Tex.
250, 252 (1847) (“[G]eneral public laws, binding all the members of the community under
similar circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private
individuals, or classes of individuals.”).
68. State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831).
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tax on Chinese immigrants was inconsistent with federal
commerce power,69 no free state court declared unconstitutional
any law discriminating against free persons of color.70 Free state
justices sustained or implemented without commentary laws
limiting the testimony of persons of color,71 allocating taxes on
the basis of race,72 mandating different guardianship rules on the
basis of race,73 prohibiting persons of color from attending public
schools,74 banning persons of color from voting75 or holding
public offices,76 forbidding persons of color from marrying a
white person77 or performing marriages,78 and refusing to permit
persons of color to reside in the state.79
Southern courts were even worse. The Supreme Court of
Georgia in Bryan v. Walton highlighted the narrow distance
between the legal status of free persons of color and the legal
status of slaves when noting that:
[T]he status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free,
is such that he has no civil, social or political rights or
capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed on him by
69. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857).
70. But see Op. of J. Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 575–76 (1857) (declaring in an advisory
opinion that free persons of color had a right to vote in Maine).
71. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 361 (1859).
72. See White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw Dist., 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 136 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1846).
73. See Thaxter v. Grinnell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 13, 14–15 (1840).
74. See Williams v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist., No. 6, Wright 579, 580 (Ohio 1834); Chalmers
v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386, 387 (1842); Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 332 (1850) (separate
schools may be organized, but not constitutionally required); Draper v. Cambridge, 20 Ind.
268, 269 (1863).
75. See Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1837); State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L.
177, 188 (N.J. 1855); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 438 (1866); Anderson v. Milliken, 9
Ohio St. 568, 570 (1859); Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 306 (1863).
76. See State ex rel. Dirs. of E. & W. Sch. Dists. v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178, 197 (1850)
(holding that a school board director is not an officer of the state that must be held by a white
person).
77. See Samuel v. Berry, 7 Mich. 467 (1859); Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 78 (1852);
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 57 (1810).
78. State v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 20, 22 (Ohio 1843).
79. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 170 (1857); Barkshire v. State, 7 Ind. 389, 389
(1856); Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390, 390 (1864); Glenn v. People, 17 Ill. 105, 106-07 (1855)
(upholding a ban on persons of color residing in the state though refusing to enforce the ban
on other grounds). Three Supreme Court Justices in the Passenger Cases approved state
laws banning persons of color. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 429 (1849). See also
People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 146 (1860) (dicta suggesting that prosecutors should be
permitted to present evidence that Chinese residents tend to resist tax collection).
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Statute; that he can neither contract, nor be contracted with;
that the free negro can act only by and through his guardian;
that he is in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship; and
that this condition he can never change by his own volition.
....
He is associated still with the slave in this State, in some of
the most humiliating incidents of his degradation. —Like
the slave, the free person of color is incompetent to testify
against a free white citizen. He lives under, and is tried by
the same Criminal Code. He has neither vote nor voice in
forming the laws by which he is governed. He is not allowed
to keep or carry fire-arms. He cannot preach or exhort
without a special license, on pain of imprisonment, fine and
corporeal punishment. He cannot be employed in mixing or
vending drugs or medicines of any description. A white man
is liable to a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment
in the common jail, at the discretion of the Court, for
teaching a free negro to read and write; and if one free negro
teach another, he is punishable by fine and whipping, or fine
or whipping, at the discretion of the Court. To employ a free
person of color to set up type in a printing office, or any other
labor requiring a knowledge of reading or writing, subjects
the offender to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.80

Free persons of color did not get an “0-fer” in slave state
courts. City of Memphis v. Winfield81 declared unconstitutional a
curfew limited to free black citizens. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee described the measure as “an attempt to impair the
liberty of a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the
exercise of his lawful pursuits, and to make an innocent act a
crime . . . .”82 The Supreme Court of Kentucky when declaring
unconstitutional a law forbidding persons of color from defending
themselves from an assault initiated by a white person declared
that the legislative power in question “can not [be] exercise[d]
over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of color,
or citizens.”83 The Supreme Courts of Virginia and Georgia held
that a free person of color claimed as a slave had a right to habeas
corpus, although both decisions interpreted statutes that did not
80.
81.
82.
83.

Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198, 202-03 (1853).
27 Tenn. 707, 709 (1848).
Id.
Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 75 (1820).
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make explicit race discriminations.84 After noting that the statute
granting rights to habeas corpus did not make a racial distinction,
Judge Tucker of the Virginia Supreme Court stated, “[a] free
negro, as well as a free white man, must be entitled to the benefit
of the habeas corpus act, both according to its language, which is
broad and general, and still more according to its spirit, which is
yet more liberal and beneficent.”85 Georgia justices in State v.
Philpot stated, “the free person of color enjoying personal liberty
has the benefit of the habeas corpus secured to him by a
constitutional guaranty.”86 No state court reached the conclusion
that the legislature had unconstitutionally discriminated against
free blacks, that a law that subjected all persons to the disabilities
the legislature had imposed solely on the basis of race would have
been constitutional.
No consensus developed in the antebellum United States on
the best textual hook to hang constitutional commitments to
equality. Cranch did not point to any provision in any constitution
when in Costin he claimed, “the constitution gives equal rights to
all the citizens of the United States . . . .”87 State courts were
promiscuous when providing the constitutional underpinnings for
equal rights.88 State decisions were rooted in general equality
provisions,89 in “due process” or “law of the land” provisions,90
on constitutional provisions prohibiting exclusive privileges or
special laws,91 on separation of powers grounds92 or on general
84. DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 449 (1836); State v. Philpot, 1 Dud. 46, 46 (Super.
Ct. Richmond Cnty. 1831).
85. DeLacy, 34 Va. at 444.
86. 1 Dud. at 52.
87. Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-27 (1857).
88. Saunders, supra note 65, at 258.
89. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 360-61 (Ala. 1838); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336-37
(1825); City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s Heirs, 39 Ky. 513, 516 (1839) (relying on both the
general equality provisions and provisions requiring “equal and uniform” taxation).
90. Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. 483, 490-93 (1842); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v.
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858).
91. See Thomas v. Bd. of Comm’rs., 5 Ind. 4, 8 (1854) (citing numerous Indiana
decisions declaring legislation “not within the constitutional prohibition of special and local
legislation”); Smith’s Adm’rs. v. Smith, 2 Miss. 102, 103 (1834); McRee v. Wilmington, 47
N.C. 186, 190 (1855); Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 491, 496-97 (1858); Norwich Gaslight Co.
v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856).
92. See Regents of Univ. of Md., 9 G. & J. at 411.
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constitutional principles.93 The Supreme Court of Vermont, in
Ward v. Barnard, without citing any particular provision in the
state constitution, struck down a legislative act on the ground that
“[a]n act conferring upon any one citizen, privileges to the
prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in like
circumstances . . . , does not enter into the idea of municipal law,
having no relation to the community in general.”94 Costin appears
to have relied on the same belief that equality was implicit in
American constitutionalism, even when not explicitly provided
for by constitutional text.
II. THE TURNER REGIME
Chief Justice Salmon Chase’s brief opinion on circuit in In
re Turner captured the constitutional law of race equality during
Reconstruction.95 Elizabeth Turner was emancipated by the
Constitution of Maryland on November 1, 1864.96 She was
almost immediately indentured to her former master Philemon T.
Hambleton.97 The Maryland law of indentures at the time made
a sharp distinction between whites and persons of color.98 As
Chase summarized:
The petitioner, under this indenture, is not entitled to any
education; a white apprentice must be taught reading,
writing, and arithmetic. The petitioner is liable to be
assigned and transferred at the will of the master to any
person in the same county; the white apprentice is not so
liable. The authority of the master over the petitioner is

93. Norwich Gaslight Co., 25 Conn. at 38.
94. Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 128 (Vt. 1825); see Lewis, 3 Me. at 332-34; Reed v.
Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27, 28 (Iowa 1849) (treating “law of the land” as a general principle);
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404-05 (1814); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 70-71
(1836); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn.
554, 555 (1831); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,502).
95. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). For a discussion of Turner, see
HAROLD H. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER
AND TEXAS V. WHITE 127-39 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1997).
96. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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described in the law as a ‘property and interest;’ no such
description is applied to authority over a white apprentice.99

Chase granted Turner’s petition for habeas corpus, releasing her
from Hambleton’s custody on two grounds. First, he declared that
the indenture was an involuntary servitude that directly violated
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment.100 Second, Chase
ruled that the Maryland indenture law violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which was a constitutional exercise of congressional
power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. In re
Turner stated:
[T]he indenture set forth in the return does not contain
important provisions for the security and benefit of the
apprentice which are required by the laws of Maryland in
indenture of white apprentices, and is, therefore, in
contravention of that clause of the first section of the civil
rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, “full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.”101

The constitutional law of racial equality in the Turner regime
had three foundations. The Thirteenth Amendment supplied the
textual hook. Congress was the institution primarily responsible
for implementing the constitutional ban on slavery. Chase
declared Hambleton’s failure to provide Turner with the benefits
the Maryland law mandated for white persons violated federal
legislation passed under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment.102 He did not maintain that those provisions of the
indenture would be unconstitutional in the absence of federal
legislation. Congress was the first mover. Congress when
implementing the Thirteenth Amendment could take all steps
necessary to ensure that former slaves were transformed into full
citizens. Chase claimed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
constitutional because “[c]olored persons equally with white
persons are citizens of the United States.”103
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 340.
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Republicans when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act emphasized the Thirteenth
Amendment as the proper textual hook for the constitutional law
of racial equality.104
Senator Lyman Trumbull’s speech
introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate declared
with reference to the Black Codes, “[t]he purpose of the bill under
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry
into effect the constitutional amendment.”105 The Thirteenth
Amendment’s ban on slavery extended to discriminations against
persons of color because race discriminations in both the free and
slave states were “badges of servitude made in the interest of
slavery and as part of slavery.”106 Trumbull asserted, “[t]hey
never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for
slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.”107
Republican members of the House and Senate during early
Reconstruction insisted that Congress was the institution
primarily responsible for implementing the Thirteenth
Amendment’s commitment to racial equality. Their Thirteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to legislate, not courts to
constrain. Senator Charles Sumner spoke of a “pledge[] to
maintain the emancipated slave in his freedom,” a pledge that
“must be performed by the national government.”108 “[W]hat
makes this constitutional amendment a practical, living thing,”
Senator William Stewart of Nevada stated, “is the power given to
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation.”109 In his view,
“it must for years be the effective power of Congress, cooperating
with the Executive, that will protect the freedmen from
oppression . . . .”110 Litigation standing alone, Republicans
insisted, could not destroy the badges and incidents of slavery or
the slave system. When Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania
suggested that persons of color sue to protect their rights, Senator
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts responded, “the Senator says that
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1865).
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id. at 91.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1865).
Id.

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:47 PM

442

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

the Constitution of the United States protects these people. I
agree that it does so far as the Constitution can do it; and the
amendment to the Constitution empowers us to pass the necessary
legislation to make them free indeed . . . .”111 Representative
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota stated, “a grand abstract
declaration, unenforced by the arm of authority, is not a
protection.”112
Congress was empowered under the Thirteenth Amendment
to pass any legislation that helped transform former slaves into
full citizens. The revised Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
covered:
[A]ll loyal refugees and freedmen, so far as the same shall
be necessary to enable them as speedily as practicable to
become self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to
aid them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation
of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under the laws
of States, and by constitutional amendment, available to
them and beneficial to the republic.113

Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained:
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now
adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer
exist, and which authorizes Congress by appropriate
legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we
have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is
deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in
view, secure freedom to all people in the United States. The
various State laws to which I have referred—and there are
many others—although they do not make a man an absolute
slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is
perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not
allow a colored person to go from one county to another is
certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman. A
law that does not allow a colored person to hold property,
does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is

111. Id. at 340.
112. Id. at 588.
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-74 (1866).
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certainly a law in violation of the rights of a freeman, and
being so may properly be declared void.114

This power to strike a death blow to slavery included the power
to eradicate the slave system as well as slavery. “Having
prohibited slavery,” Donnelly insisted, “we must not pause for an
instant until the spirit of slavery is extinct, and every trace left by
it in our laws is obliterated.”115 Congress had to grant persons of
color sufficient rights so that no vestige of human bondage
remained. Sumner stated, “[b]eyond all question the protection
of the colored race in civil rights is essential to complete the
abolition of slavery . . . .” 116
Trumbull captured the essence of the Turner regime when
he declared:
I have no doubt that under this provision of the Constitution
we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights
against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing. It was for that purpose that
the second clause of that amendment was adopted, which
says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate
legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting
slavery. Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation
is to be? The Congress of the United States; and it is for
Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may
think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end. If
we believe a Freedmen’s Bureau necessary, if we believe an
act punishing any man who deprives a colored person of any
civil rights on account of his color necessary—if that is one
means to secure his freedom, we have the constitutional right
to adopt it. If in order to prevent slavery Congress deem it
necessary to declare null and void all laws which will not
permit the colored man to contract, which will not permit
him to testify, which will not permit him to buy and sell, and
to go where he pleases, it has the power to do so, and not
only the power, but it becomes its duty to do so.117

The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination against
persons of color when prohibiting slavery. Congress was the
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 475.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 322.
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institution authorized to determine the constitutional law of racial
equality. Congress could pass any measure that promoted racial
equality and full citizenship.
The logic of Thirteenth Amendment foundations for the
constitutional law of racial equality supported race conscious
programs that benefitted persons of color as well as
antidiscrimination measures.118 The fundamental question in the
Turner regime was whether the law undermined slavery, the slave
power, or the slave system.119 Laws that prevented discrimination
against persons of color and laws that provided specific benefits
to persons of color were both constitutional means for
undermining the slave system and for making former slaves full
citizens of the United States. Representative Samuel W. Moulton
of Illinois stated, “[t]he very object of the [Second Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill] is to break down the discrimination between whites
and blacks . . . . Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill
is the amelioration of the condition of the colored people.”120
Race conscious measures that protected persons of color were
justified because real differences existed between longstanding
white citizens and newly freed slaves.
[N]ever before in the history of this Government have nearly
four million people been emancipated from the most abject
and degrading slavery ever imposed upon human beings;
never before has the occasion arisen when it was necessary
to provide for such large numbers of people thrown upon the
bounty of the Government, unprotected and unprovided for
. . . . [C]an we not provide for those among us who have
been held in bondage all their lives, who have never been
permitted to earn one dollar for themselves, who, by the great
constitutional amendment declaring freedom throughout the
land, have been discharged from bondage to their masters
who had hitherto provided for their necessities in
consideration of their services?121

Laws that discriminated against persons of color, by comparison,
sought to re-establish in different form rather than eradicate
118. This paragraph relies heavily on Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
119. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 388 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866).
121. Id. at 939.
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human bondage. Trumbull stated, “under this provision of the
Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil
rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing.”122
The Thirteenth Amendment law of racial equality did not
have a state action limitation. Chase in Turner declared the
indenture unconstitutional, not the state law mandating different
treatment for white apprentices and apprentices of color.123 “The
alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary
servitude,” he maintained, “within the meaning of the[] words in
the amendment.”124 Chase then observed “the indenture” violated
the Civil Rights Act because that private bargain “d[id] not
contain important provisions for the security and benefit of the
apprentice, which are required by the laws of Maryland in
indentures of white apprentices . . . .”125
Charles Sumner when making a Thirteenth Amendment
defense of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made no
reference to any state action limit on federal authority to make
persons of color equal citizens. The senior Senator from
Massachusetts insisted that the scope of Congressional power
under the constitutional ban on slavery was as broad as the scope
of government power.126 If the federal or state government could
regulate an institution, the federal government under the
Thirteenth Amendment could require that institution to refrain
from discriminating against persons of color. Sumner declared,
“[s]how me . . . a legal institution, anything created or regulated
by law, and I show you what must be opened equally to all
without distinction of color.”127 “Theaters and other places of
public amusement” could be prohibited from engaging in race
discrimination, even if they had no common law obligation to
serve all customers because “they are public institutions,
regulated if not created by law . . . .”128 Congress had the power
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 322.
Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
Id.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 825 (1870).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 383.
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to “open to all persons, without distinction of color” all
“institutions which have the sanction of law, which depend upon
law, which depend upon State or municipal authority.”129
Regulations could be benefits. “Whoever seeks the benefit of the
law,” Sumner declared, “must show equality.”130 He insisted that
private colleges be prohibited from discriminating against
persons of color. “I wish under this law to make it impossible for
Harvard College to close its gates against a colored person[,]” he
declared on May 21, 1873.131 “Take all our great institutions of
learning. They are not sustained by ‘moneys derived from
general taxation,’ but they are ‘authorized by law.’”132 Sumner’s
Civil Rights Act would have prohibited religious institutions from
engaging in discrimination. “[W]hen a church organization asks
the benefit of the law by an act of incorporation,” Sumner stated,
“it must submit to the great primal law of this Union—the
Constitution of the United States, interpreted by the Declaration
of Independence.”133
III. THE STRAUDER REGIME
The Supreme Court in the 1870s modified the Turner regime
by changing the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality. Strauder v. West Virginia,134 Ex parte Virginia,135 and
Commonwealth v. Rives136 completed the process by which the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment replaced
the Thirteenth Amendment as the foundation for attacks on race
discrimination.
The shift in textual hook had doctrinal
consequences. The cabining of the Thirteenth Amendment and
corresponding rise of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One
129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1869).
130. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1869); see id. (“[A]ll that my bill
proposes is that those who enjoy the benefits of law shall treat those who come to them with
equality.”).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (1870).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 823; see id. at 896 (“[T]o apply to an incorporated association the great
principles of our Government . . . does not in any respect interfere with religion . . . .”);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 3 (1870).
134. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
135. 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).
136. 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879).
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introduced the state action doctrine to the constitutional law of the
United States.137 Constitutional decisionmakers interpreting the
race-neutral Equal Protection Clause were far more prone to use
colorblind rhetoric than Republicans during early Reconstruction
who spoke of a constitutional obligation to transform former
slaves into full citizens.138 Intimations of legislative supremacy
morphed into commitments to legislative primacy. Congress
remained the institution constitutionally charged with
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme
Court determined the scope and nature of that constitutional
commitment to racial equality.
The Strauder regime was anticipated by influential dicta in
the Slaughter-House Cases asserting that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment banned race discrimination
and only race or analogous discrimination.139 Justice Samuel
Miller’s brief analysis in that case on the constitutional ban on
slavery limited the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to
“servitude.”140 The Fourteenth Amendment, in his view,
contained the provisions that protected the rights of newly freed
slaves.141 The Equal Protection Clause, Miller declared, was the
constitutional provision that banned race discrimination.142 “The
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by
[the Equal Protection C]lause . . . .”143 The Slaughter-House
majority severed equal protection completely from the
antebellum concerns with arbitrary discriminations that
structured the Costin/Manuel regime and help explain why the
persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment preferred race
neutral language to a more explicit ban on race discrimination.144
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
140. Id. at 69; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (rejecting a claim that
private discrimination violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
141. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The best discussion of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s decision to adopt
a race neutral Equal Protection Clause rather than an explicit ban on race discrimination is
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Slaughter-House’s Equal Protection Clause prohibited race
discrimination, whether arbitrary or not, and hardly any, if any,
other discriminations, no matter how arbitrary. Miller concluded:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.145

The Supreme Court in Strauder officially made the
Fourteenth Amendment the constitutional foundation for the law
of racial equality.146 Justice William Strong’s majority opinion,
after quoting the text of Section One, declared:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be
the same for the black as for the white; that all persons,
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws
of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of
their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored
race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.147

Racial discriminations stood on a different constitutional footing
than other discriminations. States, Strong wrote, “may confine
[jury] selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons
within certain ages, or to persons having educational

Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287 (2015).
145. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81.
146. For an important discussion of Strauder, see Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v.
West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained
Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS L. J. 603
(2018).
147. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879).
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qualifications.”148 Echoing Slaughter-House on the limited scope
of equal protection, the Strauder opinion continued, “[w]e do not
believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit
this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its
aim was against discrimination because of race or color.”149
Strong endorsed the Turner regime’s commitment to an
absolute ban on discrimination against former slaves.150 The
Strauder/Virginia/Rives opinions followed Turner by not
exploring whether real differences existed between white persons
and persons of color that might justify limiting juries only to
white people. Strong never discussed whether the West Virginia
law prohibiting persons of color from serving on criminal juries
served a social interest. He did not consider whether real
differences existed between white persons and persons of color
that justified excluding persons of color from juries. What
mattered for the purpose of the constitutional law of equality
under the Fourteenth Amendment was that the State had engaged
in race discrimination. Strong’s majority opinion in Rives
declared, “[t]he plain object of [the post-Civil War Amendments]
was to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a
level with whites. They made the rights and responsibilities, civil
and criminal, of the two races exactly the same.”151 Ex parte
Virginia reiterated this claim.152 Strong asserted:
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the
colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude
in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the States. They were intended to take away
all possibility of oppression by law because of race or
color.153

148. Id. at 310.
149. Id.; see also State v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98, 99 (1869) (striking down without
explaining in any detail a state law prohibiting persons of color from testifying against white
persons as inconsistent with the state constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
150. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
151. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
152. See 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879).
153. Id.; see also Underwood, 63 N.C. at 98-99.
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Justice John Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy more
explicitly captured the distinction the Turner and Strauder
regimes made between sociological difference and racial
equality.154
Harlan endorsed the Costin/Manuel regime’s
understanding that real differences exist between the races. He
wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty.155

These sociological differences, however, did not make a legal
difference. Harlan continued:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most
powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.156

Discrimination was unconstitutional, Harlan made clear, even
when real differences existed between the races.
Strauder broke from the Turner regime by adopting what
later became known as a “banned categories” approach rather
than a ban on discrimination against persons of color.157
Congress, when implementing the Thirteenth Amendment’s
mandate for racial equality, had passed race conscious measures
that favored former slaves, while insisting that persons of color
enjoy the civil rights of white persons.158 Strauder and
subsequent cases ruled out legislation making African Americans
“the special favorite of the laws . . . .”159 A constitutional law of
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 559.
Id.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 383-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986).
See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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racial equality rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure a “perfect
equality of civil rights” rather than provide former slaves and
persons of color with the rights and resources necessary to
become full American citizens.160
The late Strauder regime introduced the state action doctrine
to American law.161 The Thirteenth Amendment that provided
the foundations for the Turner regime banned slavery in toto, not
merely state laws that sanctioned slavery.162 Turner working
within those parameters explored whether the agreement between
Hambleton and Turner was constitutional and whether that
agreement violated federal laws implementing the Thirteenth
Amendment.163 Justice John Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases articulated the Turner regime’s understanding that
individual behavior as well as government action was subject to
constitutional regulation. He maintained:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce [the
Thirteenth A]mendment, by appropriate legislation, may
enact laws to protect that people against the
deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted
to other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may
be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States,
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and
wield power and authority under the State.164

The Fourteenth Amendment that provided the foundation for the
Strauder regime excluded private discrimination when declaring,
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”165 The majority opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases emphasized the insertion of “No State” in Section
One.166 Justice Joseph Bradley insisted:
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 6.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12.
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matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope.
It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State
action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures
them in life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the
laws . . . . It does not invest Congress with power to legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of State
legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State
legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of
redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of
State officers executive or judicial, when these are
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured
by way of prohibition against State laws and State
proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of
carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State
laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction
of their operation and effect.167

In sharp contrast to Turner’s focus on the legal relationship
between Hambleton and Turner, Justice Bradley’s opinion
discussed only what state officials had done and had not done.
The relationship between Robinson and the Memphis &
Charleston Railroad Company under the Strauder regime was
none of the Constitution’s business.168
Strong’s majority opinions in Ex parte Virginia, Strauder,
and Rives modified the Turner regime’s institutional
commitments by developing what we might call legislative
primacy.169 Ex parte Virginia introduced legislative primacy to
the constitutional law of the United States when declaring:
It is not said the judicial power of the general government
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting
167. Id.
168. See id. at 13.
169. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
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the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the
amendments fully effective.
Whatever legislation is
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.170

The constitutional law of race equality under legislative primacy
requires that Congress be the first mover. Litigants may assert
rights under the Equal Protection Clause only after Congress
passes a statute implementing the Equal Protection Clause.
Congress may implement, but not interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment. Federal courts must review all exercises of
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ensure that Congress, when regulating race
discrimination, has remained within judicially enforceable
constitutional limits on federal power.171
Strauder illustrates legislative primacy in action. Strong
insisted the litigants base their claim on federal constitutional and
federal statutory law.172 After “[c]oncluding . . . that the statute
of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors . . .
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to a colored man,” he did not
immediately declare the law unconstitutional.173 Instead, Strong
turned to federal statutory law. Strauder continued, “it remains
only to be considered whether the power of Congress to enforce
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate
legislation is sufficient to justify the enactment of sect. 641 of the

170.
171.
172.
173.

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
Id. at 310.
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Revised Statutes.”174 Strauder succeeded in Strauder because
Congress had passed a law implementing his right against race
discrimination in jury selection and the Justices independently
determined that the federal law in question passed constitutional
muster.175 Strauder and Ex parte Virginia were correct because
the West Virginia state legislature and Virginia bench were
violating a congressional ban on race discrimination in jury
selection and Congress had the power to pass that ban under
Sections One and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 At no
point did any decision in the Strauder/Virginia/Rives trilogy
indicate the federal judiciary could in the absence of a federal
statute declare unconstitutional under Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment state laws limiting juries to white
citizens.
Federal judicial practice in race cases during the late
nineteenth century was structured by this institutional
commitment to legislative primacy. From 1868 until 1896, every
case the Supreme Court decided on the constitutional meaning of
racial equality concerned the constitutionality and scope of
federal laws implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or
Fifteenth Amendments.177 Some cases were brought by persons
of color claiming rights under the federal statutes Congress
passed when implementing the post-Civil War Constitution.178
Other cases were brought by white persons claiming the federal
law under which they were indicted was not warranted by the
post-Civil War Constitution or that their indictments were not
warranted by federal laws implementing the post-Civil War
Constitution.179
The Justices acknowledged in dicta the
174. Id.
175. Id. at 310-11.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
177. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
178. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365 (1886); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110,
113-14 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1880); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304;
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 315 (1879). In Pace v. Alabama, Justice Stephen Field
declared that the plaintiff claimed that laws prohibiting interracial marriage “conflict[] with
. . . the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883). Field’s brief analysis,
however, also maintained that the prohibition did not conflict with the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Id. at 584-85.
179. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629, 641 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
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possibility of claims to racial equality that had no statutory
foundation. “Th[e] [Thirteenth A]mendment, as well as the
Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without any
ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any
existing state of circumstances.”180 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court for a quarter of a century did not adjudicate a single claim
that persons had rights under the post-Civil War Amendments
independent of the rights Congress had granted by federal law.
Judge William Woods in United States v. Hall captured the
foundational institutional principle of judicial practice in cases
raising constitutional questions about racial equality when he
declared, “to guard against the invasion of the citizen’s
fundamental rights, and to insure their adequate protection, as
well against state legislation as state inaction, or incompetency,
the [Fourteenth A]mendment gives congress the power to enforce
its provisions by appropriate legislation.”181 When discussing the
Equal Protection Clause in particular, Woods asserted,
“[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect
the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against
unfriendly or insufficient state legislation . . . .”182
IV. THE PLESSY REGIME
The Supreme Court in Plessy maintained the textual hook of
the Strauder regime, while abandoning post-Reconstruction
institutional commitments and modifying racial equality
339, 340 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1875); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1875); see also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581,
590 (1871) (finding that Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not permit removal of a case to federal
court when state law forbade the witnesses of color from testifying in a criminal case). The
Supreme Court in a series of cases also sustained federal laws protecting persons of color as
constitutional exercises of congressional power under Article I, Section 4 or inherent federal
authority to protect the integrity of federal elections or federal prisoners. See Ku-Klux Cases,
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (Congress has power independently of the post-Civil War
Amendments to prohibit private persons from preventing persons of color from voting);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892). For an important discussion of these
powers, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011).
180. 109 U.S. at 20.
181. 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
182. Id. at 81.
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doctrine.183 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment during the late nineteenth and first part of the
twentieth centuries provided the textual foundation for the
constitutional law of racial equality. Federal courts replaced
Congress as the institution primarily responsible for
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
The constitutional law of racial equality bifurcated. Racial
discriminations remained per se unconstitutional.
Racial
distinctions were constitutional if, as the revived antebellum
Costin/Manuel regime mandated, they were rooted in real
differences between the races and advanced the public welfare.184
Plessy further entrenched the Fourteenth Amendment as the
textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality. Justice
Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion, following SlaughterHouse185 and the Civil Rights Cases,186 cast aside arguments that
race discrimination was an aspect of slavery or a slave system.
“Slavery,” he said when rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment attack
on a Louisiana law mandating race segregation in street cars,
“implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the
ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the
labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property
and services.”187 As Miller asserted in Slaughter-House,188
Brown in Plessy maintained the Fourteenth Amendment was
enacted because the constitutional ban on slavery did not cover
the Black Codes or related discriminations against former
slaves.189 The Thirteenth Amendment, he stated, “was regarded
183. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896).
184. See id. at 543-44, 548, 550-52; Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14
(C.C.D.C. 1821) (No, 3,266); State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).
185. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (construing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)).
186. See 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
187. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
188. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71 (the Black Codes “forced upon the
statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the
rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They
accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment . . . .”).
189. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-44.
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by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored
race from certain laws which have been enacted in the Southern
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and
burdens . . . .”190 The Fourteenth Amendment was Brown’s
source for the constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality
of the two races before the law . . . .”191 The ensuing discussion
in Plessy elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.
Brown did not consider the distinctive meaning of any provision
in Section One. Plessy concluded, “we think the enforced
separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the
state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored
man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor
denies him the equal protection of the laws . . . .”192
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
became the specific textual hook for the constitutional law of
racial equality over the next thirty years. Justice John Harlan did
not mention the Due Process Clause when discussing what
clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment supported a judicial
decision sustaining a local law that provided high school
education for white children but not for children of color. His
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education
declared:
[W]e cannot say that this action of the state court was, within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the
state to the plaintiffs and to those associated with them of the
equal protection of the laws or of any privileges belonging
to them as citizens of the United States.193

Gong Lum v. Rice omitted the Privileges and Immunities Clause
as a textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.194
Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s unanimous opinion stated:
The case then reduces itself to the question whether a state
can be said to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry born in
this country, and a citizen of the United States, the equal
protection of the laws, by giving her the opportunity for a
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 548.
175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
See 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927).
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common school education in a school which receives only
colored children of the brown, yellow or black races.195

When federal courts immediately before the New Deal spoke on
the constitutional law of racial equality, they interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause and only the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in Nixon v. Herndon declared
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting persons of color from
voting in primary elections because the Fourteenth Amendment
“denied to any State the power to withhold from [African
Americans] the equal protection of the laws.”196
The Plessy regime divided the law of racial equality into the
law of race discriminations and race distinctions. Gilbert Thomas
Stephenson’s influential Race Distinctions in American Law
detailed the nature and significance of these categories. He wrote:
[T]here is an essential difference between race distinctions
and race discriminations. North Carolina, for example, has
a law that white and Negro children shall not attend the same
schools, but that separate schools shall be maintained. If the
terms for all the public schools in the State are equal in
length, if the teaching force is equal in numbers and ability,
if the school buildings are equal in convenience,
accommodations, and appointments, a race distinction exists
but not a discrimination.197

Race discriminations were per se unconstitutional. Such a law,
Stephenson declared, “necessarily implies partiality and
favoritism.”198 Race distinctions were constitutional if, as the
Costin/Manuel regime required, they were based on real
differences between the races and promoted the good of both
races. Race Distinctions in American Law explained:
Identity of accommodation is not essential to avoid the
charge of discrimination. If there are in a particular school
district twice as many white children as there are Negro
195. Id.
196. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932)
(“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court to level by its judgment
these barriers of color.”).
197. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 2-3
(1910).
198. Id. at 4.
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children, the school building for the former should be twice
as large as that for the latter. The course of study need not
be the same. If scientific investigation and experience show
that in the education of the Negro child emphasis should be
placed on one course of study, and in the education of the
white child, on another; it is not a discrimination to
emphasize industrial training in the Negro school, if that is
better suited to the needs of the Negro pupil, and classics in
the white school if the latter course is more profitable to the
white child. There is no discrimination so long as there is
equality of opportunity, and this equality may often be
attained only by a difference in methods.199

State courts during the second half of the nineteenth century
had struggled with whether to distinguish race discriminations
from race distinctions. Sumner, serving as counsel in Roberts v.
City of Boston, insisted that Boston engaged in unconstitutional
race discrimination when mandating separate schools for white
children and children of color.200 He declared, “[t]he separation
of children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or
race, is in the nature of caste, and is a violation of equality.”201
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s unanimous opinion in Roberts
maintained that government authorities had made a constitutional
race distinction. Shaw “[c]onced[ed] . . . in the fullest manner,
that colored persons . . . are entitled by law . . . to equal rights,”202
but insisted that governing authorities could consistently develop,
with this state constitutional commitment to equality, a “system
of distribution and classification” as long as “this power is
reasonably exercised” and served “the best interests of both
classes of children . . . .”203 Controversies over segregation
intensified in state courts after the Civil War.204 Some state courts

199. Id. at 3.
200. See 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201-03 (1849).
201. Id. at 202 (argument of Charles Sumner).
202. Id. at 206.
203. Id. at 209. For a detailed account of the debate over segregated schools in Boston,
see J. Morgan Kousser, “The Supremacy of Equal Rights”: The Struggle Against Racial
Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941 (1988).
204. For the struggle over school segregation in state constitutional law and practice
during the fifty years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see J. Morgan Kousser,
Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford (Feb. 28, 1985), in DEAD END:
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in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took Sumner’s
position that state segregation laws were racial discriminations.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, when declaring unconstitutional a
local ordinance segregating schools, deduced from the principle
that “all the youths are equal before the law” the holding that a
school board could not constitutionally “deny a youth admission
to any particular school because of his or her nationality, religion,
color, clothing or the like.”205 Other state courts followed Roberts
and sustained such measures as race distinctions. The Supreme
Court of Ohio channeled Chief Justice Shaw when concluding,
“[e]quality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating
white and colored persons in the same school . . . .”206 “Any
classification which preserves substantially equal school
advantages,” Judge Day’s unanimous opinion concluded, “is not
prohibited by either the State or federal constitution . . . .”207
Plessy sided with Ohio against Iowa when sustaining a local
ordinance mandating state segregation on streetcars.208 Brown’s
opinion cited Roberts when anticipating Stephenson’s distinction
between race discriminations and race distinctions.209 He
declared:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN SCHOOLS (1986).
205. Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868); see also People v. Quincy,
101 Ill. 308, 314-15 (1882); Crawford v. Sch. Bd. for Sch. Dist. No. 7, 137 P. 217, 220 (Or.
1913).
206. State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871); see also Puitt v.
Comm’rs of Gaston Cnty, 94 N.C. 709, 719 (1888); State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7
Nev. 342, 347-48 (1872).
207. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 211.
208. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (referencing Garnes, 21 Ohio
St. at 210).
209. See id. at 544 (“The great principle . . . is, that by the constitution and laws of
Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or
condition, are equal before the law . . . . But, when this great principle comes to be applied
to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion,
that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same
treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally
entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and
security.”) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)).
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nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.210

Race discriminations that abridged “the absolute equality of the
two races before the law” were per se unconstitutional.211 Brown
cited Strauder and other cases in which courts had ruled persons
of color were unconstitutionally denied rights granted to white
people.212 None of these cases required investigation into real
differences between the races and whether the law advanced the
public good. Racial distinctions, by comparison, were governed
by the antebellum principle that different treatment passed
constitutional muster if the different treatment was based on real
differences between people and promoted the public good.
Brown’s opinion in Plessy declared, “every exercise of the police
power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”213
The Louisiana segregation law satisfied both prongs of the
constitutional test for race distinctions.214 The Plessy majority
had no doubt that real differences existed between the races.
“[D]istinction[s] which [are] founded in the color of the two
races,” Brown confidently stated, “must always exist so long as
white men are distinguished from the other race by color . . . .”215
The judicial majority was as confident that race segregation
promoted the public welfare. Brown maintained that state
legislatures, when mandating racial separation, had acted “with
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.”216
Harlan appears to have accepted Plessy’s differentiation
between race distinctions and race classifications, but not the
Plessy majority opinion’s application of those categories. Harlan
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 545-46.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 550.
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famously claimed in Plessy that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind,”217 but he was willing in other cases to treat race conscious
measures as making race distinctions rather than race
discriminations.218 His opinion in Cumming,219 after noting that
the plaintiff had not attacked the constitutionality of race
segregation per se,220 endorsed differential racial treatment that,
Harlan claimed, was based on real differences between the races
and advanced the public good. His unanimous opinion for the
court held that a local school board decision could
constitutionally meet a financial crisis by closing the high school
for students of color while keeping open the high school for white
students when the alternative was closing the elementary school
for children of color.221 The school board’s decision to keep open
the school more children of color attended, Harlan concluded,
“was in the interest of the greater number of colored children
. . . .”222 The ordinance at issue in Plessy did not meet this public
good standard. Harlan pointed out, “[e]very one knows that the
statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons.”223 Segregation in this instance, he continued, did not
advance the good of all races but was rooted in unconstitutional
notions “that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens[.]”224 Harlan repeated this emphasis on public purposes
when dissenting in Berea College v. Kentucky.225 Government
could regulate private education, in his view, when “such
instruction is . . . harmful to the public morals or imperils the
public safety.”226 Harlan thought the Kentucky ban on integrated
private schools did not meet this standard because students of
217. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
218. Justice Harlan joined the Supreme Court’s decision in Pace v. State, 106 U.S. 583
(1883), which sustained an Alabama law banning interracial marriage and punishing sexual
relationships outside of marriage more severely when the participants were of different races.
219. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899).
220. See id. at 543-44.
221. See id. at 544-45.
222. Id. at 544.
223. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 560.
225. See 211 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 67.
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different races were “receiving instruction which is not in its
nature harmful or dangerous to the public . . . .”227
The Plessy regime abandoned the Strauder regime’s eroding
institutional commitment to legislative primacy in race cases.
That commitment never took hold outside of the constitutional
law of race equality. No Supreme Court opinion, when discussing
the constitutional rights of butchers and women in the SlaughterHouse Cases228 and Bradwell v. Illinois,229 respectively,
maintained or implied that the judicial role under the post-Civil
War Constitution was limited to determining whether
congressional statutes implementing Section One of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were constitutional. The
judicial decisions that provided the foundations for the freedom
of contract assumed that federal courts had independent power to
declare state laws unconstitutional and need not wait for
congressional guidance.230 Dicta shortly after Strauder was
decided indicated that, in a proper case, the Justices would
abandon legislative primacy when determining the constitutional
law of race equality. “Th[e Thirteenth] Amendment, as well as
the Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil
Rights Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any
existing state of circumstances.”231 The Justices in 1896 finally
harmonized the constitutional law of race equality with the
constitutional law of other facets of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy and the Plessy regime exhibited the same commitments to
judicial supremacy that developed in other areas of constitutional
law during the late nineteenth centuries.232

227. See id. at 68 (citing in support of dissent freedom of contract cases that insisted
that government regulations that imposed differential burdens had to be based on real
differences between people and serve the public good, but did not cite Strauder or any case
declaring race discriminations to be per se unconstitutional).
228. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
229. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
230. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 132-33 (1876).
231. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
232. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1989).
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Plessy was the first case discussing the constitutional law of
racial equality in which the Justices, following existing practice
in non-race cases, discussed only the meaning of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment.233 No opinion commented on
existing federal legislation or the debates in Congress over race
segregation that occurred when Congress was considering what
became the Civil Rights Act of 1875.234 Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy assumed that federal courts had
independent authority to implement Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He wrote, “[h]owever apparent the
injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider
whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United
States.”235 At no point did that dissent consider or even mention
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any other law Congress had
passed implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.236 Justice Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion
did not point to that failure to provide a statutory as well as a
constitutional hook for Plessy’s complaint. Brown assumed, with
Harlan, that the sole issue in Plessy was whether segregation was
consistent with the post-Civil War Constitution and not whether
the judiciary, rather than Congress, was empowered to make that
determination.237
Plessy set the tone for the next fifty years. Congress did not
pass
legislation
implementing
the
post-Civil
War
238
Amendments.
Courts did not first look to legislation already
233. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1120-31 (1995).
234. See McConnell, supra note 233, at 1120-31 (discussing such debates).
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. Homer Plessy’s lawyers also discussed only constitutional issues. See Brief for
Plaintiff in Error at ___, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1896 WL 13990;
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson at ___, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. ___), 1893
WL 10660.
237. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (“The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the
ground that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing
slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the
part of the States.”).
238. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
47, 56, 82 (2018) (noting that Congress debated at some length between Reconstruction and
the Great Society measures designed to implement the Fourteenth Amendment but did not
pass any legislation).
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on the books when determining the constitutional law of equal
protection. Williams v. Mississippi, decided two years after
Plessy, implicitly affirmed Plessy’s unspoken institutional
premise.239 Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion held that
Mississippi’s voting laws that were race neutral on their face did
not violate Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment because
plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory administration, not merely
discriminatory motivation.240 As in Plessy, the Justices discussed
only the constitutional rules. McKenna did not consider whether
the plaintiff might have a claim under federal statutory law, nor
did he treat federal statutory law as relevant to judicial power
under the post-Civil War Constitution.241 Subsequent cases
declaring race discriminations violated the Equal Protection
Clause were as oblivious to national legislation as subsequent
cases holding that race distinctions were constitutional. Federal
courts had become the first mover in the constitutional law of race
equality. Whether and when states could implement race
conscious legislation depended entirely on the judiciary. Persons
reading such decisions as Gong Lum or Herndon would have no
clue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress
with the power to implement the Equal Protection Clause or even
that Article I of the Constitution established a national legislature.
V. THE KOREMATSU REGIME
The Korematsu regime abandoned the doctrine of the Plessy
regime, while maintaining that regime’s textual hook and
institutional commitments. The Justices in Korematsu insisted
that the constitutional law of racial equality required courts to
employ a balancing test, with a strong thumb on the side of formal
racial equality.242 One size fits all. Strict scrutiny became the
governing standard whether the law at issue made what the Plessy
regime classified as a race discrimination or a race distinction,
and whether that law discriminated in favor of white persons or

239.
240.
241.
242.

170 U.S. 213 (1898).
Id. at 222-23.
See id.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20 (1944).
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persons of color.243 The Equal Protection Clause remained the
source for the constitutional law of racial equality.244 Federal
courts cited the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when determining whether race conscious state
measures passed the strict scrutiny test.245 The justices
maintained the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
“reverse incorporated” the Equal Protection Clause against the
federal government when determining whether race conscious
congressional measures passed the strict scrutiny test.246
Legislative primacy was consigned to oblivion. Federal courts
were often the first mover in determining the constitutional law
of racial equality. That constitutional law, with the exception of
some flirtations by Warren Court Justices with legislative
supremacy, was what courts said was the constitutional law of
racial equality.
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test to American
constitutional law.247 The first substantive paragraph of Justice
Hugo Black’s majority opinion declared:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.248

Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s majority opinion in
Hirabayashi v. United States seemed to reach the same
conclusion that racial discrimination would be constitutionally
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. For reverse incorporation, see Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition? The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1532-34 (2012); Akhil
Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and
Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT
(Terry Eastland ed., 1995).
247. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
248. Id. at 216; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943)
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction would not be regarded as in
accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment.”).
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tolerated only when state or federal laws were motivated by
pressing public necessity.249 Stone stated:
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows
that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the
Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures
for our national defense and for the successful prosecution
of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one
ancestry in a different category from others.250

The strict scrutiny test, as applied in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi, was arguably less protective of Japanese Americans
than the standards laid down during the Strauder and Plessy
regimes. The Japanese exclusion order was a race discrimination
rather than a race distinction. In sharp contrast to Cumming, no
justice maintained that removal benefited more Japanese
Americans than the order harmed. No justice pretended that the
military believed with Stephenson that “equality of opportunity”
on the West Coast for white persons and persons of color was best
“attained only by a difference in methods.”251 The burdens of
exclusion fell entirely on Japanese Americans. Constitutional
decision makers from Reconstruction to World War II had
insisted that such race discriminations were per se
unconstitutional. Plessy stated, “[t]he object of the [Fourteenth
A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law . . . .”252 Korematsu and Hirabayashi
violated that principle. The Korematsu regime was the first to
interpret the post-Civil War Constitution as permitting
constitutional authorities to engage in race discrimination when
that race discrimination served a public interest, albeit a very
pressing public interest.253 Justice Frank Murphy in Hirabayashi
observed, “[t]oday is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we
have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

320 U.S. at 113-14.
Id. at 100.
STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 3.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19.
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citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or
ancestry.”254
Korematsu was a clearer break from the official
constitutional law of the Plessy regime than from the racist
constitutional practices of that time. A strong case can be made
that constitutional authorities at the turn of the twentieth century
would have held constitutional federal or state laws that imposed
a wartime curfew on persons of color or excluded such persons
from certain jurisdictions during wartime had such measures been
promulgated and subjected to constitutional scrutiny during the
Strauder and Plessy regimes. Equally as strong a case can be
made that those constitutional authorities would have reworked
the Strauder/Plessy ban on race discriminations to encompass
situations when “pressing public necessity” was thought to
require imposing unique burdens on members of one race.255
Faced with a Korematsu-like fact situation, the racist Fuller Court
would have almost certainly adjusted the line between race
discriminations and race distinctions, and not have applied
mechanically the existing ban on all race discriminations.256
Rather than maintain, as Stephenson did, that a race
discrimination
“necessarily
implies
partiality
and
257
favoritism[,]” constitutional authorities might have tweaked
that claim so that only policies that “implie[d] partiality and
favoritism[]”258 were race discriminations. The point is that such
a move was not explicitly made before World War II. Korematsu,
from the perspective of 1944, weakened the Plessy regime’s
commitment to racial equality, even if that weakening was more
likely in theory than in actual practice.
Korematsu improved upon standards the Plessy regime
employed when considering race classifications, but that
improvement was limited and may have been more theoretical
than real. Black’s opinion suggests that only race discriminations

254. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring).
255. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
256. See generally OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE,
1888-1910 at 352 (2006) (discussing the racism of the Fuller Court).
257. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 4.
258. Id.
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that advance vital social purposes pass constitutional muster.259
Preventing racial mixing on street cars might not meet that
standard. Still, Korematsu did not overrule Plessy or comment
adversely on any past decision sustaining an alleged race
classification. A racist southern constitutional decisionmaker
during the first half of the twentieth century would have little
difficulty finding that preventing racial amalgamation or fights
between the races was a “[p]ressing public necessity . . . .”260 The
Supreme Court of Virginia, when justifying bans on interracial
marriage, declared:
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, or in any other provision of that great
document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the
State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity
of its citizens, or which denies the power of the State to
regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a
mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that
the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of
racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even
though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races
have better advanced in human progress when they
cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture
and developed their own peculiar genius.261

A judge more attentive to strict scrutiny might have tweaked this
opinion a bit but would not have changed the result.
Korematsu retained the Plessy regime’s and, for that matter,
the Costin/Manuel regime’s deference to elected officials when
determining whether race conscious means advanced pressing
social ends.
The strict scrutiny test in Korematsu and
Hirabayashi was limited to ends. The federal government was
entitled to impose a curfew on Japanese Americans and exclude
Japanese Americans from the West Coast because such
regulations were designed to prevent sabotage and a successful
Japanese invasion of California.262 Preventing a Japanese
invasion of California was a compelling government end.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
Id. at 216.
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20.
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Korematsu was excluded from the West Coast, Korematsu
asserted, “because we are at war with the Japanese Empire,
because the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast . . . .”263 The Supreme Court did not
heighten the degree to which justices had previously scrutinized
race conscious means to purported government ends.
Government officials had to establish only some relationship
between the race conscious measure and the end to be achieved.
Stone in Hirabayashi stated, “it is enough that circumstances
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the
decision which they made.”264 Justice William O’Douglas’s
concurring opinion in that case stated, “[w]here the orders under
the present Act have some relation to ‘protection against
espionage and against sabotage,’ our task is at an end.”265 The
Justices were as deferential to governing officials when
determining whether the exclusion orders satisfied the
requirement that race conscious measures be based on real
differences between the races. If the military had some basis for
determining that real differences existed between Japanese
Americans and other citizens, that was good enough during World
War II to sustain a race conscious measure discriminating against
some persons of color. Black stated, “[t]here was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered
that the need for action was great, and time was short.”266 “The
fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather
than another enemy power,” Stone declared in Hirabayashi, “set
those citizens apart from others who have no particular
associations with Japan.”267
Three developments occurred after World War II that made
the Korematsu regime more racially egalitarian than the Plessy

263. Id. at 223; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1943) (“The
challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the
military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces,
from the danger of sabotage and espionage”).
264. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102.
265. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
266. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
267. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101.
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regime.268 First, the Supreme Court obliterated the Plessy
regime’s distinction between race distinctions and race
discriminations. Second, the Supreme Court required that
government officials adopting race conscious measures meet a
higher standard for means as well as for ends. Third,
constitutional decision makers became far more suspicious than
the Korematsu majority that race conscious measures were
actually based on real differences between the races.
The Korematsu regime clearly broke from the Plessy regime
only when the justices abandoned the distinction between
constitutional race distinctions and unconstitutional race
discriminations. This process began during the 1950s when the
Supreme Court indicated that government actions that made race
relevant to a person’s legal standing were subject to strict
scrutiny, even if in a formal sense those measures did not treat
persons of color worse than white persons.269 Bolling v. Sharpe
held that statutes mandating race segregation had to meet the
same standard Korematsu demanded for race discriminations.270
Citing both Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s majority opinion declared, “[c]lassifications based
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally
suspect.”271 Race consciousness by the 1960s was the touchstone
for strict scrutiny rather than discrimination between white
persons and persons of color who had engaged in the same
behavior. Justice Byron White’s majority opinion in McLaughlin
v. Florida, when striking down a state law that punished
interracial premarital sex more severely than premarital sex
between persons of the same race, declared, “[j]udicial inquiry
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a
showing of equal application among the members of the class
defined by the legislation.”272

268.
scrutiny).
269.
270.
271.
272.

See Fallon, Jr., supra note 8, at 1273-74 (discussing the development of strict
Id. at 1277.
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Id. at 499.
379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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The mature Korematsu regime insisted on scrutinizing race
conscious means as strictly as Korematsu purportedly scrutinized
government ends. By the mid-1960s, government officials could
no longer point to a rational basis or the equivalent of “evidence
of disloyalty on the part of some” when defending race
classifications or discriminations.273 The constitutional law of
racial equality required race conscious measures to be necessary
or narrowly tailored means to their purported government ends.
“[N]ecessity,” Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in
McLaughlin declared, “not mere reasonable relationship, is the
proper test.”274 Government officials at the turn of the twentyfirst century could no longer blithely expect judicial deference
when they insisted a race conscious measure was based on real
differences between the affected races. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor insisted that “skepticism” rather than deference was the
attitude courts should take when determining whether a race
conscious measure was a narrowly tailored means to a compelling
government end.275 “Any preference based on racial or ethnic
criteria,” she declared in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
“must necessarily receive a most searching examination.”276
Korematsu did not specify the textual hook for the
constitutional law of racial equality when the federal government
adopted race conscious policies. Black placed more emphasis on
constitutional powers than constitutional rights. His opinion
noted that the military orders at issue in Korematsu were attacked
“as an unconstitutional delegation of power . . . beyond the war
powers of the Congress, the military authorities and of the
President,” and “a constitutionally prohibited discrimination
. . . .”277 The express holding of Korematsu focused entirely on
the Article I powers of Congress and the Article II powers of the
President. Black declared, “we are unable to conclude that it was
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude
273. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
274. Bolling, 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 194 (“Such
classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification.”); see also id. at 196 (“Such a law
. . . bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”).
275. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24, 227 (1995).
276. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 273 (1986)).
277. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
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those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the
time they did.”278 When discussing what constituted “a
constitutionally prohibited discrimination,”279 Black did not
mention much less discuss the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Thirteenth Amendment or any provision in the Bill of Rights.
Hirabayashi was more forthcoming.
Justice Stone
announced that the Fifth Amendment provided the textual hook
for the constitutional law of racial equality when the federal
government adopted race conscious policies. “The questions for
our decision,” he stated, “are whether the particular restriction . . .
was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an
unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power,
and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated
between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other
ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”280 At the onset
of the Korematsu regime, a gap existed between the rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution and
the rights enumerated by the post-Civil War Amendments. The
Supreme Court during World War II was no more willing to
interpret the Fifth Amendment as holding the federal government
to standards mandated by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment than the justices had been willing to
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as holding the states to the
standards mandated by the Fifth Amendment.281 Stone in
Hirabayashi declared, “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal
protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due
process.”282 While “[i]t is true,” Murphy agreed:

278. Id. at 217-18.
279. Id. at 217.
280. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943); see also id. at 89
(Appellant’s “contentions are only that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative
power to the military commander by authorizing him to impose the challenged regulation,
and that, even if the regulation were in other respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and
those of other ancestry.”).
281. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
282. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
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[T]hat the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains
no guarantee of equal protection of the laws . . ., [i]t by no
means follows, however, that there may not be
discrimination of such an injurious character in the
application of laws as to amount to a denial of due process
of laws as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment.283

As both the Stone and Murphy opinions indicated, the
Korematsu regime regarded the Equal Protection Clause as the
appropriate textual hook for determining whether state race
conscious policies were constitutional.284 The Equal Protection
Clause provided the constitutional foundations for the judicial
decisions declaring state mandated segregation unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court in Brown framed the question before the
Justices as whether “segregation . . . deprive[d] the plaintiffs of
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”285 Loving v. Virginia held that “restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”286 Justices
in the Korematsu regime determined whether race conscious
measures that benefited persons of color passed constitutional
muster by analyzing the constitutional meaning of “equal
protection.” Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke understood affirmative action
as raising the question whether under the “Equal Protection
Clause . . . discrimination against members of the white
‘majority’ cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as
‘benign.’”287 Justice William Brennan’s separate opinion in
Bakke was similarly grounded on an “analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”288
The gap between the due process law of racial equality that
governed federal race conscious measures and the equal
protection law of racial equality that governed state race
conscious measures vanished as the Korematsu regime matured.
The Brown line of decisions began the process of obliterating the
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 112 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35, 242; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978).
Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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differences between the federal and state law of equal protection.
Schools segregated by federal law met the same fate as schools
segregated by state law. “In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools,” Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in
Bolling, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”289 By
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Justices were insisting that
race conscious federal policies had to meet the same strict
scrutiny standards as race conscious state policies.290 O’Connor
in Adarand declared “congruence” to be a fundamental principle
underlying the constitutional law of racial equality.291 Her
opinion eviscerating any remaining space between federal and
state obligations declared, “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . .”292
The Thirteenth Amendment remained largely moribund as
an alternate textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., was the exception that proved the rule.293 The Justices
in that case held that Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment
could prohibit race discrimination in private housing markets.294
Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion declared that “the
freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can
live.”295 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court made any
further effort to integrate this element of the Turner regime into
the Korematsu regime.
The path-breaking federal
antidiscrimination laws passed during the Great Society did not

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Id. at 224.
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 443.
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mention the constitutional ban on slavery.296 No Supreme Court
opinions sustaining these measures discussed whether these
measures might have Thirteenth Amendment foundations.297 The
Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence paid no heed to
the Thirteenth Amendment but focused entirely on the
constitutional law of equal protection.298
The resulting Fourteenth Amendment law of racial equality
was not as friendly to affirmative action programs as Thirteenth
Amendment law had been during Reconstruction. In sharp
contrast to the Turner regime, which maintained race conscious
programs were a legitimate means for implementing the
Thirteenth Amendment’s commitment to ending both slavery and
the slave system, the Korematsu regime insisted on a race neutral
interpretation of the phrase “equal protection.”299 Justice Lewis
Powell’s crucial opinion in Bakke stated, “[t]he guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color.”300
“The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause,”
O’Connor’s opinion in Adarand agreed, “is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.”301 Strict scrutiny was not quite as strict when race
296. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241.
297. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Remarkably, the petitioners in Heart of
Atlanta Motel raised a Thirteenth Amendment claim when they insisted that the prohibition
of race discrimination was an “involuntary servitude.” Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at
243-44.
298. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A cottage
industry has developed, however, on the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative source for
fundamental rights, including constitutional rights to racial equality. See Douglas L. Colbert,
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (1995);
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90
BOS. U. L. REV. 255 (2010); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012); Alexander Tsesis, Into the Light of Day:
Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447
(2012); James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and
Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426 (2018); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989).
299. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
300. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
301. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995).
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conscious measures benefited persons of color. O’Connor in
Adarand “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict
in theory, but fatal in fact[]’” when government attempted to deal
with “the lingering effects of racial discrimination.”302 Still,
Congress and state legislatures at the turn of the twenty-first
century did not enjoy the same leeway under the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Reconstruction Congress had under the
Thirteenth Amendment to promote racial equality by employing
race conscious measures.303
All the Judges on the Korematsu court took for granted that
federal courts were responsible for determining the constitutional
law of racial equality. The majority opinions and dissents
quarreled over whether justices should defer to the military
judgment that excluding Japanese from the West Coast was
necessary to prevent a possible Japanese invasion.304 None
suggested that implementing the constitutional law of racial
equality was primarily a legislative task. As was the case with
Plessy, all the Justices on the Korematsu court assumed that they
had the final say in determining whether a measure
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race.305 Justice
Frank Murphy’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi stated: “We
give great deference to the judgment of the Congress and of the
military authorities as to what is necessary in the effective
prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are
constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to uphold.”306
“While this Court sits,” he asserted, “it has the inescapable duty
of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed.”307
Justice Wiley Rutledge’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi
rejected claims that “the courts have no power to review any
action a military officer may ‘in his discretion’ find it necessary

302. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).
303. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
304. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
305. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
306. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 113.

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:47 PM

478

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

to take with respect to civilian citizens in military areas or zones
. . . .”308
Ironically, the Plessy regime’s abandonment of legislative
primacy made possible the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown.309 Under the Turner and Strauder regimes, Congress had
to be the first mover when the constitutional law of racial equality
was established. Courts could not consider whether race
conscious measures were unconstitutional race discriminations or
constitutional race distinctions unless Congress had passed a law
prohibiting the race conscious measure under constitutional
attack.310 Senator Charles Sumner insisted during the early 1870s
that Congress prohibit segregated schools311 because he assumed
that courts were unlikely to declare segregated schools
unconstitutional in the absence of federal law banning such
institutions. When introducing what became the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, he spoke of “the absolute necessity of congressional
legislation for the protection of equal rights . . . .”312 Sumner’s
last speech in Congress maintained with respect to segregated
schools, “I most solemnly believ[e] that the only true remedy is
in a national statute, uniform and complete in its operation
everywhere throughout the land . . . .”313 No such congressional
legislation was on the books when Brown was decided. Justice
Robert Jackson’s comment in oral argument, “I suppose that
realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t
be obtained from Congress[,]”314 reflected the Plessy and
308. Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
309. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
310. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879).
311. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner).
312. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner); see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner) (“[T]hose axiomatic and self-evident truths . . . shall be maintained by the
legislation of Congress carrying out the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”).
313. 2 CONG. REC. 949 (1874) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
314. Schmidt, supra note 238, at 65 (quoting LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT: THE
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TOPEKA, 1952-55 244 (1969)). Jackson repeated this claim in his unpublished draft
concurrence in Brown. Id. He declared, “We are urged . . . to supply means to supervise
transition of the country from segregated to nonsegregated schools upon the basis that
Congress may or probably will refuse to act. That assumes nothing less than that we must
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Korematsu regimes’ commitment to permitting federal courts to
be the first mover in determining the constitutional law of racial
equality. Just as no judge on the Plessy Court considered federal
statutory law relevant to determining whether states could
mandate segregated street cars, so no judge on the Brown Court,
following the practice entrenched only during the Plessy regime,
considered federal statutory law relevant to determining whether
states could mandate segregated public education.
The Korematsu regime replaced legislative primacy with
judicial supremacy. The Justices when implementing Brown not
only did not bother looking for guidance from the elected
branches of the national government but insisted that all
government officials were to be guided by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
In an opinion signed by all nine Justices on the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Cooper v. Aaron declared, “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle . . . [is] a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”315 Justice
Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion piled on. He wrote, “[o]ur
kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the
Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal
specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what
is ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’”316
While the Supreme Court remained the managing partner
throughout the Korematsu regime, the role of Congress in
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality
was sometimes analogous to senior partner, sometimes analogous
to junior partner, and sometimes closer to summer associate.
Katzenbach v. Morgan indicated that remedying race
discrimination might be a joint enterprise, with federal courts and
the federal legislature equally empowered to make the
constitutional law of racial equality.317 Justice William Douglas’s
act because our representative system has failed.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE ROBERT H.
JACKSON’S UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN BROWN V. BOARD 129 (2017).
315. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
316. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: ANDREW JACKSON (2004).
317. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966).
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majority opinion held that Congress could forbid states from
denying the ballot to Spanish speakers educated in Puerto Rico,
even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that literacy
tests were constitutional.318
“Congress might . . . have
questioned,” Douglas wrote, “whether denial of a right deemed so
precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or
appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of
furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise.”319
City of Boerne v. Flores withdrew any suggestion in Morgan that
Congress might be authorized to interpret independently the postCivil War Amendments.320 Congress was authorized to remedy,
identify, and prevent constitutional violations, but not determine
what actions constituted a violation of the equal protection or any
other clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.321 Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s majority opinion condemned the elected branches of
the national government for trying to overturn a judicial decision
narrowing the free exercise rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.322 He asserted, “[w]hen the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed.”323 Shelby County v. Holder further
reduced congressional power to implement the post-Civil War
Amendments.324 Chief Justice John Roberts brazenly challenged
whether thousands of pages of congressional factfinding justified
legislation extending the preclearance provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.325 Congress, he insisted, had to demonstrate
318. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
319. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 342
(1966).
320. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
321. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-29.
322. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
323. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
324. See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
325. Id. at 554.
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“‘exceptional’ and ‘unique’ conditions” when legislation
implementing the constitutional commitment made during
Reconstruction to racial equality trenched on an early
constitutional commitment to state sovereignty.326
A. Compared to What
Whether Korematsu or the Korematsu regime should be
celebrated depends on what the Korematsu regime is being
compared to. Korematsu fares well when compared to the Costin
regime, which permitted states to make race discriminations on
the ground that persons of color were racially inferior to white
people.327 The comparison between the Korematsu regime and
the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes is more complicated.
Each of the latter three regimes has at least one element that
arguably better promotes racial equality than the Korematsu
regime. The Plessy and Strauder regimes treat race as a banned
category.328 The Strauder and Turner regimes require Congress
to be the first mover in implementing the post-Civil War
Amendments.329 The Turner regime treats the Thirteenth
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial
equality.330 These differences make a difference, particularly
with respect to the law of affirmative action and the state action
doctrine. Whether the Korematsu regime improved upon these
past regimes depends on whether one thinks affirmative action
promotes racial equality, whether some version of the state action
doctrine is an appropriate limit on the constitutional commitment
to race equality, and what institution in general at present is most
likely to best implement the constitutional commitment to race
equality.

326. Id. at 555; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966).
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Costin v. Corp. of
Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).
328. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 306-07 (1879).
329. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310; In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867)
(No. 14,247).
330. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339.
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1. Banned Categories

A contemporary Strauder or Plessy regime by taking a
banned categories rather than a strict scrutiny approach to race
conscious discriminations would reverse the result in Korematsu,
at least in theory,331 and the result in Grutter.332 Both the
Japanese exclusion order and affirmative action admissions
programs are race discriminations as race discriminations were
understood at the turn of the twentieth century. Each burdens or
benefits members of one race without providing the same or
equivalent burden or benefit for members of another race.333 As
such, both are per se unconstitutional under the Strauder and
Plessy regimes, but may be constitutional under the Korematsu
regime, which permits government officials to adopt race
conscious measures when doing so is a narrowly tailored means
of achieving a compelling governmental end.334 Whether
returning to this banned categories doctrine of the Strauder and
Plessy regimes improves upon the strict scrutiny doctrine of the
Korematsu regime depends on the most likely forms of race
conscious legislation, whether governing officials can be trusted
to use race conscious measures to promote racial equality, and
whether race conscious measures inherently violate constitutional
commitments to race equality.
For most of American history, Plessy’s banned categories
approach, even restricted to race discriminations as opposed to
race distinctions, would have better promoted race equality than
Korematsu’s strict scrutiny test. A few Reconstruction measures
aside,335 race conscious federal and state laws from the
ratification of the Constitution to the Great Society were means
of maintaining white supremacy and almost always provided
331. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
224.
332. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
333. Although, a good lawyer would claim all persons, even white persons rejected on
racial grounds, enjoy the benefits of diversity. See NATASHA K. WARIKOO, THE DIVERSITY
BARGAIN AND OTHER DILEMMAS OF RACE, ADMISSIONS, AND MERITOCRACY AT ELITE
UNIVERSITIES (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016).
334. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
224.
335. Lundin, supra note 46, at 9.
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benefits only to white people or imposed burdens only on persons
of color. A banned category standard would have outlawed the
common race discriminations that dotted the antebellum
American legal landscape and prohibited the Black Codes that
former confederate states adopted in the immediate aftermath of
the Civil War.336 A banned category standard applied to all race
classifications would have prevented Jim Crow segregation.
Many contemporary progressives have come to prefer strict
scrutiny to banned categories because only during the last thirty
or forty years have most explicit race conscious measures
purported to provide benefits only to persons of color or burden
only white persons. A fair case can be made that from a
progressive point of view, the benefits of a strict scrutiny review
that allows some affirmative action admissions policies in higher
education and some minority set-asides in government
contracting to pass constitutional muster337 outweigh the
occasional explicit racial profiling by law enforcement officers
that might meet that constitutional smell test.338 Justice Stephen
Breyer believes that the contemporary constitutional law of race
equality must give educators at the turn of the twenty-first century
some leeway to make race conscious decisions. His dissenting
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 asserted:
The wide variety of different integration plans that school
districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem
of racial segregation in schools, including de
facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The fact that many
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that
such criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to
play.339

336. For the Black Codes, see THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF
of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa eds., 1965).
337. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d
1147, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a minority set-aside program satisfied strict
scrutiny).
338. The issue in most racial profiling cases is providing race consciousness, not
determining whether an explicit race conscious profiling policy satisfies the strict scrutiny
test. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
339. 551 U.S. 701, 861 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
THE SOUTH (Univ.
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Strict scrutiny, or even a lesser form of scrutiny, is superior to
banned categories from a progressive perspective because race
conscious measures may promote as well as frustrate the
constitutional commitment to race equality as antisubordination
or anticaste.340 Justice John Paul Stevens articulated the
antisubordination conception of equal protection in his Adarand
dissent. Condemning the judicial tendency to lump all race
conscious programs, Stevens asserted:
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the
difference between a “No Trespassing” sign and a welcome
mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote
against Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to keep
African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with
President Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a
positive factor. It would equate a law that made black
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed
at recruiting black soldiers. An attempt by the majority to
exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market
is fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market.341

Some higher degree of scrutiny is necessary to distinguish the
“No Trespassing” sign from the welcome mat, but a banned
categories approach throws out the equality promoting baby with
the racist bathwater, so to speak.
Conservatives prefer the Strauder regime to the Korematsu
regime. Justice Clarence Thomas sees no differences between the
race conscious measures of the late Korematsu regime and those
of the Plessy regime. Giving contemporary “school boards a free
hand to make decisions on the basis of race,” he maintains, is “an
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in
Brown.”342 Contemporary government officials have no more
capacity to make race conscious policies than the white
supremacists of the past. Thomas asks, “[c]an we really be sure
that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a
340. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471, 1493, 1540
(2004).
341. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
342. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but
beneficent and progressive?”343 More to the point, conservatives
insist that a banned categories approach recognizes how race
classifications are inherently injurious and by their very nature are
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to race equality.
Thomas articulates the central understanding of the
anticlassification understanding of equal protection when he
insists, “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race
because every time the government places citizens on racial
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans all of us.”344
Strict scrutiny, these brief observations highlight, suffers
from a Goldilocks problem. Progressives find the test too hot. A
lower level of scrutiny in the twenty-first century is more than
sufficient to root out the racist race conscious measures of the
past,345 while permitting contemporary race conscious measures
that promote racial equality. Conservatives find the test too cold.
Too often, in their view, strict scrutiny permits university
administrators and others to mask old fashioned race
discrimination under the guise of diversity.346 The standard that
is “just right” awaits a less racially polarized United States.
2. Congress or Courts
A contemporary Turner or Strauder regime, by adopting an
institutional commitment to legislative primacy, would maintain
Grutter but reverse Brown.347 Courts in a regime committed to
legislative primacy are limited to implementing federal
legislation and determining whether federal legislation
implementing the post-Civil War Amendments is constitutional.
A Supreme Court committed to legislative primacy would sustain
343. Id. at 781-82.
344. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
345. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Japanese exclusion order was not “reasonably related to a public
danger”).
346. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the admissions at the University of Michigan Law School are more
consistent with commitments to quotas than commitments to diversity).
347. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions program
as long as the Justices determined that affirmative action violated
no federal law.348 Courts would sustain segregated schools in
Topeka, Kansas, for the same reason. Congress as of 1954 had
passed no laws prohibiting race segregation in public schools.
The result in Korematsu depends on the version of
legislative primacy employed by government officials. Both the
Turner and Strauder regimes required Congress to be the first
mover. Courts had no independent authority to secure racial
equality in the absence of a federal law mandating racial equality.
Legislative primacy in the Turner regime, at least as understood
by congressional radicals, bordered on legislative supremacy.
Congress was empowered to determine the constitutional
meaning of racial equality as well as the legislation that best
implemented the constitutional commitment to racial equality.
Courts had no business interfering when federal officials
determined that Japanese Americans had to be excluded from the
West Coast. Legislative primacy in the Strauder regime was
weaker. Federal courts had no independent power to enforce the
constitutional commitment to racial equality, but they were
empowered to determine whether federal legislation was
implementing that constitutional commitment. The justices could
not interfere with a state exclusion policy that Congress had not
prohibited, but federal courts could independently determine
whether a congressional exclusion policy met constitutional
standards.
Comparing the virtues and vices of the Turner/Strauder
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy to those of the
Korematsu regime’s commitment to independent judicial review
is difficult. A cottage industry exists comparing judges and
elected officials as rights protectors.349 Much of that literature
highlights the relative contributions the national judiciary and
348. Bakke’s holding that crucial provisions of federal antidiscrimination law were
coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause complicates this analysis. See Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978).
349. See, e.g., REBECCA ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONSTITUTION, AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (NYU Press: New York eds., 2006); JOHN J. DINAN,
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS
OF RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS eds., 1998).
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national legislature have made to racial equality in the United
States.350 On the one hand, independent judicial review was once
the only means by which persons of color could obtain relief from
a white supremacist regime. A court committed to legislative
primacy would not have reached any of the Supreme Court
decisions that declared unconstitutional state race conscious
measures handed down before the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.351 On the other hand, independent judicial review at
present is at least as much a boon to white persons challenging
race conscious laws promoting racial equality as to persons of
color challenging race conscious laws preserving white
supremacy. Federal law now protects numerous rights of race
equality and almost certainly would protect against all
manifestations of twentieth century Jim Crow if constitutional
doctrine required Congress to pass additional laws prohibiting
traditional forms of race segregation. State affirmative action
policies and state minority set-aside programs are the two most
prominent race conscious measures that contemporary courts
committed to legislative primacy would not adjudicate.
Disaggregating judicial decisions and federal laws for the
purpose of determining the merits of legislative primacy
compounds these difficulties. Some scholars think Supreme
Court decisions independently implementing the post-Civil War
Amendments inspired federal laws prohibiting garden-variety
race discriminations.352 Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis
proposes that massive resistance to Brown stirred northerners to
support such measures as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.353 Legislative primacy, in this view,
ignores how judicial decisions often spur vital congressional
actions promoting race equality. Gerald Rosenberg insists that

350. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 11; LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES: TWO CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL
(Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK eds., 2017).
351. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
352. See ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL
CHANGE 241-42 (Wesleyan Univ. Press: Middleton, CT eds., 1982).
353. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85 (1994).
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independent judicial review is a distraction.354 Brown and related
judicial decisions neither directly achieved much desegregation
nor inspired federal legislation prohibiting segregation.355
Legislative primacy, in this view, is institutional
acknowledgement that federal legislation and executive
enforcement are the necessary ingredients of a regime committed
to racial equality.
Matters are further complicated when the distinction
between strong Turner legislative primacy and weak Strauder
legislative primacy are thrown into the comparative mix.
Turner’s combination of legislative primacy and legislative
supremacy keeps judicial hands off federal affirmative action
programs and voting rights laws, as well as off all state race
conscious measures that are not forbidden by federal law.
Strauder’s legislative primacy and judicial supremacy empowers
courts to determine the constitutionality of federal laws
mandating affirmative action programs and implementing the
Fifteenth Amendment, but not race conscious state laws, unless
those state laws are prohibited by federal law. The Korematsu
and Strauder regime’s commitment to judicial supremacy
permitted the Supreme Court to strike down the preclearance
formula Congress mandated when reauthorizing the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, but the result in Shelby County could not have
been reached by judges who adopted the legislative supremacy
commitments of radical Republicans during the Turner regime.
Legislative primacy is most attractive when the dominant
national party has the commitment and power necessary to enact
comprehensive measures promoting race equality.
This
combination of commitment and power has occurred only twice
in American history and for relatively short periods of time.356 A
burst of civil rights legislation occurred during Reconstruction
and during the Great Society.357 During these periods, elected
354. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE 420-29 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing
“The Fly-Paper Court”).
355. See id. at 39-169.
356. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 79-81 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 1999).
357. Id.
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officials could be trusted to implement the constitutional
commitment to racial equality at least as extensively (weak
legislative primacy) and probably more extensively (strong
legislative primacy) as federal courts. At all other times in
American history, justices have been more committed to racial
equality than elected officials, even when that judicial
commitment is quite weak.358
Americans may be entering a third period in which some
version of legislative primacy is an attractive means for securing
racial equality, at least as racial equality is understood by
contemporary progressives.359 Democrats in the 2020 national
election gained control of all three branches of the national
government. Persons of color make up a substantial part of the
Democrat electorate and compose an increasing percentage of the
Democrats in the legislative and executive branches of
government.360 By comparison, the judicial branch of the
national government for the foreseeable future, the Supreme
Court in particular, will be controlled by very conservative
Republicans. Five of these Justices are older white men who are
not old enough that one could safely predict they will leave the
bench in the foreseeable future. Given the dramatically different
understandings of racial equality likely to animate the elected
branches of the national government and the national judiciary,
progressives might be better off returning to the weak legislative
primacy of the Strauder regime, which did not permit the
Supreme Court to strike down state laws in the absence of a
federal law prohibiting such measures, and even better off
returning to the strong legislative primacy championed by
Republican radicals during the Turner regime, which vested
Congress with the power to determine the constitutional meaning
of racial equality.

358. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 350, at 372, 375.
359. This paragraph relies heavily on Jack M. Balkin, Race and The Cycles of
Constitutional Time, MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), [https://perma.cc/28PQ-GZT3].
360. In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race, and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5B94-T2LH]; Anna Brown & Sara Atske,
Black Americans Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5NW5-QGTT].

2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:47 PM

490

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
3. Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment

The Turner regime that regarded the Thirteenth Amendment
as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality
might reverse Korematsu, but not Grutter. The point of the
constitutional law of racial equality, from the perspective of the
Thirteenth Amendment, is to ensure that former slaves and other
victims of racial prejudice are treated as equal members of the
American polity. Race neutrality is a means to that end and not
the end sought. Korematsu was wrongly decided because the
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was rooted
in historical prejudices against immigrants from Japan and other
Asian countries. Grutter was rightly decided because affirmative
action programs are designed to help persons of color become
equal citizens, do not reflect historic prejudice against white
persons, and are not designed to reduce white persons to secondclass citizenship.
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race
equality are partly yoked to the merits of affirmative action.
Progressives are likely to celebrate a Thirteenth Amendment law
of race equality because the constitutional ban on slavery
provides stronger foundations for affirmative action programs
than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Thirteenth
Amendment is about caste. Congress is empowered to eradicate
slavery and the slave system. The persons who have rights under
the Thirteenth Amendment are those who have experienced
slavery, the slave system, the badges and incidents of slavery, or
the aftereffects of slavery. White persons have no rights under
the Thirteenth Amendment because members of that class have
never experienced slavery, the slave system, the badges and
incidents of slavery, or the aftereffects of slavery. Conservatives
are more likely to celebrate a Fourteenth Amendment law of
racial equality that is more open to being interpreted as
articulating a constitutional commitment to race neutrality or
colorblindness. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
no special treatment for former slaves or their descendants. All
persons, whatever their race, must be treated equally. White
persons complaining about affirmative action programs have
some history as well as text on their side. The evidence suggests
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that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction abandoned a version
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment limited to race
discrimination in favor of the race neutral Equal Protection
Clause precisely because the latter was thought to better protect
persons of all races.361
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race
equality are even more firmly yoked to the state action doctrine.
Justices in the Strauder, Plessy, and Korematsu regimes insisted
that the state action requirement was a necessary element of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s law of race equality.362 The Turner
regime, which regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as the source
of the constitutional law of race equality, had no state action
requirement.363 This state action requirement clearly inhibits
efforts to achieve race equality in the United States. Justices have
wielded state action when striking down federal bans on
discrimination against persons of color in places of public
accommodation,364 when permitting racially restrictive covenants
in American housing markets,365 and when allowing private clubs
with state liquor licenses to refuse to admit black members or
guests.366 A Thirteenth Amendment law of race equality might
permit the Justices to reach a more racially egalitarian result in
each of these circumstances on the ground that private
discrimination is a feature of a slave system or a badge and
incident of slavery.367 The Korematsu regime’s commitment to a
state action doctrine that imposes limits on efforts to secure race
equality can be justified, if justified at all, only if state action has
other constitutional benefits that outweigh the costs that doctrine
imposes on efforts to remove the substantial race prejudice
vestiges of the American slave system.
361. See Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction
and the Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287, 297, 315
(2015).
362. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
363. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968).
364. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
365. See, e.g., Corrigan, 271 U.S. 323.
366. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163.
367. See supra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
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4. Packages

Doctrines, institutional authority, and textual hooks come in
packages. Legislative primacy complements the Thirteenth
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of race
conscious measures. Congress is better positioned than the
Supreme Court to determine what practices maintain the status
hierarchies first established by the antebellum slave system and
how those status hierarchies are best dismantled without harming
other social interests. The number of employees that should
trigger antidiscrimination obligations raise questions of
constitutional policy best resolved by a legislature rather than
questions of constitutional law best adjudicated by a court. The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is more
conducive to the rule-bound analysis typically performed by
justices. The closer to “sameness” the rules for implementing the
constitutional commitment to race equality, the better courts are
at constitutional decision making. The Justices who adjudicated
the cases challenging school segregation could have easily
determined that school districts were employing race conscious
measures,368 that the schools for students of color were inferior to
the schools for white students,369 and that in the United States
students of color could have never enjoyed equal education in
racially segregated schools.370
The Korematsu regime may be the best package Americans
can achieve. That regime offers a Goldilocks solution to the
problem of legislative discretion. The Costin and Turner regimes
give elected officials too much power over race conscious
measures. The banned categories approach of the Strauder and
Plessy regimes gives elected officials too little discretion. Strict
scrutiny with judicial review is “just right.” Affirmative action
policies pass constitutional muster, as long as they do not use
racial quotas explicitly and give individualized consideration to
all applicants.371 The state action doctrine remains a limit on
efforts to achieve race equality. Nevertheless, as Terri Peretti has
368.
369.
370.
371.

See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948).
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950).
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
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detailed, the justices tend to apply that requirement only when
race is not on the table.372 Goldilocks strikes again, achieving a
balance between prohibiting private race discrimination and
maintaining individual freedom that is close to “just right.”
Comparing the Korematsu regime only to the Costin regime
or the worst features (of which there were many) of the Plessy
regime forecloses discussion of the contributions the Thirteenth
Amendment, legislative primacy, and banned categories might
make to the constitutional law of race equality. The Turner,
Strauder, and Plessy regimes all promote racial equality in some
instances when the Korematsu regime tolerates race conscious
measures that discriminate against persons of color. The Turner
regime’s commitment to the Thirteenth Amendment facilitates
bans on private discrimination. The Turner and Strauder
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy gives Congress the
leeway to determine how best to dismantle racial hierarchies. The
Strauder and Plessy regime’s commitment to banned categories
forecloses legislative excuses for race discrimination. Korematsu
is not the only way, these alternatives demonstrate, even if that
way is better than much of what preceded that understanding of
the constitutional law of race equality.

372. See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010).
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THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE ON TRIAL
Keaton Barnes*
INTRODUCTION
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.1

In 1786, a group composed of ex-military and farmers
sought to take over the seat of government in Massachusetts in a
coup later known as Shays’s Rebellion.2 This distressing event
occurred because the people in rural areas of Massachusetts felt
that they were not properly represented by the “elites” in more
densely populated areas.3 Before that group, small, radical groups
of Colonists led a rebellion against Britain’s vast empire for
mainly the same reasons.4 The phrase “no taxation without
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Articles Editor of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author extends thanks to the faculty and staff of the
University of Arkansas, specifically Professor Mark Killenbeck, as well as to the Arkansas
Law Review. Additionally, the author extends thanks to God for making this Comment
possible, and to all those who vehemently disagree with each other - sharpening arguments
and propagating the sport of critical debate.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S
FINAL BATTLE 4, 6, 18 (2003).
3. Id. at 6.
4. See RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW
COMMON PEOPLE SHAPED THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 5, 14-17 (Howard Zinn ed., The
New Press rev. ed. 2016). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S.
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representation” is undoubtedly an idiomatic motif of the
Colonists’ purpose.5 This quaint but markedly gruesome
rebellion later became known as the American Revolution.6 After
both events had come and gone, the victors took measures to
ensure appropriate representation for their constituents.7
Likewise, both incidents required radical changes to their
respective structures of government. Given that Americans have
always gone to great lengths to seek adequate representation, it is
unsurprising that the national popular vote movement exists.
That being said, this Comment aims to prove why the
national popular vote—and in particular the iteration referred to
as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is
unconstitutional, ineffective, and potentially disastrous. While
there has been much scholarly debate about the validity of a
national popular vote interstate compact, many works have
focused only on the Compact Clause requirements. The articles
that have shifted focus away from the compact aspect of the
popular vote system either fail to incorporate the Compact Clause
materials at all or do not have the benefit of new Supreme Court
decisions outlining the States’ near plenary power to control their
electors.
This Comment aims to provide a holistic picture of the
NPVIC and any closely related compacts through updated
precedent. This Comment will first look at what a national
popular vote might entail and explicitly lays out the most
prominent popular vote movement, the NPVIC. This Comment
will then focus on the NPVIC’s Compact Clause element to
determine whether congressional approval is required before this
compact can go into effect. Next, this Comment will address the
1776) (saying one justification for the revolution was the deterioration of “the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants
only”).
5. See, e.g., RAPHAEL, supra note 4, at 16-17 (saying the American Revolution did not
spawn from mere class warfare and was in fact instigated in part by “[m]any merchants,
lawyers, and other colonists of comfortable means object[ing] only to the abuse of power by
the British Parliament”).
6. See id. at 24 (saying the lead up to the American Revolution was carried out by
small, unorganized movements, not a heroic call to arms by any founding father).
7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2; see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1.
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potential legal challenges to the NPVIC that would exist despite
congressional approval. In discussing that post-approval claim,
the potential procedural bars to a case against the NPVIC will be
addressed, then the substantive challenges of any potential case.8
Finally, this Comment will close on the national popular vote
movement’s purpose and some healthy alternatives to safely and
practically reach that same goal. In conclusion, this Comment
will advocate one alternative above the rest for its constitutional
consistency, compliance with social reformation demands, and
structural integrity.
I. DEFINING A NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
In determining a national popular vote’s constitutionality, it
is necessary to first define, in a concise manner, what a national
popular vote is. Luckily, since 2006, many States have proposed
and adopted a uniform interstate compact, the NPVIC, to achieve
that very thing.9 While none of the NPVIC statutes have gone
into effect as of this Comment’s writing, their activation has been
looming year after year and will do so in perpetuity.10 This
perpetual possibility stems from the fact that, once adopted, there
is no action necessary except to wait for the triggering event—the
addition of more member States.11 As a result, States that have
already adopted the NPVIC can renew this measure without end
and with an unlimited time to garner support.12 This Comment
will focus on the NPVIC alone because it appears to have the most
wind beneath its wings, compared to other national popular vote
proposals.13 After the 2016 presidential election, the NPVIC
8. The substantive challenges will be predicated on the plain text of the Constitution,
the thoughts and opinions of the founding fathers during the convention, and the current
social and political arguments against a national popular vote and the NPVIC specifically.
9. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NPV—THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
INITIATIVE: PROPOSING DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH AN INTERSTATE
COMPACT 2 (2019).
10. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
[https://perma.cc/MM4U-PDEQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
11. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1.
12. See id.
13. Eric T. Tollar & Spencer H. Kimball, A More Perfect Electoral College:
Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions Under the Twelfth Amendment, 9 LEGIS. & POL’Y
BRIEF 4, 28 (2020).
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found renewed support, which generated the most positive
movement towards a national popular vote since the idea’s
inception.14 That being said, this Comment’s analysis and
conclusions can be extended to any similar proposal so long as no
material changes have occurred. After reviewing other proposals,
it appears the general principles of a national popular vote system
remain more or less unchanged in any iteration of the proposal.15
So, what system does the NPVIC set out? First and most
critically, it will, as the name implies, nationalize the election
processes of member States.16 In other words, it will eradicate
any distinction between State lines when determining which
candidate the State electors should vote for. Upon the first
presidential election’s occurrence after the compact goes into
effect, the NPVIC would instead instruct member States to
conduct their statewide popular votes as they would absent the
compact.17 The States would then add up each of the statewide
popular votes, and the “chief election official” of each State
would determine the nationwide popular vote’s outcome.18 At
this point, the chief election official would submit the outcome of
the national popular vote to the members of that State’s Electoral
College.19 The electors would then cast their ballots, conforming
to the national popular vote’s results, regardless of what results
their State yielded.20 The “election official” designation belongs
to either the State’s governor or the mayor in the District of
Columbia.21 Coupled with the wording of some State statutes that
bind electors to their party’s primary candidate, the NPVIC’s
process would effectively restrict the electors to vote only for the
candidate who won the nationwide popular vote.22
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Ralph M. Goldman, Hubert Humphrey’s S. J. 152: A New Proposal for
Electoral College Reform, 2 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (1958); H.R.J. Res. 109, 108th
Cong. (2004).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019).
17. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
19. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
20. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01.
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).
22. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying states have
absolute control of their electors); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979) (voiding faithless
votes); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (1994) (imposing a penalty for a faithless vote).
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The NPVIC will take effect when a sufficient number of
States join the compact.23 The number of federally delegated
electoral votes each State has determines the number of necessary
States.24 Before the compact can take effect, the total number of
electoral votes collectively possessed by member States must
equal 270 or more, so that this compact and its members alone
can secure the presidential seat.25 As of this Comment’s writing,
the NPVIC member States’ combined electoral votes equal 195,
only 75 shy of their 270 goal.26 Despite the NPVIC’s adoption
by more than a dozen States, it does not appear that this compact
has been proffered for congressional approval.27 The following
section will discuss why congressional approval is necessary, but
not sufficient, for the compact to be effective in a constitutional
manner.
II. WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD
NEED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
The Compact Clause of the Constitution is found in Article
I, Section 10, Clause 3. The pertinent language in that mandate
is as follows: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
. . . .”28 While this seems straightforward, the Supreme Court has
varied significantly in determining what is required by this
clause.29 The irony with this clause’s inconsistent treatment is
that both accepted definitions are allegedly based on textualist
interpretations of the Constitution.30 The broader of the two
definitions would place a bar on any interstate agreement made
without congressional consent, regardless of the nature of such
agreement.31 Under this interpretation, the Court defines the
23. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
24. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.355 (2001).
25. See 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
26. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 10.
27. NEALE, supra note 9, at 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
29. Compare U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978)
(defining “agreements” and “compacts” narrowly), with Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 519 (1893) (defining “agreements” and “compacts” broadly).
30. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519.
31. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 459.
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terms “compact” and “agreement” as used in Article I, Section 10
broadly and synonymously.32 This encompasses any activity that
possibly interferes with the supremacy of the United States, and
any activity that “the United States can have no possible objection
[to] or have any interest in interfering with[.]”33
This plain text meaning of the Compact Clause, as laid out
above, was previously said to be invalid when read in context by
the proponents of the narrower definition.34 While the Court did
acknowledge that the two contrasting definitions were both
predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, the first
interpretation was nevertheless abandoned as the Court was
reluctant to bar interstate agreements that “do not enhance state
power to the detriment of federal supremacy.”35 In addition, the
Supreme Court has indicated that Congress can implicitly
approve of an interstate compact before it is fully furnished for
any formal approval.36 The Court also stressed that there are
some instances where the States must act before Congress can
determine whether its approval will be granted or not.37 In sum,
not every agreement entered into between States requires
congressional approval.38 The Court even went as far as to say
that some agreements did not need congressional approval at all
because the historical practice of seeking congressional approval
for like compacts was merely out of caution and convenience for
the associated states, rather than to prevent injury to the
supremacy of the United States.39 However, the Court did
acknowledge that any negative impact to the supremacy of the
United States was to be considered for its potential of and not
actual injury.40

32. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 520.
33. Id. at 518.
34. See id. at 519.
35. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460.
36. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 (finding that congressional approval may
be implied in a number of ways including subsequent ratification and enforcement of the
terms of a compact).
37. See id. at 521.
38. See id.
39. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471.
40. Id. at 472.
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While there has been some pushback over the years to this
laissez-faire rule—allowing significant interstate dealings
without congressional approval41—the most important pushback
to this rule (regarding a national popular vote) was the
acknowledgment that the interference with the supremacy of the
United States was not the only matter for consideration.42 Instead,
the Court recognized that an agreement would require
congressional approval when such approval would guard against
any potential adverse effect on any State not made a party to the
agreement.43 If there is an agreement that has the potential to
injure another State, it is the right and duty of Congress to provide
approval before the agreement goes into effect.44 The Court
eventually laid out four indicia that an agreement would be of the
kind to require congressional approval due to its potential harm
to another State. These indicators are: (1) the existence of a joint
administrative body between the States, (2) the action of one
member State being conditioned on the action of another member
State, (3) the bar on any of the States to unilaterally and freely
modify or repeal their acceptance of the agreement, and (4) the
requirement of reciprocity in an agreement concerning limitations
imposed on a member State’s inherent powers.45
The general principles of the Compact Clause include
possible interference with federal supremacy or a substantial
impact on non-member States.46 As a result, congressional
approval is required here regardless of the indicators’ existence,
but that will be discussed later.47
Assuming, arguendo, that further proof is needed to
determine whether congressional approval is required, the above
test, when applied to the compact at hand, is satisfied with three
out of the four indicators being present.48 There does not appear
41. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 372 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
42. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175
(1985).
46. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978); see also
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 494.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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to be any indication that the NPVIC will adopt an administrative
body; thus, the first indicator is likely not met.49 However, the
rest of the indicators are blatantly present. Getting the ball rolling,
the NPVIC meets the second indicator, which essentially looks to
“whether [the compact’s] effectiveness depends on the conduct of
other members . . . .”50 This is met because the NPVIC will come
into effect only after “states cumulatively possessing a majority
of the electoral votes” have enacted this agreement.51 This means
that every member State has only conditionally approved the
compact, subject to action by other States.
Additionally, how a State directs the panel of electors to cast
their electoral votes would be predicated on conducting a popular
vote in each of the other member States.52 Northeast Bancorp,
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Bancorp) involved multiple States drafting a similar statute in
each jurisdiction, and there was evidence suggesting that the State
legislatures drafted the statutes together.53 Nevertheless, the
Bancorp Court found that no compact had been formed, let alone
one that needed congressional approval.54 This was largely
because while an incentive structure was designed to entice more
States to adopt the similarly-worded statute, the document was
more akin to a model law than an agreement between States.55
In addition, the incentive structure found in that case was not
a result of the proposed law itself, but rather the incentive
originated from a federal law barring the interstate exchange of
bank titles, absent a contrary State law permitting the transfer.56
In essence, the law there was not reciprocal because the States
49. But see JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE BASED PLAN FOR
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 278 (National Popular Vote Press,
4th ed. 2013) (“These tasks could be simplified by the establishment of an administrative
clearinghouse for these functions. The officials of the compacting states might themselves
establish such a clearinghouse. Alternatively, such a clearinghouse might be established by
federal law.”).
50. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303A (2019); see also NEALE, supra note 9, at 1.
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002; S.P. 252, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019).
53. See 472 U.S. 159, 163-65, 173, 175 (1985).
54. Id. at 175.
55. See id. at 169.
56. Id.
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were merely working together to reap the full benefits of an
enacted federal law.57 In that case, once one State adopted the
statute it became valid and enforceable as to that State,
independent from the actions of any other State.58 In short, the
statute at issue in Bancorp is vastly different from the NPVIC.59
To reiterate, the NPVIC requires other States to adopt the
same law before it becomes effective.60 While there is no
mandated adoption or forced incentive structure built into the
NPVIC,61 there are other ramifications States may face if they do
not play nice with the existing member States upon activation.62
The States’ selection of electors is expressly conditioned on a
popular vote in the other member States.63 In conclusion, the
NPVIC’s conditional adoption clause and how the compact
functions make its effectiveness conditioned on other member
States’ actions.
Next, when a compact cannot freely and unilaterally be
repealed, that indicates the compact will likely need prior
congressional approval.64 Customarily, a compact has the
“distinguishing feature” of presumptively being interminable
without the deliberate action of multiple member States and thus
requires congressional approval.65 The presumption of this
norm’s presence in compacts can only be overborne by “express
provisions that permit withdrawal . . . .”66 In fact, express
permission to leave a compact is so necessary that “[t]he absence
of comparable language in the Compact is significant and weighs
against” the ability of a State to freely and unilaterally repeal a
compact.67 One State supreme court went as far as saying that not
57. Id. at 164.
58. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 472 U.S. at 175.
59. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167A, § 2 (1996), with OR. REV. STAT. § 23.248
(2019).
60. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).
62. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 9882 (2003).
63. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
64. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
175 (1985).
65. Waterfront Comm’n v. Murphy, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.N.J. 2019), vacated, 961
F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2020) (vacating order for lack of jurisdiction).
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. (citing Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013)).
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even the unequivocal ability to come and go as a State freely
pleases (even when enumerated) is sufficiently dispositive of
whether a compact would require congressional approval under
this indicator.68 Instead, the court there looked to the statute’s
history.69
While the member States are free to repeal the NPVIC, they
have a limited duration to repeal the statute.70 Otherwise, they
will be bound by their initial pledge to appoint their electors based
on the nationwide popular vote.71 If they intend their refutation
to be effective, the member States must repeal the NPVIC before
the last six months of a president’s term.72 This, while not an
absolute bar on the repeal of the agreement, sufficiently impacts
a State’s unilateral ability to withdraw.73 There is no language
indicating that States can freely repeal or modify the statute at
their discretion.74 Because the absence of express permission to
freely and unilaterally repeal or modify a compact indicates the
inability to do so,75 the NPVIC would presumptively not allow
member States to leave or modify willingly. In addition to the
absence of such a provision, the express restriction on when a
member State can effectively walk away76 sufficiently satisfies
this indicator.
Finally, and “[m]ost importantly,” when a compact requires
reciprocal obligations or limits to inherent State powers, the
compact will need congressional approval.77 This indicator
essentially looks to whether the member State “ceded a portion of
its own sovereignty in order to benefit from the collective action
of multiple states . . . .”78 All member States to the NPVIC give
up their ability to direct their electors to vote under that State’s
68.
69.
action”).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1985).
78.

Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015).
Id. (finding “the history of the Compact is replete with examples of unilateral state
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01.
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. 2016).
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mandates.79 This ability is undoubtedly a part of a State’s
sovereign power.80 The restriction of such sovereign power so
that all member States may expand their combined strength is
precisely the kind of reciprocal obligation this indicator
requires.81 In sum, the most important indicator that a compact is
of the kind that would require congressional approval also
appears to be the most straightforward. It is undeniable that any
State that enters into the NPVIC limits its ability to “appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors . . . .”82 This is because member States will be relying
on the chief election officials of other member States and the
outcome of the national popular vote to allocate electoral votes—
rather than the independent discretion of their respective
legislatures.83
Admittedly, the Bancorp case has largely been cited for its
commerce precedent and is rarely used to adjudicate challenges
to the Compact Clause.84 That being said, a return to the general
Compact Clause principles will necessitate congressional
approval, regardless of the indicators’ presence. This is because
the NPVIC compact is, on its face and by its text, a political matter
undoubtedly capable of affecting the rights and power of other
States as well as the federal government.85 The compact states
“[t]his article shall govern . . . in each member state,”86 “to
produce a national popular vote . . . [unless] the electoral college
is abolished.”87 Additionally, the supporters of the NPVIC even
79. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140
S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (indicating each State has a right to independently control its
electors).
80. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
81. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 849.
82. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
84. See, e.g., Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 838
F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1988); Cont’l Ill. Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 n.5 (11th Cir.
1987); Smith Setzer & Sons v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1322 (4th Cir.
1994); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792, 793 n.16
(4th Cir. 1991).
85. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 201
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter MADISON,
CONVENTION NOTES] (discussing the ramifications of various electoral schemes).
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2753 (2011).
87. Act of June 12, 2019, ch. 356, 2019 Or. Laws (internal quotation marks omitted).
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admit, potentially obliviously so, that the compact would
guarantee the presidency to the member States, that the compact’s
design is to “remedy” the laws in 48 States, and that the NPVIC
intends to reshape how federal elections are campaigned for.88
Now turning a closer eye to these broad principles, it seems
the NPVIC’s potential impact could have a disastrous toll on the
supremacy of the United States, as well as the sovereignty of other
States. Regarding the impact on supremacy:
the compact may not authorize member states to do anything
collectively that they could not do individually. Second,
member states must not delegate their sovereignty, but rather
they must retain their freedom to withdraw from the compact
at any time.89

Suppose member States engage in these practices—
collective power enhancement, delegation of sovereignty, and
conceding the ability to withdrawal—through a compact. In that
case, that compact is said to be a potential threat to the supremacy
of the United States and to non-member States, and that compact
would require prior congressional approval.90 These concerns are
very similar to the four indicators previously stated, and thus this
analysis will be brief. The NPVIC combines the member States’
power to secure for its members the sole ability to determine the
presidency.91 Alone, no State could achieve this outcome. Again,
the States are not free to withdraw without significant restrictions,
and their withdrawal will potentially be deemed invalid—replete
with eerily looming enforcement mechanisms left for
speculation.92 Finally, the sovereign powers of the member States
have been partially subjugated to the NPVIC, exactly as

88. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/HSN2-QCV3] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
89. State v. Kurt, 802 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo. 1991) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)).
90. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854); Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).
91. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019); see also supra notes 65-77 and
accompanying text (discussing how the member States to the NPVIC are not free to withdraw
from the compact).
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contemplated by the broad compact concerns when determining
the necessity of congressional approval.93
Having determined that the NPVIC is an interstate compact
of the kind that requires congressional approval (with or without
the presence of the four indicia), the question that remains is what
recourse a non-member State or the citizen of a member State
could have if Congress did approve the NPVIC.
III. WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD
STILL FAIL TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, DESPITE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
There are a couple of different issues that must be discussed
before approaching the merits of any potential case against the
NPVIC. Both of these issues are theoretically dispositive of the
case on procedural grounds. To get to the case’s merits, the
justiciability doctrine and jurisdiction must be satisfied.94 Briefly
addressing each concern now, there are no justiciability grounds
that would dismiss this cause of action because it would be based
on a non-political question, and most likely, non-member States
would be filing this suit against the federal government
(dismissing standing concerns).95 Even if this were a suit against
one State by another, it is likely to be valid.96 Additionally, the
Supreme Court may or may not have original jurisdiction to hear
the complaint, but it could nevertheless reach the Supreme Court
through appeals.97

93. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying States have
near plenary power to dictate electors).
94. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99, 204 (1962).
95. See id. at 209; see also infra Section III.A.
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-06 (1821) (“[The Eleventh
Amendment] does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a
State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases and in
these a State may still be sued.”); see also Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934);
see also infra Section III.A.
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)(2) (1988); Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 393, 399 (“If a State be a party, the jurisdiction of
this Court is original . . . . The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article of the
constitution . . . .”).
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Within the merits of the case, the Constitution plainly allots
the power of elections to the individual States.98 However,
questions remain regarding the exclusivity of such power.99
Looking to the Supreme Court’s precedent, the States’ power
appears to be definitively exclusive, at the cost of federal and
State interference.100 This conclusion is further aided by the
founding era’s thoughts and examples.101 Finally, if no legal
argument is persuasive, the social and political reasons alone
should be sufficient to halt the NPVIC.
A. Justiciability Concerns
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no
rule for his government?102
It is a fundamental principle that the legislature’s mere will
cannot alter the Constitution absent amendment proceedings.103
Likewise, the legislative branch cannot pass any laws or take any
action repugnant to the Constitution.104 Suppose the legislature
engages in any activity that is thought to be unconstitutional. In
that case, it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative to adjudicate
whether or not there has been legitimate infringement.105 While
these principles are no doubt ingrained in the hearts of every
scholar of the law, these principles become increasingly murky
when dealing with an interstate compact. Of course, the usual
justiciability concerns are present with an interstate compact, just
as with any potential case and controversy brought before the

98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
99. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2318 (2020); Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214, 225 (1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“The question before
us is not one of policy but of power . . . .”); see also infra Section III.B.1.
100. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also infra Section III.B.1.
101. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 57, 509; see also infra
Section III.B.2.
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
103. Id. at 177.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 177-78.

3 BARNES.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE

12/13/21 2:49 PM

509

Court.106 However, the Compact Clause’s mandates erect some
peculiar obstacles to justiciability that need to be addressed.
The first of these, and most likely to prevent a suit, is the
political question doctrine. The decision to approve or disprove
an interstate compact is undoubtedly one of the legislature’s
political judgment, rather than one of constitutional judgment
akin to that of the Supreme Court’s.107 The political question
doctrine then would seemingly bar the Supreme Court’s review
of a claim alleging Congress improperly approved an interstate
compact in violation of a constitutional principle.108 This doctrine
requires federal courts to determine whether, based on six
independent factors, a matter is committed to another branch such
that separation of powers precludes judicial review.109 These
factors are: (1) constitutional commitment of the issue to a
different political branch, (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards, (3) the need for an initial non-judicial
policy decision, (4) the potential for any judicial decision to
indicate a lack of respect to the coordinate branch, (5) the need to
adhere to a political decision already made, or (6) the potential for
embarrassment after multiple branches have resolved the issue
differently.110
This bar is especially present when the claim is based on a
violation of the Guarantee Clause, which the Court has explicitly
labeled a political question.111 The Guarantee Clause requires
every State of the Union to be guaranteed a republican form of
government.112 In other words, some fashion of a representative

106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (applying the justiciability standards
to that case because it arose under the Federal Constitution); see also Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 517 (1893) (Compact Clause cases arise under the Federal Constitution).
107. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 485 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
108. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
109. Id. at 211, 217.
110. Id. at 217.
111. Id. at 224 (“[C]hallenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency
with [the Guarantee Clause] present no justiciable question.”). There is, however, some
debate as to whether this bar still exists with the same force. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 71-72 (1988) (citing circuit court decisions as well as Supreme Court decisions that
indicate the Guarantee Clause may still be used to adjudicate cases).
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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government must be present across the nation.113 Here, it is
abundantly clear that any claim against establishing a national
popular vote would incorporate that very clause;114 however, that
may not be the only alleged constitutional violation possible. If a
claim touches on the Guarantee Clause but also relies on the
violation of another constitutional principle, the claim may still
be heard assuming the alternative violation does not likewise fall
under the Court’s political question bar.115
Thus, it is necessary to determine what other constitutional
principles might be violated by congressional approval if any suit
is maintained against an interstate compact establishing a national
popular vote. Although still potentially problematic, the
requirement of a system of electors, also known as the
Presidential Electors Clause, found in Article II, Section 1 and the
Twelfth Amendment, would undoubtedly be violated with the
establishment of a national popular vote.116
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held (although stepped
back in more recent cases)117 that the Constitution provides
citizens an affirmative right to vote.118 While not considered a
natural, unalienable right, it is still considered fundamental.119
Because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote,120 the
NPVIC could be subject to attack for equal protection and due
process violations.121 This would likely stem from individuals
who felt they were now disenfranchised from their vote due to
their State’s sparse population. As the Supreme Court has said,

113. See THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 194 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1880) (defining
republican government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”).
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 227.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The cause of such a
violation will be discussed in more detail in Section III.B.
117. E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States . . . .”).
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 110.
THE
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“[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because
he lives in the city or on the farm.”122
While it is important to note these additional means in which
the NPVIC might be attacked, this Comment will only focus on
the most ambiguous and challenging means of invalidating the
NPVIC: the idea that the compact is a violation of the Presidential
Electors Clause, which establishes the Electoral College.123 This
is partly because this Comment aims to avoid discussing
individual rights and instead discusses the right of States as
sovereign entities (which presumptively have no right to sue for
due process/equal protection violations124).
The distinction between reliance on the Guarantee Clause for
a potential suit versus the Presidential Electors Clause is
admittedly sparse. Still, the distinction is nevertheless present in
that the Guarantee Clause helps define a judicially enforceable
requirement in the Constitution. The use of the Guarantee Clause
to define the meaning of the electoral requirement is different
from the Supreme Court’s potential to “disrupt a State’s
republican regime” by enforcing a government system the Court
deems more akin to a republic, which would violate the political
question doctrine.125 The Guarantee Clause will only be used
here as a means of textual interpretation and not to determine what
that clause alone requires of the States.
A suit against the NPVIC, predicated on the violation of the
Presidential Electors clause, is not a political question. This is
because the suit, although first requiring Congress to exercise its
constitutionally committed judgment,126 would be against a
potential violation of the Constitution.127 This case would only

122. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
124. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). But see Shelby
Cnty. v. Alabama, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
125. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23
(1892). The State of Michigan was sued for improperly appointing electoral members in
violation of the Constitution. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23. The Court found that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case saying:
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be brought after Congress gave its consent to the interstate
compact, and “once Congress gives its consent, a compact
between States—like any other federal statute—becomes the law
of the land.”128
When the question presented to the Court is whether
congressional activity has violated the Constitution, the Supreme
Court can hear the case regardless of potential political
concerns.129 The political question doctrine is not designed to
prevent the Court from hearing legitimate constitutional
questions.130 Instead, the political question doctrine, under the
guise that the Court does not have that power under the
Constitution, is designed to bar the Court from hearing truly
political matters and, in so doing, questioning coordinate
branches’ judgments or rationales.131 This is the difference
between asking whether a coordinate branch can do something
versus whether it should do something. The former can be heard
by the Court, whereas the latter is barred.132
The validity of Congress approving the NPVIC falls under
that first category. Regardless of the NPVIC’s potential merits, a
suit against congressional approval would simply be asking
whether such approval was an appropriate use of Congress’s
constitutional powers. In this respect, no deference is deserved,
nor any embarrassment incurred by asking whether the
Constitution was violated.133
it is said that all questions connected with the election of a presidential elector
are political in their nature; that the court has no power finally to dispose of
them; and that its decision would be subject to review by political officers and
agencies, as the state board of canvassers, the legislature in joint convention,
and the governor, or, finally, the Congress. But the judicial power of the
United States extends to all cases in law or equity arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this is a case so arising . . . .
Id.
128. Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018).
129. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968).
130. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11, 217.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 217 (“The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action . . . exceeds constitutional authority.”).
133. See id. at 218; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“It is most
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not. [B]ut it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because
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Assuming for a moment that the violation of the mandate for
the Electoral College is sufficient to state a claim, it must be
agreed that the case would meet the other justiciability
requirements exclusively on that alleged violation for the suit to
commence absent subsequent equal protection or due process
claims.
Given that any potential case brought to the Supreme Court
after enacting the NPVIC likely cannot be directly contingent on
the Guarantee Clause,134 the remaining causes of action must
provide a sufficiently justiciable case regarding standing. As
discussed above, this Comment will only consider the
Presidential Electors Clause.
The recent case brought by the Attorney General in Texas
regarding the 2020 election may initially seem dispositive of this
question; however, the two causes of action are irreconcilably
different.135 Standing generally requires injury, causation, and
redressability.136 Causation is essentially a given when “the
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at
issue.”137 However, States have special standing, or relaxed
standing, to bring suits to enforce their sovereign rights.138 This
level of standing alleviates the need to show injury.139 More
recent cases of State suits against the federal government fail to
even contemplate State standing and tacitly accept the State’s
standing to sue.140 Thus, the difference between a suit against the
it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution.”).
134. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 227.
135. Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).
136. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
137. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
138. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (allowing Missouri to bring
suit against the United States for entering into a treaty in violation of Missouri’s perceived
regulatory rights, but ultimately rejecting the claim because no regulatory rights existed
there).
139. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (allowing a State suit against the
federal government for violating the State’s sovereign rights); Tarah Leigh Grove, When Can
a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 862 n.54 (2016) (discussing a
State’s special sovereignty).
140. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (immediately
discussing the substantive rights of a State without first discussing any potential justiciability
bars); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
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NPVIC and the suit launched by Texas, and what in turn makes
the presented hypothetical suit sustainable, is that it is predicated
on federal or state infringement of a State right, satisfying
standing.141
However, it is possible that a suit against the NPVIC could
also be launched (either by a member State or a non-member
State) against a member State or multiple member States. If this
were to be the case, it would initially seem that the standing
concerns are the same as a suit against the federal government.142
Despite those initial impressions, the Court has on occasion
restricted the capacity of one State to sue another, requiring
“absolute necessity” to exercise jurisdiction.143 They have gone
as far as to require “serious magnitude and imminent” injury be
“clearly shown . . . .”144 There is undoubtedly a more significant
burden on a State to establish standing than that of a private
individual in a suit against another State. However, this increased
burden appears to be inconsequential given the gravity of the
topic.
It is important to note that another underlying tenant of the
justiciability doctrine is that the Court must have jurisdiction in
the first place to hear the matter.145 The Constitution provides
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases where a State
would be made a party as well as those in which the United States
is a named party.146 Congress cannot reduce this original
jurisdiction.147 That being said, the Court has been reluctant to
exercise its original jurisdiction in specific cases.148 If the Court’s
141. See Grove, supra note 139, at 862 n.54. This distinction may apply less fervently
in the case of a member State given that it sought this legislation voluntarily and thus is not
afforded the same protection of the rights it ceded. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); Merritt, supra note 111, at 17-18.
142. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).
143. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).
144. Id. at 292.
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962).
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147
(1803).
147. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138.
148. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (“[T]he pending state-court
action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated.”).
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exercise of jurisdiction remains consistent, a post-congressionalapproval case against the NPVIC likely will not be heard under
original jurisdiction. Regardless though, this hypothetical case
could still be heard at the federal level. It just may have to reach
the Supreme Court as a course of appeals.149
While there is some question as to whether a State could sue
a member State, alleging that the NPVIC violates the complaining
State’s rights, it is undoubtedly clear that there would be no
question as to the possibility of a suit between a State and the
United States.
Having sufficiently determined that the
justiciability concerns would not preclude review of an interstate
compact after congressional approval, when a suit is based on a
violation of the Presidential Electors Clause, the merits of the case
remain.
B. Substantive Concerns
Assuming that the Supreme Court has not yet dismissed the
case for want of procedural requirements, the case’s merits must
sufficiently justify a ruling against the NPVIC. The merits of the
case will be discussed below by first looking into the plain text of
the Constitution as well as the Court’s interpretation of the same.
Then this Comment will discuss both the founding era arguments
against the NPVIC and the modern-day social and political
arguments against the NPVIC.
1. Plain Text of the Constitution and Judicial Interpretation
The Constitution merely orders that each State must appoint
electors equal to its number of representatives in Congress as
directed by its State legislature.150 These electors must meet in
their respective States and vote via ballot for the President and
Vice President separately.151 Nowhere in the Constitution are
electors of a State directed to vote based on specific criteria.152
Despite the Founders’ suggestion that the only criterion was to be
149.
150.
151.
152.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257(a) (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020).
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the electors’ independent decision, and no vote was to be cast at
the direction of any law,153 this is simply not present on the face
of the Constitution.154 As a result of the lack of instruction in this
matter, the requirement of an electoral body must first be defined
by examining the totality of the document. If ambiguity persists,
the practices at the time of ratification should prevail.155
Taking the entire Constitution into account, the States were
intended to remain as several unionized sovereigns instead of
forming a single sovereign entity.156 In addition, the Constitution
promises to these several States a “Republican Form of
Government[.]”157
This edict for a republican form of
government modifies the establishment of an electorate system.
However, there is no authoritative mandate in the text of the
Constitution regarding federal interference with the States’
exclusive ability to generate presidential electors pursuant to their
independent form of a republican government. Therefore, a case
predicated on such interference must rely on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of what little is enumerated.
The Court has not always favored federalism. It has often
received the tail end of the Court’s generosity, if any attention at
all.158 This inattention was somewhat alleviated when the Court
decided National League of Cities v. Usery.159 In that case, the
Supreme Court determined that there are, in fact, limitations to
the federal government’s power to regulate commerce.160 These
153. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 351 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
155. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-92 (2008) (applying
a textualist/originalist approach in interpreting the Constitution).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 196-97
(James Madison) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720 (1838) (recognizing the States are “sovereign
within their respective boundaries”); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931)
(describing the States as “neighbors members of a single” or “quasi-sovereignties bound
together in the Union”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (saying the
Eleventh Amendment exists to “confirm[]” the presumption that “each State is a sovereign
entity in our federal system”).
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (saying
the federal power to regulate commerce is plenary in nature).
159. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
160. Id. at 842.
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limitations are predicated on the belief that the several States
retain some sovereignty.161 The Court determined that the federal
government could not legislatively displace areas deemed to be
the traditional government functions of the States—such as the
wages set for government employees—even when the power
invoked by Congress was outlined in the Constitution.162 It said
this bar was found implicitly in the Tenth Amendment.163
While it would be refreshing to reinvigorate the Tenth
Amendment in this way, the text of that Amendment simply does
not contain any language to support this protection.164
Additionally, the Court later found that the National League of
Cities rule, barring the infringement on “traditional governmental
function[s],” was unworkable and did not protect the sovereignty
of States.165 As a result of these two blunders, that case was
summarily overturned.166
The case that replaced National League of Cities provided
an equally ambiguous test to determine whether a particular State
right existed and, if so, whether the federal government could
regulate in that area or if State sovereignty barred its control.167
That case was Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, which also dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s
(FLSA) minimum wage requirements concerning government
employees.168
The Court there found that the Constitution provides both
limits and avenues to impose federal control.169 In so doing, the
Court rejected alternative theories that had previously protected
the States’ rights, such as protection from federal infringement
upon “‘uniquely’ governmental functions” or “‘necessary’
governmental services . . . .”170 Instead, the Court provided that
the Constitution’s structure protects the States from federal
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 842-43.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 12.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
Id.
See id. at 556; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 15.
469 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 545.
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infringement on their sovereignty.171 It went on to say
enumerated barriers in the Constitution must justify any restraint
on federal power.172 These barriers can be a double-edged sword
cutting both for and against the sovereignty of the States.173 The
Court pointed out that the Constitution provides explicit areas that
Congress may regulate in Article 1, Sections 8 and 10.174 Paired
with the Supremacy Clause, the Court held that the States’
sovereignty was diminished upon ratification, but it is not gone.175
Since Garcia, additional precedent has shed light on the
notion of State power to control elections. In Shelby County v.
Holder, the Court not only upheld the premise of Garcia’s
federalism construction, but also explicitly acknowledged Tenth
Amendment protections for state-controlled elections.176
Specifically, it said “the Framers of the Constitution intended the
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”177 The Court also
assured that the several States retained equal sovereignty.178
The rule presently regarding federalism is that the federal
government may only regulate where it has been granted that
express authority.179 It is also important to reiterate that the States
are, in fact, independent sovereigns, although they have
surrendered some power by their status as members of the
Union.180 Much like a surgeon, the federal government may only
operate in the areas in which it has previously been given
informed consent.181

171. Id. at 552.
172. See id. at 554.
173. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). This differs from Nat’l League of Cities in that the
Holder Court relied on enumerated State safeguards.
177. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991)).
178. Id. at 544.
179. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543.
180. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543.
181. Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321, 322 (1990)
(“[T]he law has placed upon physicians a duty to disclose information regarding diagnosis
and treatment . . . .”); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (quoting U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
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Indeed, the Garcia Court quoted James Madison
affirmatively when he said, “[i]f the power was not given,
Congress could not exercise it . . . .”182 The Court reasoned this
constitutional protection is granted to the States as evidenced in
part by the voting rights that the States retained, namely, the
ability to elect the federal executive and legislative branches.183
Indeed, the Court went on to say that, at least regarding the
Commerce Clause, substantive restraints on federal power should
be “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process . . . .”184 This has been interpreted broadly to
apply to all potential federal interference with State
sovereignty.185
Additionally, the Tenth Amendment’s
protections for enumerated States’ rights has recently been
enforced.186
National League of Cities and Garcia provide an alternative
mode of transportation for the Court to discuss federalism (an
attempt at a pun). Still, they are nonetheless demonstrative of the
federal government’s ability to regulate the Electoral College.187
Under this analytical regime, any interstate compact that creates
a popular vote, as the NPVIC does, is an impermissible
infringement on the States’ sovereignty after being adopted by
Congress.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Garcia, the way the
United States’ government is arranged explicitly recognizes the
States’ rights as sovereigns.188 Phrased another way, the States’
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual
State.”)).
182. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
183. Id. at 550-51.
184. Id. at 554.
185. Merritt, supra note 111, at 15; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 326 (1966) (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))
(establishing the “basic test to be applied” to determine the veracity of federal interference
with State sovereignty). The Court in Katzenbach applied this test to an alleged violation of
State sovereignty authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment despite the fact that the test
originated from a potential federal violation predicated by the Commerce Clause. The use
of this test shows the interchangeability of tests designed to determine federal overreaching
despite the genesis of the federal government’s actions.
186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543, 556-57 (2013); Chiafalo, 140
S. Ct. at 2322-23, 2333.
187. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
188. Id. at 549, 554.
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sovereignty is found in the Constitution by the plain text of the
Constitution (specifically that text which defines the structure of
government).189 Here, the cause of action being raised is
predicated on the same State sovereignty evidenced by
constitutional decree.190 It could be argued that the Presidential
Electors Clause is an explicit acknowledgment of State
sovereignty in that area.191 Indeed, that was argued in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board when the Court, per
curiam, said:
[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable
not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection
of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely
under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by
virtue of a direct grant of authority made under [the
Presidential Electors Clause].192

However, assuming that the Presidential Electors Clause
alone is insufficient to show that control of the Electoral College
is the exclusive right of the State, the Garcia Court went on to
recognize that a crucial element of State sovereignty, implied by
the way the Constitution created the governmental system, is the
ability of the States to solely elect the president and congress.193
Thus, the Constitution ordains the right to elect the President as a
sovereign power of all the States.194
Additional evidence that the right to oversee the vote for
President and the right to form the Electoral College is
exclusively the right of the States can be found in Chiafalo v.
Washington.195 In that case, three electors from the State of
189. See id. at 554.
190. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
191. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“Article II, § 1’s appointments power gives the
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent some other constitutional
constraint.”).
192. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000).
193. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (“The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection
both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”).
194. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“[N]othing in the Constitution expressly prohibits
States from [controlling] presidential electors’ voting discretion . . . .”).
195. Id. at 2319-20. For an even more recent acknowledgement of such State
exclusivity, one need not look any further than the shambling mound of cases dismissed in
favor of States’ rights during and after the 2020 presidential election. See Joshua A. Douglas,
Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
(forthcoming).
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Washington voted against the candidate that won the statewide
popular vote.196 The Court upheld Washington’s use of a civil
sanction against these “faithless elector[s],” saying that, “[t]he
Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history both support allowing
a State to enforce . . . far-reaching authority over presidential
electors . . . ‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over
. . . the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includ[ing]
power to condition his appointment[.]”197
Because the right of States to vote for President and control
the Electoral College (the States’ election rights) are exclusive,
they cannot be infringed by federal regulation,198 much like any
other exclusive State power cannot be (the power to regulate the
health and welfare of a State’s citizenry for example).199 While
the Court has sometimes allowed federal infringement of States’
rights when there exists a legitimate end for the interference,
those instances are predicated on infringement of an implicit right
of the States after the federal government was granted express
permission to regulate there by the Constitution or subsequent
amendments.200 This case is the opposite of those. The
Constitution explicitly authorizes States to appoint presidential
electors as the legislature of that State sees fit.201
At best, there is only implicit power for the federal
government to regulate the States’ election rights. This implicit
power could arguably spawn from the Civil War and other voting
rights amendments’ broad grants of regulatory authority,
especially regarding elections.202 However, this extension of
authority is not infinite. Notably, this power extends only to the
enforcement of those amendments.203 No doubt some proponents
196. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.
197. Id. at 2322, 2323-24.
198. Id.; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
199. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting congressional
regulation to only those constitutionally expressed areas and barring regulation that would
infringe on a State’s law-making power for the health of its citizens).
200. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing to United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). See also M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
406 (1819) (discussing the inability of the State to tax instruments of the federal
government).
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
202. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
203. Id.
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of the NPVIC claim a violation of those amendments is occurring
under the existing electoral systems.204 However, it is hard to
fathom that such a systemic issue has existed for as long as it has
without any substantial prior acknowledgement of such a heinous
defect. If the Electoral College negatively impacts the individuals
protected by those amendments, the Electoral College
undoubtedly would be an ancient relic of the invidious past, just
as literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, and abundant
violence are.
To say that the Electoral College is in the same category as
the aforementioned practices, and is thus subject to regulation by
the same amendments, is mere convenient political jiggerypokery. The Electoral College, assuredly being different in kind
than what the voting and Civil War Amendments were conceived
to protect, cannot be regulated by such methods. Even if
regulation was permissible though, the NPVIC is a far cry from
the rational basis of those noble causes, let alone the quasi-narrow
tailoring required.205
The NPVIC would eradicate some States’ abilities, and the
values of others, to enforce their election rights. Any federal
regulation, including the interstate compact’s approval,
interfering with these rights is not predicated on any express
constitutional authorization of the federal government’s power.206
There is no conceivable basis in the Constitution or its
amendments authorizing such federal insight into this exclusive
State power. This would be an impermissible federal regulation
of a State’s constitutional powers under the Presidential Electors
Clause,207 and the Constitution generally.
The member States may have a more difficult time finding
friendly litigation, given they sought out the surrendering of their
rights voluntarily, but they are potentially not without recourse.208
While the more modern precedent does trend toward procedurally
204. See Faith Karimi, Why the Electoral College Has Long Been Controversial,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/XV9F-6J6G] (Oct. 10, 2020, 6:59 AM).
205. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542, 545 (2013).
206. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I (laying out the powers of Congress).
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
208. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798-99, 808 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720, 723 (1997).
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barring State suits against other States,209 a State is still capable
of suing another for infringement on its sovereign powers.210 This
is true even after that infringement occurs pursuant to joint
action.211 If the merits of the case are heard, the just outcome in
either instance (State v. State or State v. United States) favors the
right of the State to freely exercise its sovereign powers without
impediment from federal law or other State law.
To be as straightforward as possible: the right of the States
to control their election procedures is exclusive, as defined under
the Garcia framework.212 Any exclusive right may only be
abridged by the federal government if there is informed consent
to do so (evidenced by a clause in the Constitution or its
amendments).213 While there are clauses granting such power to
the federal government, these clauses are narrow and the powers
implicit.214 Moreover, the Electoral College is not at all related
to what these clauses are designed to remedy. Additionally, there
is no indication that the NPVIC can address these concerns; even
if it is determined they are present with the Electoral College. To
continue the medical analogy, there is at best informed consent
for the federal government to conduct as minimally intrusive a
procedure as possible to remedy an exceedingly unique condition.
The Electoral College is not an etiology of that unique condition
and the NPVIC is not that minimally intrusive procedure. If the
plain language and interpretation thereof is not sufficient to bar
the NPVIC, the legislative history of the Constitution and relevant
clauses may be persuasive.

209. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669, 674 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
210. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); South Carolina v. North Carolina,
558 U.S. 256, 268 (2010) (“That the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate
entities is high, however, does not mean that it is insurmountable.”).
211. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).
212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
213. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2334 (2020); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
214. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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2. Founding Era Thoughts and Examples

How the citizens of each State would be represented in the
federal government was discussed at length during the ratification
of the Constitution.215 Still, only a sparse mandate made it into
the final draft.216 Although it is the least desirable and most
speculative course of action, the lack of definitive text may
require a delving into the Founders’ minds and those who
followed. The framers defined the election powers of a
republican system of government as not being comprised by the
will of the people but rather the will of political bodies that
represent the people.217 This definition appears to be consistent
with the common understanding around the time of ratification.218
Beyond dictionary definitions, the understanding of a republican
government’s election can be demonstrated through the practical
applications of such a system cited by the Founders, namely
existing State constitutions at the time of ratification.219
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
established a method for choosing the president and vicepresident of the State where the several counties of the State
would elect members of the general assembly and council
members.220 Those elected officials would then choose the
persons to fill the executive office of the State.221 Similar
processes of indirectly elected executives existed in every State
at this time.222 While these State examples of an executive
215. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 284, 509.
216. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 198 (James Madison).
218. Republican Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (defining
Republican Government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”); JOHN
BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2902 (8th ed.
1914).
219. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 584-86 (2008);
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19; MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25 (stating the governor of the State
is elected by vote of both houses of the legislature with the senate being elected by county
representatives and the general assembly being elected directly by the people); DEL. CONST.
of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate shall be chosen by joint ballot of both houses
. . . .”).
220. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19.
221. Id.
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 195 (James Madison); see, e.g., MD.
CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7.
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election process are engaged in by the legislative bodies,223 the
Founders of the Constitution felt that the selection of a President
would be better assigned to an independent, single-purpose,
electoral body (as opposed to an executive elected by the
legislatures or the people directly).224 This conclusion was
reached after a full and frank discussion of the several election
processes available, including the potential use of a popular
vote.225 The framers also indicated their decision was predicated
on failed or failing foreign examples of direct democracies.226
The Founders’ definition of the Presidential Electors Clause
and the examples relied on to create the electoral system should
be more than dispositive of what the Constitution requires.
However, the philosophical ideas behind this portion of the
Constitution may be necessary to convince the most ardent
proponents of the NPVIC. The framers’ arguments on behalf of
the Electoral College generally entail three substantial areas.227
These are the avoidance of cliques, the separation of coordinate
branches, and electing the most competent executive officer.228
While the separation of coordinate branches in electing a
President is undoubtedly essential, in the context of a popular
vote, the first and the last concerns are the most relevant. Under
the first concern, the framers thought that a group or individual
could elicit the support of many individuals and improperly seek
out the presidency in a nationwide popular vote such that there

223. See MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; PA. CONST. of
1776, § 19.
224. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 509 (saying that an
independent electoral system would avoid the “great evil of cabal” because each slate of
electors would be states away from another).
225. Id. at 320-21.
226. See, e.g., id. at 268 (looking to the election of an executive in Poland); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 23-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan
eds., 2001) (discussing Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage—saying “[t]here have been, if
I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars”).
227. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 452-53
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON,
CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268-69, 284.
228. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284.
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could be no counter to a powerful individual playing on the
excitement of society.229 Specifically, it was said that:
The additional securities to republican government, to
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of
the plan, consist chiefly in the restraints which the
preservation of the union will impose upon local factions and
insurrections, and upon the ambition of powerful individuals
in single states, who might acquire credit and influence
enough, from leaders and favourites, to become the despots
of the people . . . .230

Or that the people “will be led by a few active and designing
men.”231 This would be aided by the fact that the larger States
would likely support a candidate from their State to the detriment
of any small State who opposed them.232 In essence, the fear of
cliques was the fear that someone could seize control through
force and fear, as individuals are more susceptible to
radicalization than separate and detached institutions.233 There
are cliques that the framers discussed composed not of the people,
but of the other coordinate branches.234 Again, this is not in direct
relation to the NPVIC.
The framers also feared that the people en masse would not
be capable of selecting the most competent candidate.235 This
was in part due to the lack of reliable and easily obtainable
information regarding national events.236 Indeed, the framers
229. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85,
supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton).
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton).
231. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
232. Id. at 268, 284.
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Cary & James
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 257 (James Madison) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander
Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 353 (Alexander Hamilton);
MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (describing Governor Morris’s
advocacy for a national popular vote to avoid an executive branch dependent on the will of
the legislature).
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan
eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (Mr. Sherman saying
“[t]he [people] will never be sufficiently informed of characters”).
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 235, at 447-48 (Alexander Hamilton)
(saying the people at large have no means to acquire personal observation of presidential
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talked repeatedly about the need for the electoral group to be
diverse enough to reference national issues as opposed to local
issues.237 The other half of this concern stemmed from the fact
that even if the people as a whole had the opportunity to be
informed, the information would not necessarily be accurate.238
At best it is second-hand knowledge of a candidate and at worse
it is akin to the game of telephone, even though a highly efficient
game of telephone, with all the underlying inaccuracies. To this
end, the framers said, “[a] small number of persons, selected by
their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to
possess the information and discernment requisite to so
complicated an investigation.”239
The framers and indeed the generations that followed
deemed, through implication of continued use despite significant
criticism,240 this system of election superior to a direct
democracy.241 However, the relevancy of their reasoning may
differ in the modern world. To answer the relevancy question, it
is necessary to look at the changes that have occurred since then
that might impact the historic rationales.
3. Social and Political Arguments Against a Popular Vote
You have to remember one thing about the will of the people:
It wasn’t that long ago that we were swept away by the
Macarena.242

candidates and all information that is received is filtered through the lens of trusted
individuals—albeit unelected—anyway); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
269 (Colonel Mason saying “it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character
for [president] to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man”).
237. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 172-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 269.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton).
239. Id.
240. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (saying that the Presidential Electors Clause “has probably been
the subject of more proposed amendments than any other provision of the Constitution”).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII (changing the selection
process of Vice President but retaining the Electoral College).
242. Mark Dawidziak, Jon Stewart Blurs the Lines Between Jester and Journalist, THE
PLAIN DEALER, [https://perma.cc/G22T-FJDA] (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:49 AM).
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Some people in modern America may be taken aback by the
previous section’s idea that the general public is incapable of
discerning a proper presidential candidate. To support this
outrage, the speed at which news is provided could be noted.
Likewise, the presidential candidates’ coverage could be cited.
Regardless of either argument, however, political society as a
whole has not drastically changed, despite our increased access to
media.243 The presidential candidates do not visit or invest their
campaigning into more than just a few States,244 nor does the
available media generally provide one-on-one access to the
presidential candidates.245 We may know more about the world
around us now, but the accuracy of that information has remained
essentially unchanged.246 Some even argue that this surplus of
243. Compare Shawn Garvey, A Positive Look at Negative Campaigns, 8 LBJ J. PUB.
AFFS. 13, 14 (1996) (“[W]hat his opposition claimed would result if Jefferson won the
presidential election of 1800: ‘Murder, robbery, rape, adultery and incest will be openly
taught and practiced,’ warned the Federalist press[,]” and “[t]he 1884 presidential race . . .”
where “Cleveland, widely rumored to have fathered an illegitimate son, was targeted by a
Republican campaign attack song: ‘Ma, ma, where’s my pa? Gone to Washington, ha, ha,
ha’” and “[a] famous 1964 Lyndon Johnson campaign commercial began with a little girl
plucking the petals from a daisy. Within seconds, a nuclear explosion erupted in the
background, and a mushroom cloud enveloped the little girl.”), with Gabriel Tate, The MudSlingers: The Most Shocking Presidential Attack Ads Ever Aired, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12,
2016), [https://perma.cc/NFR4-TPJS] (discussing a 1988 ad suggesting rapists and murders
would be freed upon election of the ad’s opponent and a 2016 ad suggesting that the ad’s
opponent lacked the fortitude to protect against “external threats to American security”).
244. 94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States,
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/E6CS-UVBN] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); Tollar
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 19-20 (discussing the history of presidential campaigning and
how geographically limited said campaigning has been).
245. Compare 1858 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/AHC7-HSPL] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (stating that only 7 debates
occurred, all in one State, spanning only 3 months, with no crowd involvement in the 1858
Lincoln-Douglas debates), with 2000 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/JD3J-NXCJ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (explaining how only three
presidential debates occurred in 2000, in one month’s time, with minimal crowd involvement
in one of the three debates), and 2020 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/754A-6RNW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (describing how only two
presidential debates occurred in 2020, with no crowd involvement).
246. Janet A. Hall, When Political Campaigns Turn to Slime: Establishing a Virginia
Fair Campaign Practices Committee, 7 J.L. & POL. 353, 366 (1991) (stating that
“[c]ampaign falsity statutes . . . are generally unenforced”); Maximilian J. Mescall, Make
Campaign Coverage Great Again: Presidential Campaigns, the Pres, and the Rights of
Access, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1653, 1653, 1657 (2018) (stating “more Americans follow
the news” despite the fact that “journalists continue to act as moderators” as they did “[i]n
early American History . . . as ‘gatekeepers by adhering to a developed set of ethical
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information makes discerning the quality information from the
rubbish more difficult.247
That being said, it seems readily apparent that the current
system simply cannot continue without some modification.
Regardless of the system’s merits, if the social outcry is
substantial enough, the practical implementation becomes so
frustrated as to exhaust all hope of success. Recent events have
yielded a plethora of research into the average American’s
mindset and faith in the electoral process.248 Generally, the
verdict against the process is not pleasant.249 The need for a
trusted and reliable system of elections is arguably more
important than the actual process that occurs.
In that vein, any proposed system must be consistently
applicable and transparent. Likely, a successful system would not
be subjected to potential manipulation by a single individual or
small subset of society. Other concerns that have prevailed,
despite the erosion of time, include the possibility that cliques will
form and, as discussed above, the potential that the most
norms’”) (quoting Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 72
(2016)).
247. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 437, 449 (2008); Joan Deppa, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance Symposium:
International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 25,
28 (1996) (discussing how too much media coverage after terror events may violate the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, confuse the facts, and encourage further violence);
Paul Carrington, Too Much Publicity, 27 TEX. BAR J. 75, 76 (1964) (explaining the “excess
of publicity has been called a ‘discredit to the American system of justice’”).
248. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect to Have
Difficulties Voting, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4WBF-GCA6]
(researching the impact Covid-19 had on voter confidence) [hereinafter Election 2020:
Voters are Highly Engaged]; Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelburne, How Voters’ Trust in
Elections Shifted in Response to Biden’s Victory, MORNING CONSULT (Jan. 19, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/3V8H-VH4M] (polling the impacts of violence and voter fraud on voter
confidence in the electoral system).
249. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, supra note 248 (stating 49% of
voters believed it would be difficult to vote in the 2020 elections); Laughlin & Shelburne,
supra note 248 (stating only 27% of registered republicans “say they trust the United States’
election system either ‘a lot’ or ‘some’” as of January 10, 2021); Deep Divisions in Views of
the Election Process—and Whether It Will Be Clear Who Won, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 14,
2020), [https://perma.cc/G8AR-QCWZ] (stating that only 22% of registered voters, polled
from Sept 30 to Oct 5, 2020, are very confident that “[a]fter all the votes are counted, it will
be clear which candidate won the election”); Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in
U.S., GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZX7Z-AGRJ] (stating that only 30% of
Americans said they had confidence in the honesty of elections in 2016).
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competent candidate will not prevail.250 A foundation-era
concern that was only slightly voiced then but is far more
significant in modern times is voter suppression and the suffrage
of all citizens.251
The NPVIC does not, and cannot, protect against these
concerns. First, even if it practically does not achieve this
outcome, the NPVIC will most likely be perceived by a
significant portion of the Nation’s voters as a way of
disenfranchising their vote. This can be evidenced by the existing
arguments launched against the NPVIC,252 which can be expected
to intensify upon its potential adoption. Likewise, the NPVIC
cannot address the concerns for consistency and reliability
required of any electoral system. For example, a vast exodus from
or to a highly populous member-state could potentially drastically
alter the outcome of the NPVIC’s vote. This change would be
substantial and could occur rapidly without any limitation on how
frequently it could occur. This may seem far-fetched, but again,
the primary concern with an election system is how trusted and
reliable it is by the people, regardless of the actual capacity for it
to be altered. To its credit, the NPVIC could likely end the impact
of gerrymandering. It would do so by simply ignoring any sparse
or minority populations—an ironic example of the idiom “the
medicine is worse than the disease.” Another of the major
concerns that the founding fathers had was that cliques could be
raised to change the results of an election forcibly.253 This
250. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284.
251. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 286 (“There was one
difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the
latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”).
252. Jonah Goldberg, Column: Scrapping the Electoral College Is a Bad Idea, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/D4HC-P2GR] (suggesting intentional polarization
as the driving force behind the NPVIC and that it encourages populist control of a “handful
of large, highly urbanized states”); see also Curtis Gans, Why National Popular Vote Is a
Bad Idea, HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/5QMK-HQS9] (suggesting
the NPVIC will “diminish voter turnout” and warning of the legitimacy challenges to an
NPVIC election); Chris Stirewalt, The Electoral College Dodges Another Bullet, FOX (Jul.
6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R2VS-FJ5S] (warning “a national popular election in a nation so
vast and diverse would be a demagogue’s dream”).
253. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
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concern was in part mitigated by the geographical distance that
existed between the electors in each State.254
The NPVIC brings all the relevant electors/election officials
into a significantly smaller geographic area and subjects them to
the “great evil of cabal” associated with direct political
pressure.255 In addition, the creation of a new election official
who seemingly has unfettered control to report the election
results256 likewise may establish cliques among these newly
founded chief election officials.
Regarding the competency of presidential candidates, this
concern has been launched with increasing frequency in modern
times.257 The NPVIC does not allow any enhanced observation
or determination of a presidential candidate’s competency other
than what is presently in place. Thus, this concern is not better
addressed after the enactment of the NPVIC.
Finally, the NPVIC does not address the disenfranchisement
that is already being alleged under the present election system.258
While this could be mitigated as an ancillary concern of any
election system (to be addressed more directly outside of election
law), at least one alternative to the NPVIC, proposed later, does
in fact address this concern.
As a result, the NPVIC, while no better nor much worse than
the current system in many ways, is almost assuredly not the best
overall solution. In addition to these specific and identifiable
concerns the NPVIC either fails to address or potentially brings
about, there exist other, more ambiguous sovereignty concerns
upon the NPVIC’s adoption. One such concern is that the erosion
of the distinction between the States reduces the ability to “try

254. Id. at 57, 509.
255. Id.
256. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
257. Miles Parks & Mark Katkov, What the 25th Amendment Says about Removing a
Sitting President, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5LSN-N6TY];
Marianna Sotomayor & Mike Memoli, Joe Biden Releases Medical Assessment, Described
as ‘Healthy, Vigorous’, NBC NEWS, [https://perma.cc/7CY8-QSV2] (Sept. 16, 2021, 2:41
PM); Jeannie Suk Gersen, We May Need the Twenty-fifth Amendment If Trump Loses, THE
NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2020), [https://perma.cc/UT95-4XQ8].
258. Block the Vote: Voter Suppression in 2020, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 3,
2020), [https://perma.cc/SRD4-Z845]; How to Put an End to Voter Disenfranchisement,
RUTGERS TODAY (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5VP2-N4HR].
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”259
Given the general disdain that many Founders held for a
national popular vote and the potential pitfalls of such a system
that still exist today,260 there must be a highly persuasive reason
for the present idea that this system is necessary. The NPVIC’s
proponents suggest that something must be done. Regardless of
why, their reasons should be addressed thoroughly and
respectfully. The section below attempts to provide more
appropriate alternatives than the NPVIC.
IV. WHY DOES THE POPULAR VOTE MOVEMENT
EXIST AND WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVES?
It appears that the popular vote is aimed at reconciling the
disparity between the outcome of an election and the outcome of
the people’s desire.261 After all, it is a cornerstone in our
Constitutional Republic that the will of the people is
controlling.262 Additionally, the motivation of the NPVIC’s
proponents may also be to broaden the focus of presidential
campaigning.263 In achieving these goals, it has been proposed
that the NPVIC is not an attempt to abolish the Electoral College
writ large. Instead, it is primarily concerned with eradicating the
winner-take-all provisions that presently prevail across the
Nation.264
259. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-80 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284; see also supra Section III.B.2-3.
261. See Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 Presidents Came into Office Without Winning
the National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/3E9R-JVW5] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2020).
262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 405-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
263. How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE
(Jun. 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZU27-GNXT].
264. Michael Gonchar & Nicole Daniels, Is the Electoral College a Problem? Does It
Need to Be Fixed?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X8W3-HGTE]; see also
Map of General-Election Campaign Events and TV Ad Spending by 2020 Presidential

3 BARNES.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE

12/13/21 2:49 PM

533

An advocate of the NPVIC more immersed in the nuances
might also suggest that it would eliminate the disparity in voting
power between the citizens of States based on population
differences (e.g., an occupant of California accounts for one vote
out of tens of millions in a State that only controls roughly nine
times the electoral votes of Arkansas, where a citizen accounts for
one vote among a few million).265 This disparity is further
exacerbated when comparing more disparate populations. Under
this argument the NPVIC would more accurately reflect the one
person one vote standard.
These motivations can be inferred from the direct words and
publications of those that advocate for the NPVIC or similar
national popular vote programs.266 Regarding the first concern,
several articles have been published admonishing the Electoral
College and discussing how the outcome of a particular election
did not reflect the popular vote when another candidate “won the
national popular vote by 2,868,518 votes.”267 Finally, regarding
the broadening of presidential campaigns, the NPVIC’s
proponents have said sullenly, “[t]he concentration of . . .
campaign events in just a few battleground states is nothing new
. . . .”268 It is advocated that the NPVIC will be the solution to all
these problems and more.
Now knowing the desires of those who advocate the NPVIC
specifically, and more generally those that support some form of
a popular vote, there must be a way to reconcile the Constitution’s
commands while simultaneously reaching the desires of its
Candidates, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/BE48-GN7Y] (last visited Jan. 4,
2021) [hereinafter Map of General-Election Campaign Events] (blaming the winner-take-all
laws for the lack of campaign diversity, among other qualms). Interestingly enough, the very
winner-take-all system the NPVIC allegedly loathes would likely be the inevitable outcome
of the NPVIC, except at a nationwide, rather than a statewide, scale—just a few populous
States would control the entire presidential outcome as opposed to a few densely populated
counties.
265. Distribution of Electoral Votes, THE U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,
[https://perma.cc/6875-TQ37] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020).
266. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 15, at 93-94 (“The Humphrey method, however,
would have modified the exaggerated Electoral College majorities . . . [and] would heighten
the need for [a] co-ordinated and widely distributed presidential campaign effort on a
national basis.”); How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, supra note 263.
267. Nate Silver Calculates that a 3-Million Lead Only Gives Biden a 46%, NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/7NTG-AGKD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
268. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264.
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opposition. The systems proposed below also try to remedy the
dangers of keeping the current system.
A. Ranked Choice Voting
Ranked-choice voting allows each present individual the
opportunity to exercise his or her voting rights more than once.269
This system is very similar to the way Iowa’s presidential DNC
Caucuses are conducted.270 Because the Iowa caucus system is
more developed, it will be the foundation for this section, and the
Ranked Choice Voting System will be briefly discussed toward
the end. The political parties of Iowa determine the presidential
caucus rules of that State.271 In the Iowa system, the voters will
initially physically divide the room (or attempt to replicate this
practice through technology) and locate themselves according to
their desired candidate.272 Then, if that candidate does not receive
a sufficient percentage of the total votes (ranging from 15-25%),
that same voter can realign to his or her next most preferred
candidate.273 This process is then used to select the political
delegate to elect a primary candidate.274
Transferring this system to a general presidential election
would essentially entail the same process. This process, however,
is incompatible with the current electoral scheme, which only
allots one vote per person.275 This is undoubtedly a significant
obstacle for this proposed election method. The only potential
saving grace for this idea is that there is no explicit Constitutional
mandate requiring one person one vote.276 Instead, the Supreme
Court has simply interpreted the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments to require this.277 The Court also said
that this interpretation’s main objective was to ensure “every
269. See IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IOWA DELEGATION SELECTION PLAN 3 (2020).
270. Compare id., with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 801 (2020).
271. IOWA CODE § 43.1 (1973).
272. IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, supra note 269.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
276. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity).
277. Gary, 372 U.S. at 381.
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voter is equal to every other voter in his State[.]”278 Thus, if this
method was universally available to all eligible voters and
carefully crafted to avoid disparate voting power, there appears to
be no violation. This could also be likened to the runoff election
procedures, which have been deemed to comply with the one
person one vote mandate.279
However, it is for this complication alone that this proposed
system does not present a viable alternative to the Electoral
College as it stands now. Nevertheless, it is still a possible and
popular280 contender to the NPVIC, and thus, States could
potentially impose new laws in compliance with and recognition
of this system. Indeed, many States have already shown a desire
to radically change the electoral system in their respective
jurisdictions, as evidenced by the acceptance of the NPVIC and
its originating legislation.281
As previously stated, one State has adopted a general
presidential election model that mirrors the Iowa caucus
system.282 In Maine, as of November 2020, the candidates for
president go through several rounds in the selection process.283
After each round, the candidate with the smallest percentage of
votes is removed from the running, and the next round begins.284
This goes on until only two candidates remain, at which point the
candidate with the most votes wins.285 Each eligible voter
receives at least five ranks to place the candidates on the ballot
278. Id. at 380.
279. Minn. Voters All. v. Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 2009); Dudum v.
Arntz 640 F.3d 1098, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing runoffs, even when participation
was restricted to only a few eligible voters, to prevail in the face of unequal voting power
claims).
280. See, e.g., Ranked Choice Voting, YANG2020, [https://perma.cc/866P-9ZLL] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2021).
281. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002
(2019); D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801 (2020).
283. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723A(2); Timeline of Ranked choice Voting in Maine, FAIR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/9TAVL65G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (Maine’s ranked choice statutory scheme was adopted for
State general elections in November 2016. Upon expansion to federal elections in 2018, it
faced a veto referendum petition, which suspended its implementation until it passed again
on the November 2020 ballot).
284. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2).
285. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2).
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(this can be expanded, but the minimum is five).286 Despite Rank
Choice Voting already being unanimously ruled in violation of
the Maine Constitution—because it violates the one person one
vote rule expressly mandated within—it has, like a phoenix, or a
cockroach, remained un-killable.287
Additional complaints have been launched against Ranked
Choice Voting Systems, aside from any constitutional complaints
that could be made.288 These generally attack this system’s
practical implementation.289 Many point to its implementation in
the 2020 Iowa Democrat Primary as evidence that this system
would be doomed from the beginning.290 Indeed, there is strong
credibility in the argument that the infrastructure necessary for
this system is far from available, and what we do have seems less
than capable. There is also the concern that an election system of
this nature would all but disenfranchise a voter who did not have
several hours to devote to an election.291
Given the aforementioned constitutional attacks a Rank
Choice Voting System would be subject to, as well as the practical
drawbacks of such a system, it is difficult to imagine this system
being able to reach the fundamental goals of any election system.
It provides no greater access to presidential candidates than the
current system, with the exception that in the distant future there
may be more candidates to choose from. As such, the people’s
opportunity to meet a candidate may be slightly increased. Again,
this interaction would almost assuredly be brief and as
286. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(4).
287. See Op. of the Justs., 162 A.3d 188, 210-212 (Me. 2017).
288. See, e.g., Maura Barrett & Ben Popken, How the Iowa Caucus Fell Apart and
Tarnished the Vote, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NL8L-ZDKL].
289. See id.; Hollie Russon Gilman, The Democratic Party in Iowa Changes the
Caucus Rules. There Could be Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/456E-FTRR] (“For instance, as my research finds, the wealthier, more
educated and more able-bodied and -minded residents of Iowa are more likely to persuade
their fellow caucus-goers. Furthermore, participating in caucuses requires time and
resources. Even getting to the caucus—especially on a cold, snowy February night—can be
challenging, skewing who shows up. Particularly excluded are those with disabilities, nontraditional work schedules and child-care responsibilities. Moreover, the Iowa caucuses
have not always appeared to be transparent.”).
290. Sara Morrison, The Iowa Caucus Smartphone App Disaster, Explained, VOX
(Feb. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9H76-MATC] (stating that “many precinct chairs didn’t use
the app at all, citing difficulty downloading or using it”).
291. Gilman, supra note 289.
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analytically meaningless as the shaking of hands (or bumping of
elbows) that occurs presently. This system is also subject to
manipulation simply by the inherent complexity. In that same
vein, this system’s trust and reliability have already been called
into question,292 and there has yet to even be a substantial
implementation of a Rank Choice Voting System.
Because of the uniqueness of a Rank Choice Voting System
and similar election processes, it is difficult to determine how this
would specifically reach the goals sought by the NPVIC. That
being said, thinking in the abstract, it would allow for a varied
vote, with potentially lesser-known candidates having a larger
constituency and greater potential to actually secure the
presidency. This system would also almost certainly broaden the
scope of campaigns given its ability to divert attention from the
two major political parties in the United States. While there does
not appear to be any numerical benefit to the voters’ desire
compared to the election’s outcome, increased representation may
nonetheless occur. It would be procured by giving the voters
more opportunities to elect nuanced candidates and, in turn,
would require candidates to give more attention to secure States
if they stand a chance at winning. The electoral systems in place
presently would largely remain unchanged (the Electoral College
slate would still vote for the candidate who won the State’s
popular vote).293
As has been previously stated, this hypothetical alternative
to the NPVIC is highly speculative at best. The practical impact
of using an Iowa caucus/Ranked Choice model in the general
presidential election would be just as unpredictable and possibly
illegal as the NPVIC. However, this system has the distinct
advantage of only requiring States to change their laws
independently, which can be done according to the State’s powers
highlighted in Chiafalo.294 Notably this means that no interstate
compact is required.
Because of this model’s ambiguity, it may best be retained
only as a last resort. The proceeding systems are far more
292. See Barrett & Popken, supra note 288; Morrison, supra note 290; Gilman, supra
note 289.
293. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021).
294. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020).
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concrete and seemingly reach the same goals as the NPVIC, but
through legal means.
B. Proportional Electorate Systems
There have been several proposals over time that could
potentially reduce the discrepancy between the outcome of a
State’s popular vote and the State’s allocation of electoral votes.
Most of these systems incorporate some kind of proportional
distribution of a State’s electoral votes based on each district’s
popular vote.295 This section will specifically discuss the method
employed by Nebraska as well as a new system coined by Eric T.
Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball in their article, A More Perfect
Electoral College: Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions
Under the Twelfth Amendment.296
Both of these propositions are defined by their rejection of
the Winner Takes All (WTA) provision existing across most
States.297 The WTA system requires all of a State’s Electoral
College votes to go to the candidate who won a majority of the
State’s popular vote.298 Instead, the Nebraska system allocates
each congressional district’s electoral votes to the candidate that
won the majority of the popular votes in that district.299 Then the
electoral votes that extend from that State’s senate seats as
opposed to their district/house of representative seats go to the
State’s overall winner.300
This electoral system has been criticized in large part for its
susceptibility to gerrymandering.301 It is proposed that another
electoral system, while similar in function, gets around many of
the deficiencies in the Nebraska system. This is the system
developed by Eric T. Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball, called the
Proportional Election Manner (PEM), where the State’s electoral
votes are divided based on the percentage each candidate received

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 25, 29.
Id. at 20; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2015).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2).
Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 26.
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in the State’s popular vote.302 When this results in a fraction of
the electors, the number of electoral votes is rounded down to the
nearest whole number, and the winner of the State’s popular
election overall is awarded the remainder.303
Both of these systems seek to meet the demands of the
NPVIC in roughly the same way. In each process, the WTA
system is replaced with a proportional vote,304 and thus the
people’s vote theoretically becomes more influential in
determining who their electoral representative votes for.
There is potential in both systems to alter the scope of
presidential campaigning; however, the scope will not necessarily
be broadened. Instead, the focus will simply change from swing
States to the States that employ these methods. This can be
evidenced by Nebraska’s present attention (and Maine’s
historically, until the recent repulsion of this electoral system).305
If every State of the Union were to adopt these same methods, the
outcome would be similar to the NPVIC’s adoption in this regard.
In other words, a candidate would likely invest campaign
resources into swing districts or other highly populated areas
instead of a variety of States. The States adopting these solutions
may see an increase in political importance or campaign coverage
akin to swing States (assuming only a few States adopt these
methods), but these proposed alternatives do not solve the
problem of isolated campaign focus. In addition to meeting the
concerns the NPVIC seeks to address, these proportional systems
account for some, but not all, of the underlying goals of any
election system.
For starters, they have no mechanism for providing the
citizens increased interaction with presidential candidates aside
from potentially broadening the campaign locations. However,
302. Id. at 29.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2).
305. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264 (“The single visit
to Nebraska and the 2 events to Maine were motivated by the fact that those states award
electoral votes by congressional district. Although the statewide result is not in doubt in
either state, the 2nd congressional district of Nebraska (the Omaha area) and the 2nd
congressional of Maine (the northern half of the state) were closely divided. These campaign
events were held in those particular districts, and the remainder of both states received no
attention.”).
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these systems adequately address the trust, reliability, and
transparency issues to the same extent the present electoral
system does. Finally, they seemingly do not increase the risk of
manipulating the electors or the risk of cliques forming. It should
also be noted there is likely a practical bar to the implementation
of these systems. That is, the dominant political party in each
State has no incentive to relieve its State of its control, even
partially, without the rest of the nation reciprocating the sacrifice.
For this reason, it is unlikely these systems will slowly be tested
State to State. Furthermore, if adopted all at once, the problems
of overuse would quickly become apparent.
The systems above more or less maintain the current
system’s status quo. The changes they propose are substantial
and could potentially alter presidential elections to address the
grievances put forth by the NPVIC’s proponents; however, many
of these changes would likely lose all effectiveness shortly after
implementation due to overuse. In addition, these proportional
methods fail to stand toe-to-toe with yet another proposed
method, as seen below.
C. A Second Look at the Source Material
Historically, each State’s presidential electors were the only
names on a presidential ballot, if the people’s input was
considered at all.306 The elected individuals would then convene
in their States to select the president on behalf of their
constituents.307 There was no decree contemplating who they
were to vote for, nor any other mandatory indication except their

306. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020) (“In some States,
legislatures chose the electors; in others, ordinary voters did.”); Joel K. Goldstein, Electoral
College: Is it a Dinosaur that Should be Abolished or a Last Bastion of Democracy?, 20
UPDATE ON L. RELATED EDUC. 34, 35 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism,
Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903,
906 (2017) (“Early in the nation’s history, the political parties provided ballots to voters to
cast in the election, and those early presidential ballots simply listed the names of the
presidential electors pledged to vote for that party’s presidential nominee.”); Rosenthal,
supra note 240, at 4.
307. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4
(“[T]he electors are still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the
President.”).
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perceptions and beliefs about the candidates.308 Since that time,
States have continually and gradually reduced the discretion that
these electors have to cast their ballots.309 This process largely
began after the election of 1800 when the electors sought to
disrupt the election of the president by spreading their votes
between the president and vice president evenly such that the
decision would be controlled by Congress, which at the time was
composed of the electors’ favorable political party.310 The
Twelfth Amendment wholly remedied this problem.311
Nevertheless, many statutory schemes are presently in place
to prevent the exercise of discretion by electors.312 This includes
the WTA system, which directs all electors to vote for the
candidate who won the statewide popular vote,313 and faithless
elector statutes, which bar deviation from the result of the
statewide popular vote.314 The NPVIC is yet another attempt to
regulate electoral discretion but instead favors the national
popular vote outcome.315
While electoral discretion is certainly not perfect, if it were
to be allowed, as it once was—with the duly elected individuals
having complete discretion316—it would likely meet many of the
problems contemplated by the NPVIC, as well as other problems
the NPVIC fails to address. For starters, the implementation of a
308. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 (stating that the
lack of electoral discretion common today “would have been unrecognizable to the
Framers”). But see Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323 (suggesting that upon the advent of political
parties, the electors of each State were under a strong expectation “to support the party
nominees”) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1952)); Whittington, supra note 306,
at 911 (comparing the Electoral College and Presidential Electors Clause to “Chekov’s gun”
in the sense that it falsely indicates that electors are free to choose when they are in reality
“instruments for expressing the will of those who selected them”).
309. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 14.
310. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2327.
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (resolving the issue by dictating that if no candidate for
the presidency received a majority of the votes, “then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.”).
312. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 22-23.
313. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (1969).
314. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906,
18002 (1994).
315. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
316. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 17. But see
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323; Whittington, supra note 306, at 911.
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direct election of electors rather than a direct election of the
president would allow for the electors of a person’s State to hold
a more intimate connection with their constituents and to
zealously advocate for the issues important to their people on the
national stage. This would reduce the number of people vying for
a candidate’s attention by increasing focus on the chief issues in
various States.
Paired with the newfound impossibility of the WTA system,
electors could make independent and informed value judgments
about candidates. In the process, this would also level the
disparity of power between the single voters in each State.
Functionally, that power would become indirect. Electors would
be free to vote for the candidate they feel is the most
representative of their constituency after having a personal
connection with the people, as well as the candidate. This system
allows the will of the people of every State to be explicitly heard
through their liaison.
Additionally, the votes, occurring at a far more local level
than state or nationwide scale, will almost certainly be more
representative of the elector chosen to represent a specific district.
This proportional representation is precisely what the Nebraska
and PEM methods seek to accomplish.317 This is because the
people are voting as a specific district, which gives less of an
opportunity for a densely populated area to overrule the rest of the
State or the Nation.
This system also has the potential to alleviate even the most
sinister gerrymandering by requiring the independent thought of
an elector. No, the elector likely would not sway from his or her
partisan affiliation, but the elector is at least subject to moral
accountability. This system also reduces the incentive to
gerrymander in the first place. Even a partisan sweep (occurring
when every elector is from the same political party) cannot ensure
a statewide victory for a single candidate, and the majority is no
longer dispositive of the entire State’s electors.
Likewise, a presidential candidate’s campaigning will be
broadened, albeit not geographically, but rather by the specific
and targeted issues raised by the electors representing the entire
317. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
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United States. The presidential candidates would no longer have
to campaign or rally to mass crowds of thousands of people,
greeting only ten or so before being shuffled away. Instead, a
candidate could sit down with 538 people or less throughout a
campaign, with each person chosen to be the best representative
of their community’s interests. Likely to be a televised event, this
would almost assuredly be more representative of a candidate’s
actual capacity compared to a candidate addressing a partisan
crowd chanting their name or waving their flags. While the
electoral representative would undoubtedly be as partisan as the
populations he or she represents, the decreased number of people
would give the candidate time to address opposing views in an
actual conversation instead of merely spouting the same rhetoric
to a different crowd.
The American people commonly appoint representatives to
control substantial aspects of their lives, including but not limited
to a person’s literal life and death. To think that presidential
electors should be treated any differently is to ignore the
foundations of the United States and to laugh in the face of the
men and women who already see to it that the rights of the people
reign eternal.
The potential adoption of this plan, it should also be noted,
is more likely than any other proposal. This is because the
adopting State’s political party does not need to cede its control.
The electors, now directly chosen by the people, will likely have
similar, if not the same, partisan affiliations as they did before
adoption. The difference is that they are no longer bound in the
same way they were before. It is in no way realistic to expect
members of a political party to uniformly abandon said party,
except in the most abhorrent of circumstances. They will likely
vote along the same partisan lines, but now for the candidate most
acutely after their own district’s heart. As a result, there is not the
same incentive to shy away from this legislation by the dominant
political party as there is with the other potential electoral
systems. Likewise, to those States seeking to avoid the seemingly
inevitable NPVIC, this system presents a viable alternative.
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CONCLUSION

The national popular vote movement and, more specifically,
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been gaining
attention.318 It likely will continue to gain attention and support
in the years following this Comment. The NPVIC requires
congressional approval, which it has yet to receive, if it is
constitutionally permissible.319 However, even if congressional
approval is tendered, it is unlikely that the compact can be
sustained.320 The States could challenge the federal government
and the compact under the notion that the States have a right to
participate in the federal election process.321 Under the precedent
set by the Supreme Court in Garcia and other cases, this right is
evidenced by the structure of the Constitution and the explicit
federalism concerns stated within.322 This view is also compliant
with the historical teachings recorded at the Nation’s inception.323
Additionally, there are practical social and political reasons not to
implement the NPVIC or a similar election method.324
Despite the NPVIC’s many faults, the motivation behind it
is presumptively virtuous.325 As a result, alternative methods to
reach the same goals have been proposed.326 Two of the proposed
methods are better suited, right off the bat, for use in the United
States, given their possible compliance with the Constitution.327
With a third likely to avoid Constitutional preclusion until it is in
practice. However, there are many other differences between the
alternatives and the NPVIC.
318. Id. at 28.
319. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 201; see also supra Part II and
accompanying text.
320. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
321. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Alabama v. Arizona, 291
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); see also supra Section III.A. and accompanying text.
322. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
323. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
324. See supra Section III.B.2. and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part IV and accompanying text; Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45
Presidents Came into Office Without Winning the National Popular Vote, supra note 261.
326. See supra Sections IV.A-C. and accompanying text.
327. See generally U.S. CONST; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity); Tollar
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
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Under the Rank Choice proposal, providing variety in
campaigning and better representation would be achieved. That
being said, this method is undeniably speculative, despite the
minimal changes to state law that would be required for
implementation. Proportional systems, of varying degree and
kind, all adopt proportional representation of the Electoral
College’s votes and seemingly meet many of the proposed goals.
However, they are mainly effective only when used by a few
States. In other areas, they merely maintain the system, and all
its faults, in place today.
Finally, a return to the original method of presidential
elections would provide the people the most representation,
would not require a significant change in existing laws, could be
implemented effectively throughout the nation, and would secure
the propriety of elections and the will of the people for centuries
to come. If we are to truly accept that some truths are self-evident,
we should strongly consider an election system that derives from
the consent of the governed.
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THE HIGH PRICE OF POVERTY IN
ARKANSAS’S COURTS: RETHINKING THE
UTILITY OF MUNICIPAL FINES AND FEES
Madison Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
The opposite of poverty is not wealth. It is justice.
— Bryan Stevenson, Esq.1
Beginning in the 1980s, a “trail of tax cuts” led to budget
shortfalls and revenue gaps throughout the United States.2 These
budgetary problems resulted in many cities and towns shifting
their burden of funding courts and the justice system at large “to
the ‘users’ of the courts, including those least equipped to pay.”3
Although “jailing an indigent person for a fine-only, low-level
offense is unconstitutional,” it is still an ongoing practice in many
states, including Arkansas.4 In 1995, Arkansas passed new
legislation to govern its circuit courts’ collection and enforcement
of fines and fees.5 One subsection of this chapter explicitly
provides that the “court shall inquire into the defendant’s ability
to pay and shall make a determination of the defendant’s financial
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Arkansas Law
Notes Editor for the Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author thanks Associate Dean
Tiffany Murphy of the University of Arkansas School of Law for her guidance and advice
in writing this Comment. The author also thanks David Sachar for his invaluable insight into
Arkansas’s Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission. The author thanks the Criminal
Justice Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights for its unrelenting efforts to
remedy this injustice and for igniting her passion for this cause. The author would also like
to thank her family for their lifelong support in her educational endeavors, and Tyler for his
unwavering encouragement and support.
1. PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
IN AMERICA xix (2017) (emphasis added).
2. Id. at xv.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-13-701 to 712 (1995).
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ability to pay the fine.”6 Although this procedural safety net is
embedded in the statute, it has not served its intended purpose for
several reasons.
A large part of the problem stems from courts’ partial or, in
many cases, complete neglect of this mandated analysis.7 One
contributing factor is that “the statute does not enumerate types of
information to be considered before making an ability to pay
determination.”8 Therefore, many judges fail to conduct a truly
meaningful analysis when determining an individual’s realistic
ability to pay. In Arkansas, the law mandates an inquiry into
whether the person can show that his or her failure to pay was not
“purposeful” or a result of a lack of “good-faith effort” before
imposing jail time.9 However, in practice, “the entire inquiry
[may] rest[] on a judge’s observations of whether defendants
possess random items, such as cigarettes, smart phones, or brand
name clothing.”10 There are endless examples of people whose
struggles illuminate the real-world effects of these arbitrary
determinations.
Kimberly Snodgrass, a named plaintiff in Mahoney v.
Derrick,11 was convicted for failure to pay ten separate times over
four years because she could not afford the monthly payments the
judge imposed.12 However, the presiding judge did not conduct
the requisite evaluation of Kimberly’s ability to pay, as is required
by Arkansas law,13 even though “[a]ll but one of her jail records
indicate[d] she was unemployed at the time of arrest.”14 Upon
each conviction, she endured up to thirty days in jail, as well as
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (emphasis added).
7. MYESHA BRADEN ET AL., LAWS.’ COMM. FOR CIV. RTS UNDER L., TOO POOR TO
PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES POVERTY & MASS
INCARCERATION 9 (2019), [https://perma.cc/AU7R-C2E9].
8. Id. at 10.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-703.
10. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
11. See generally Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial at 2, 12-13,
Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 60CV-18-5616 (Aug. 9, 2018). Mahoney v. Derrick is a class
action lawsuit that was filed against a White County District Court Judge in an effort to put
an end to his unlawful behavior in his assessment of fines and fees. See infra text
accompanying notes 82-89.
12. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(5)(A) (1995).
14. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 28.
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additional charges between $450.00 and $670.00 tacked onto her
existing outstanding debt.15 Aside from added charges, each
payment made towards an outstanding debt’s principal balance
has a portion deducted as an administrative interest fee.16 As a
result of her repeated incarceration and mounting debt, Kimberly
“lost two jobs, her driver’s license has been suspended multiple
times, and she has lost housing four times; each time losing much
of what she and her children owned.”17
Tragically, Kimberly’s story is not unique. Tina Phares, then
a forty-seven-year-old mother and former accounts manager with
an associate degree, had a similarly disastrous experience with the
Arkansas courts.18 Tina’s story began when she turned to drugs
after a series of personal tragedies, including the deaths of her
father and toddler son, an accident that left her husband
“hospitalized [and] in an induced coma for a year,” and a
tumultuous divorce.19 Over the subsequent years, before entering
a treatment program in 2017, she was “convicted of failure to pay
nine times and sentenced to 30 days in jail seven times.”20 At one
point, the judge issued an arrest warrant for failure to pay “less
than [a] month after she was released on two consecutive 30-day[]
sentences for convictions of failure to pay[,]”21 allowing her
almost no time to get back on her feet and earn an income.
While Tina has made personal strides, such as becoming
drug-free and, in 2018, “bringing home her first paycheck since
her son died[,]” her life and personal progress remain stagnated
by the over $15,000 in debt she owes to the court.22 Like in
Kimberly’s case, there was no inquiry conducted to determine
Tina’s ability to pay the fines and fees levied against her.23 Had
15. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 (explaining that, on average, Kimberly has
spent “one of every three days in the White County Detention Center” since the time of her
first arrest in September 2014).
16. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).
17. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 16.
18. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/2TRR-HWXS].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 20.
22. Personal Narrative: Tina Marie, supra note 18.
23. Id.
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the proper examination been performed, the judge likely would
have recognized the personal hardships, battle with addiction, and
lack of employment and financial resources that impeded Tina’s
ability to pay. Moreover, Tina might have never spent time in
jail, and she certainly would not have been burdened with
thousands of dollars in debt (totaling approximately $15,000 in
2018).24
Because of the unlawful actions of one judge, both Kimberly
and Tina were jailed on failure to pay warrants for more than 150
days over a three-to-four-year period, and both have incurred
additional debt of “between $4,000 and $5,000 in fines and costs
for the same charges.”25 These two first-hand accounts are drops
in the bucket of the endless stories of personal and financial ruin
brought on by the courts.26 Thousands of Arkansans remain
bogged down by outrageous mounting debt stemming from
flagrant disregard for the law and Arkansas’s Constitution.27
Many people have spent time in prison, lost jobs, missed
opportunities for personal and financial growth, and some have
even lost custody of their children because of their inability to
afford the debt imposed on them by Arkansas courts.28
While the initial response is oftentimes, “don’t do the crime
if you can’t do the time,” the goal of this Comment is to illustrate
how the issue is much more complex than a simple form of
appropriate retribution or punishment. Many people find
themselves in this treacherous cycle due to low-level civil
offenses, such as a single traffic ticket or a minor housing code
violation.29 These are not felony convictions; many times, these
are not even infractions that carry with them more than a fine,
much less jail time. The preamble to the United States
Constitution expressly references the goals of “establish[ing]
24. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 10.
25. Id. at 28.
26. See generally NEIL SEALY ET AL., ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING:
HOW INSTITUTIONS & POLICIES KEEP ARKANSANS IN DEBT 11-12 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/PNA8-YUD7].
27. See generally id.
28. See, e.g., Personal Narrative: Nikita, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/NS9T-7MH7].
29. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 6; see also SEALY ET AL., supra note 26, at 11-12.
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Justice, . . . promot[ing] the general Welfare, and secur[ing] the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”30 This
Comment will argue that until we remedy these grave injustices,
inflicted primarily upon low-income Arkansans, we are not living
up to these ideals.
While the issue is complex, the premise is simple. It is
wrong to jail poor people or add hundreds of dollars at a time to
the principal of their debt solely because they cannot afford to
pay, and it should not be happening in the State of Arkansas. The
Arkansas statutes and United States Supreme Court cases31 that
address this issue have not served their intended purpose of
safeguarding constitutional rights. Therefore, Arkansas should
make a concerted effort to end this unconstitutional practice that
is a waste of taxpayer dollars, with the cost of incarceration
typically exceeding the amount in dispute.32 The Arkansas
Legislature should address this urgent problem by adding
specificity to the existing statute in the form of factors a judge
must consider when making an ability-to-pay determination.
Additionally, community members and non-profit
organizations should continue pushing for reform through
litigation. To enact real change, there must be accountability.
Given the obstacle of judicial immunity in litigation, plaintiffs,
lawyers, and concerned citizens alike should utilize Arkansas’s
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (“JDDC”) to
report repeat-offender judges and ensure that unethical or
unlawful behavior does not go unpunished. Arkansas should
prioritize this effort and establish a uniform system to guarantee
equal protection under the law for its citizens and promote
confidence in its courts and the judiciary. Furthermore, many
individuals facing unlawful treatment do not have the time,
connections, or resources to continue litigating a case for years
through proceedings and appeals. While courts can serve as an
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
31. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that “[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has”); see also
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
32. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 5 (2019), [https://perma.cc/YE9N-AR3E].
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effective mechanism for plaintiffs, we should not accept the
notion that the existence of courts as an avenue for recourse
somehow negates the serious nature of judges flouting the law.
This Comment will proceed with four main parts. Part II
will provide background on the subject matter to furnish a
foundational understanding of the issue. Part III will explain how
the municipal fines and fees system functions in Arkansas. Part
IV will propose possible solutions and practical remedies that, if
utilized, could generate more positive outcomes for Arkansas’s
local and municipal governments and their citizens. Finally, Part
V concludes that making meaningful reforms in this area is both
morally and economically imperative.
II. BACKGROUND: THE “FINES AND FEES”
CONUNDRUM
For at least two decades, the new criminalization of poverty
crept into communities large and small, driven by misbegotten
law enforcement politics and the search for revenue, but with
little public attention.33
“A debtors’ prison is any prison, jail, or other detention
facility in which people are incarcerated for their inability,
refusal, or failure to pay debt.”34 The federal government
outlawed debtors’ prisons in 1833.35 However, it was not until a
series of cases between 1970 and 1983 that the Supreme Court
established the unconstitutionality of incarcerating people simply
because they cannot afford to pay fines and fees that the State has
levied upon them.36 The Court’s opinion in Bearden v. Georgia
33. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xviii.
34. Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb.
24, 2015, 7:15 AM), [https://perma.cc/X7N3-3KMY].
35. Id.
36. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 235, 240-41 (establishing that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when a defendant is imprisoned for an amount of time exceeding the
statutory maximum on the basis of an inability to pay a fine or court costs); Tate, 401 U.S.
at 397 (opining that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when a crime is punishable only
by fine for those who can afford to pay it, but by prison for those who cannot); Bearden, 461
U.S. at 668 (holding that incarcerating an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates
the Equal Protection Clause unless the defendant has the financial means to pay, and thus,
nonpayment is willful).
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was, and remains, arguably the most consequential case on this
issue.37 Although Bearden established that courts must conduct
an analysis into a defendant’s ability to pay and must not imprison
him or her for failure to pay unless the failure was willful, the
opinion did not give explicit instruction regarding what exactly
the Court meant by “willfully refused to pay.”38
Because of this lack of clarity, municipal judges frequently
ignore state law and the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
in Bearden.39 One consequence of this initial failure to conduct a
meaningful analysis of an individual’s ability to pay is that, in
many cases, the individual is then placed on a payment plan with
the court that he or she may not be able to keep up with. As a
result, if an individual defaults on their payment plan and the
judge issues a bench warrant for his or her arrest, “Bearden
becomes irrelevant”40 because the individual’s failure to pay
“constitutes criminal contempt, which allows incarceration as
well as further fines and fees.”41 Once a person commits a “crime
that allows jailing,” such as contempt, “there is no protection for
indigence.”42 In turn, this creates a loophole that results in
punishing people for their inability to pay.43
The truth is, while they are not referred to as “debtors’
prisons” by name, local jails across the country are full of people
incarcerated based upon their inability to pay fines and fees.44
The American Action Forum estimates that roughly “10 million
37. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 4-5.
38. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
39. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Cf. Cortney E. Lollar, Eliminating the Criminal Debt Exception for Debtors’
Prisons, 98 N.C. L. REV. 427, 434 (2020) (stating that while “[a] person who is incarcerated
because she does not have the ability to pay a [] legal [financial] obligation might well be
deterred from engaging in any further criminal activity, but when the failure to pay in and of
itself becomes criminal activity justifying further incarceration, the deterrence value is
difficult to ascertain”).
44. Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the
United States, AM. ACTION F. (June 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/97HP-MDYF]; see also
Lollar, supra note 43, at 434-35 (arguing that “courts and legislators should eliminate
incarceration for the nonpayment of” legal financial obligations because “[s]ufficient
mechanisms are already in place for those who have assets but choose not to disgorge
them[,]” such as property seizure and wage garnishment).
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people owe $50 billion in legal fees, fines, and penalties” in the
United States.45 Despite their legal obligation to do so, “many
courts refuse to consider a person’s financial condition” when
imposing fines and fees and “at times[,] reject attempts to explain
dire financial circumstances such as homelessness, the needs of
dependent children, and the like by explicitly stating that [courtimposed] debt must take priority over such concerns.”46
While fines, imposed at the time of conviction, are intended
to serve the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence, fees, on
the contrary, “are intended to raise revenue” and often “bear no
relation to the offense committed.”47 Arkansas’s Constitution
specifically states that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for debt
in any civil action . . . unless in cases of fraud.”48 Additionally, if
a “defendant claims an inability to pay [a] fine, the court shall
inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay and shall make a
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay the
fine.”49 If an individual elects to pay a fine in installments, there
is an added fee (essentially an interest charge) deducted from his
or her payment each month.50 These additional fees prolong the
amount of time it takes to pay off the debt, allowing the
municipality to rake in extra revenue and profit at the expense of
its community’s most vulnerable members.
Further, a missed payment can wreak havoc on a person’s
life in endless ways. Some judges in Arkansas will revoke the
person’s driver’s license and registration as punishment, despite
not having the authority to do so.51 This unlawful yet pervasive
45. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44 (adding that roughly 5,000 people in the United
States are incarcerated because they are unable to afford release).
46. Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 59 (2018) (detailing the account of one father of four who has
had to prioritize paying court debt over paying his electricity bill, buying his child a winter
coat, and providing food and shelter for his family, lamenting that “[i]t doesn’t matter what
[his] family suffers, so long as the court gets paid”).
47. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
48. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16.
49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-702(a)(5)(A) (1995) (emphasis added).
50. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-704(b)(1)(A) (2017).
51. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-402 (2021) (granting the Department of Finance and
Administration’s Office of Driver Services complete authority over administering laws
pertaining to suspension and revocation of driver’s licenses); BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7,
at 2.
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practice is counterproductive, as many people, particularly those
in rural areas of Arkansas, do not have adequate access to public
transportation.52 The lack of access to transportation coupled
with a suspended license may cause a person to lose their job,
further hindering their ability to pay off their debt.53
While non-profits like the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law (“Lawyers’ Committee”) and the American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) have made litigating these “fines
and fees” cases a priority, another available avenue of recourse is
reporting repeat-offender judges to the Judicial Discipline and
Disability Commission in Arkansas (“JDDC”).54 Arkansans
adopted a constitutional amendment establishing this commission
in November 1988,55 which “investigates and may take
disciplinary action or, in the most serious cases, recommend to
the Arkansas Supreme Court that it impose discipline upon a
judge whose actions are found to be a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.”56
There are several possible disciplinary remedies that the
Commission may recommend. However, in the most serious
cases, “the [Arkansas] Supreme Court has the power to suspend,
remove or involuntarily retire or censure judges based on the
Commission’s recommendation.”57 In less serious cases, the
Commission acts independently to mandate professional
counseling and issue public admonishments, reprimands, or
censures to judges who have violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct.58 This process is worthwhile because it puts the judge
on notice of his or her misconduct. Additionally, as public record,
52. Rayla Bellis, More Than One Million Households Without a Car in Rural America
Need Better Transit, T4AMERICA BLOG (May 15, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X33T-KNF3];
BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
53. See BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
54. See Press Release, Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, Letter of
Admonishment (Mar. 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/SX78-MJ3F] (publicly admonishing
District Court Judge Keith Blackman of Craighead County for his practice of exacting illegal
fees on certain defendants “for changing a plea from ‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty[,]’” and formally
putting Judge Blackman on notice that this practice was unlawful).
55. See ARK. CONST. amend. 66.
56. About the Commission, JUD. DISCIPLINE & DISABILITY COMM’N,
[https://perma.cc/3G3Q-7WAH] (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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it may deter other judges from similar actions, resulting in
increased judicial accountability and incentivizing judges to
adhere to Arkansas’s laws and Constitution.
Making these reforms would most certainly benefit indigent
Arkansans, but the State’s population as a whole would reap
positive benefits as well. A 2020 study conducted by the Center
for American Progress found that 16.2% of Arkansans live in
poverty, with African Americans accounting for the largest
percentage of that group at 27.1%.59 This indicator ranks
Arkansas at 47th out of the 50 states and the District of Columbia
in overall poverty.60
The criminal justice system greatly depletes Arkansans’ tax
dollars. Arkansas has seventy-five counties, each with a county
jail.61 In 2018, Arkansas’s incarceration rate was 589 per 100,000
residents, far surpassing 2018’s national average of 374 per
100,000 residents.62 Over the last forty years, Arkansas’s prison
population has continued to increase steadily, skyrocketing from
2,911 in 1980, to 11,851 in 2000, to 17,713 in 2019.63 These
numbers do not even include the jail population in Arkansas’s
county jails, totaling 8,610 in 2013.64 Sebastian County, the
fourth largest county in Arkansas, proposed a county budget for
the year 2020 with the jail budget listed at $6,774,888, “a 5.8%
increase from the total jail budget from 2019[,]” consuming a
quarter of the proposed general fund budget, “making the jail the
highest-funded department in the general fund.”65
According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “almost every
state has increased criminal and civil court fees or added new

59. Arkansas 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/C2UC-EX85] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2021).
60. Overall Poverty 2020, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-9WJG]
(last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
61. Arkansas 2018, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/GXU2-J9P6] (last visited
Apr. 6, 2021).
62. Id.; 2018 National Averages, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., [https://perma.cc/38QJB6UF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
63. State-by-State Data: Prison Population Over Time, SENT’G PROJECT,
[https://perma.cc/8D2J-YRV3] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
64. Id.
65. Thomas Saccente, Proposed ‘20 budget for Arkansas Jail Grows, ARK. ONLINE
(Oct. 20, 2019), [https://perma.cc/PJJ3-6JB9].
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ones” since 2008 as a way to increase revenue.66 However, the
Brennan Center’s report explains in detail just how inefficient this
practice is. For instance, the report points out that not only does
jailing people who are unable to pay the fines and fees imposed
on them fail to generate revenue, but it also comes at a high cost,
“sometimes as much as 115 percent” more than the outstanding
amount.67 The imposition of fines and court costs provides more
than 20% of the revenue for “nearly half of local governments.”68
Every state in the nation is squandering money it could invest in
infrastructure, better public schools, and improved public
health.69 Instead, it is invested in jailing individuals for low-level
offenses, including failure to pay court fines and fees.70 Worse
yet, jailing an individual only further handicaps their ability to
pay their legal financial obligations, and therefore, is a lose-lose
situation for all parties involved.
III. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN
ARKANSAS
There are a variety of scenarios around the country, but they
all add up to the same thing: prosecuting people for low-level
offenses, squeezing them for money, and jailing them if they miss
payments, in a cruel game of “pay or stay.”71
Because the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
jailing an indigent individual for failure to pay is
66. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.
67. Id. at 5 (additionally, the report points out that the actual costs are even higher than
the estimated amounts because many of the costs associated with the debt collection are
unascertainable).
68. Hayes & Barnhorst, supra note 44.
69. See MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5, 9; Christopher Ingram, The States That
Spend More Money on Prisoners Than College Students, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/99CD-M7KX].
70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9; see also
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/KD5K-QB96]; see generally Terry-Ann
Craigie et al., Conviction, Imprisonment, and Lost Earnings: How Involvement with the
Criminal Justice System Deepens Inequality, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 15, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/7N2R-NBT3].
71. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
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unconstitutional,72 upholding this ruling should be relatively
simple. However, Bearden’s language that a failure to pay must
be “willful” for incarceration to be an appropriate remedy73 has
left lower courts with too much discretion in determining what
exactly “willful” means. In 2009, the Arkansas Court of Appeals
clearly stated that when a defendant violates the terms of their
sentence in the form of a failure to pay, “the State has the burden
of proving that the failure to pay restitution was inexcusable.”74
However, once the State presents that evidence, “the defendant
has the burden of presenting some reasonable excuse for his
failure to pay.”75
In Jordan v. State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that
“[a] defendant’s failure to make bona fide efforts to seek
employment or to borrow money to pay restitution may justify
imprisonment.”76 While seeking employment seems reasonable,
the suggestion that someone may go to jail because they have not
made “bona fide efforts” to borrow money from people in their
life is not reasonable and is entirely too subjective. Additionally,
borrowing money would place the person in the same position of
owing money to someone or something—keeping them indebted.
Arkansas law mandates that in determining the method of
payment of restitution, the court take into account:
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to
another obligation of the defendant;
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the
court; and
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment
of restitution and the method of payment.77

While this may sound like “the bases are covered,” what is
happening in practice is an entirely different story.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1983).
Id. at 668.
Beebe v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 113, at 2, 303 S.W.3d 89, 90.
Id.
327 Ark. 117, 122, 939 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1997).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).
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One would be hard-pressed to find a better example of this
statute’s inefficacy than the courtroom of one White County
District Judge.78 During his 2016 campaign, the judge was quoted
in the Searcy Daily Citizen admitting, “I know my fines are a lot
higher [than other judges] . . . I have a policy: Stay out of trouble
for four years . . . Make your monthly payments . . . If they can
do that for four years, they can do it for the rest of their lives.”79
Further, he proceeds by saying, “I try to hammer them at the front
end and make them want to change, then I give them incentive.”80
One of the many issues with this approach is that his selfproclaimed “zero tolerance” policy81 is outside of his purview as
a judge.
Court filings in Mahoney v. Derrick—the class action
lawsuit brought against the judge—further outline his behavior,
asserting that the judge “routinely sentences individuals
convicted of failure to pay to twice the length of jail time as those
convicted of the most serious misdemeanors under State law. He
does not credit the jail time against their debt; instead, the jail time
is in addition to new debt imposed.”82 The Complaint goes on to
allege not only that “[t]housands of individuals currently owe
debt in [the judge’s] courts[,]” but also that he has “jailed some
[individuals] while they live[d] in tents or shelters.”83
The judge confirmed in a deposition that he issues arrest
warrants and jails individuals who miss a single payment with no
pre-arrest determination of “whether that person failed to make
their fine payments knowingly and willfully.”84 Further, he
concedes to his failure to act in accordance with the Arkansas
Fines Collection Law, stating that he does not consider an
individual’s ability to pay at sentencing, and does not consider
78. See Alan Pyke, A Judge in Arkansas Makes $147,000 a Year for Turning Poor
People into Indentured Servants, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 9, 2018, 3:27 PM),
[https://perma.cc/6BB6-ZJZN].
79. Id.
80. Id. (it is unclear what exactly this “incentive” is).
81. Max Brantley, New Lawsuit on ‘Debtor Prison’ Practices in White County
UPDATE, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4JBP-6TKZ].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Mahoney
v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Aug. 3, 2020).
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“whether the $100 per month payment plan he imposes causes a
severe and undue hardship on that person or his or her
dependents.”85
Because of the position of trust and authority that judges
occupy in our society, the very least the public should expect them
to do is follow and uphold the law. One might think that when
such disregard for the law is exposed, the thousands of people
who have faced financial ruin as a result of the injustice would
have their debts forgiven, or at least receive some sort of
compensation. However, that is not the case. The Circuit Court
of White County granted summary judgment for the defendant
judge in Mahoney based on his entitlement to “absolute judicial
immunity.”86 The plaintiffs got nothing.87 However, even if the
court had ruled in their favor, the tens of thousands of dollars in
debt that they collectively owe to the judge’s courts would have
remained unsettled, and they would not have received any
compensation.88 Because the plaintiffs only sought declaratory
relief, a court order would have simply mandated that the judge
modify his actions to accord with Arkansas’s laws when imposing
and enforcing the collection of fines and fees.89
Such an outcome is a crushing blow to indigent people’s
quest for justice in Arkansas and across the country. When a
judge acknowledges under oath that he engages in practices that
violate state law, as well as numerous rulings set forth by the
United States Supreme Court with impunity, that should be
concerning. The egregious and ongoing nature of the judge’s
practices met with the outcome of this case leaves only one
conclusion: there must be a new route to recourse for indigent
Arkansans.

85. Id.
86. Order and Judgment at 4, Mahoney v. Derrick, No. 73CV-18-874 (Dec. 30, 2020).
87. Id.
88. This is because the plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief, which “refers to a
court’s judgment stating the rights of parties without ordering any specific action or listing
awards for damages.”
Declaratory Relief, CORNELL L. SCH. (June 2020),
[https://perma.cc/Y9KQ-T8TV].
89. See id.
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In its 1998 opinion in Robinson v. Langdon,90 the Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s test
for judicial immunity articulated in Cleavinger v. Saxner.91 This
test articulates six factors for consideration:
(1) the need to assure that the individual can perform his
functions without harassment or intimidation;
(2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling
unconstitutional conduct;
(3) insulation from political influence;
(4) the importance of precedent;
(5) the adversary nature of the process; and
(6) the correctability of error on appeal. 92

The Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers further elaborates on
this concept, noting that “[t]his immunity applies even when a
judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[,]” and that
“[t]he rationale . . . is not to protect or benefit malicious or corrupt
judges, but to benefit the public, whose interest it is that judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of consequences.”93
While some of these justifications sound sensible when
assessed at face value, the rationale that failing to punish judicial
wrongdoing is somehow to the community’s benefit is an
argument that holds little weight when looking at an example like
the Mahoney case. First, a judge’s “errors” are not always errors
which an appeal could remedy.94 Second, when a judge is not
exactly “perform[ing] his functions”95 in an ethical way, instead
of protecting him as the hypothetical target of harassment or
intimidation, the courts should prioritize the public’s best interest.
Courts should not ignore the ways in which the judge violated his
90. 333 Ark. 662, 670, 970 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1998).
91. 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985).
92. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296.
93. 3 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ARKANSAS LAWYERS § 9:21
(2020-2021 ed.).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89; see also Declaratory Relief, supra note
88.
95. Robinson, 333 Ark. at 670, 970 S.W.2d at 296.
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oath of office and ultimately ensured members of his community
stayed intrenched in poverty for years.96
What started as a “zero-tolerance” policy ultimately resulted
in a pattern of unconstitutional failures to conduct inquiries into
individuals’ ability to pay, incarcerating many of those
individuals when they could not pay, and continuing to levy
additional fines and fees upon them for years.97 Many Arkansans
will never financially or emotionally recover from their
entanglement in this system, and granting the judge absolute
judicial immunity does not protect the interests of Arkansas’s
citizens.
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Mahoney were not seeking
monetary damages.98 Therefore, allowing the doctrine of judicial
immunity to bar the imposition of declaratory relief to stop
unlawful behavior—with no monetary damages at stake as a
possible remedy—seems rather ludicrous. While the argument
that the judicial immunity doctrine furthers the public interest
because “judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences”99 certainly
makes sense in some situations, this doctrine must be narrowed,
clarified, and reformed for its stated policy objectives to function
as intended.
Judicial immunity should not serve as a complete barrier to
justice for individuals treated in an antithetical way to that which
most Arkansans would deem ethical, appropriate, or deserving of
a position of power and respect. Furthermore, a doctrine created
to alleviate judges from “fear of consequences” might not serve
the public’s best interest.100 Instead, establishing a doctrine that
provides judges with reasonable protection from suit while still
preserving a strong mechanism for accountability and the
imposition of appropriate consequences would be more suitable.
Judges swear an oath to uphold our state laws and constitution,
96. See supra text accompanying notes 78-90.
97. See Matthew Martinez, Arkansas judge throws defendants ‘too poor to pay’ in
‘debtors’ prison,’ lawsuit says, Fort Worth Star Telegram (Aug. 10, 2018, 10:10 AM),
[https://perma.cc/9UWC-673Y].
98. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 1.
99. 3 HALL, JR., supra note 93, § 9:21.
100. See id.

4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

12/13/21 2:50 PM

RETHINKING MUNICIPAL FINES

563

and it is in the best interest of the public to ensure judges uphold
these oaths.
However, in November 2017, the ACLU of Arkansas and
the Lawyers’ Committee were successful in settling a lawsuit in
which the city of Sherwood, Pulaski County, and the district court
judge were the named defendants.101 This settlement mandated
that “Sherwood’s ‘hot check’ court [would] no longer jail people
who can’t afford to pay court fines and fees imposed for bouncing
a check . . . [and] requires the court to evaluate each defendant’s
ability to pay before determining the person’s sentence.”102
Several factors could point to why this outcome was so different.
The fact that the city and county were themselves named
defendants, and thus, were not entitled to judicial immunity, may
have provided a greater incentive to settle. Maybe it was because
this case was litigated in federal court as opposed to state court.103
However, the fact that the settlement had to include a mandate to
evaluate each individual’s ability to pay, which the law already
requires, further demonstrates the shirking of the law that is
occurring in some of Arkansas’s courtrooms.
IV. THE PATH TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE
SYSTEM IN ARKANSAS
Ferguson was a spark that turned isolated instances of
activism into a national conversation and produced numerous

101. Dade v. City of Sherwood, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF ARK.,
[https://perma.cc/Q9AN-JMQE] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
102. Id.; see also Linda Satter, Under Deal, 1 Arkansas Court to Back Off Jailing Over
Hot Checks, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Nov. 15, 2017, 4:30 AM),
[https://perma.cc/8WBR-747M] (One plaintiff in the case “wrote a single bad check for
$28.93 in 2011 that, by the time the suit was filed [in 2016], had resulted in her being arrested
at least seven times, paying nearly $3,300 in fines, fees and court costs, and spending 25
days in jail . . . . [T]he lead plaintiff, Charles Dade, spent more than 100 days in jail and was
assessed about $4,000 in fines, fees and court costs because of six bounced checks totaling
$360 that he wrote in 2009.”).
103. See Complaint—Class Action at 6, Dade v. City of Sherwood, No. 4:16-CV00602-JM (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/68TN-WKLV] (bringing “civil
rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”).
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examples of partnerships between advocates and decisionmakers.104
In 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released the
findings from its investigation of the Police Department in
Ferguson, Missouri, highlighting the fact that “Ferguson law
enforcement efforts are focused on generating revenue.”105 As a
result, many states and localities began to face pressure to
reevaluate the use of fines and fees to generate revenue.106 While
there are many meritorious ideas regarding the most effective
ways to achieve reform, this section will focus on three practical
suggestions to make strides towards a more just and equitable
system in Arkansas.
A. Utilizing the Arkansas JDDC to Punish Judicial
Misconduct
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a
formal opinion regarding the “[e]thical obligations of judges in
collecting legal financial obligations and other debts,”107
following the DOJ’s groundbreaking report detailing law
enforcement’s unlawful practices in Ferguson, Missouri.108 The
nexus between the ABA’s opinion and the DOJ’s report is that
they both address unlawful practices of government and law
enforcement officials in their focus on generating revenue.
The ABA opinion asserts that to comply with the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges must “undertake a meaningful
inquiry into a litigant’s ability to pay court fines, fees, restitution,
104. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 10.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (2015) (quote in all capitals in the original).
106. See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2015), [https://perma.cc/K9HM-PJ4Y] (asserting that “[t]he publication of the
Ferguson report is widely viewed as the start of the movement to reform fines and fees in the
U.S.”).
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 490 (2020) (quote in all capitals
in the original) (discussing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s clear mandate for
meaningful inquiry into a defendant’s ability to pay before incarcerating a defendant for
failing to pay).
108. See id. at 2.
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other charges, bail, or civil debt before using incarceration as
punishment for failure to pay, as inducement to pay or appear, or
as a method of purging a financial obligation whenever state or
federal law so provides.”109 According to the ABA, Rules 1.1,
1.2, 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct all
require meaningful inquiry as “a fundamental element of
procedural justice necessary to maintain the integrity,
impartiality, and fairness of the administration of justice and the
public’s faith in it.”110
The opinion clearly states that “[a]s long as a defendant’s
failure to pay is due to genuine financial incapacity, alternatives
to incarceration must be explored.”111 Furthermore, it emphasizes
the necessity for consistently followed and “carefully prescribed
procedures” to promote uniformity—opining that failing to adopt
and adhere to such policies in failure to pay proceedings that
could result in incarceration “strikes at the very roots of the fair
and impartial administration of justice and poses a direct threat to
public faith in the legitimacy of the judicial process.”112
While some judges have been able to evade legal
accountability through the judicial immunity doctrine, this
doctrine does not shield them from ethical consequences. In
McBryde v. Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, the D.C. Circuit explained that “the
constitutional measures meant to protect judicial independence
were not intended to insulate individual judges from
accountability to ‘the world as a whole (including the judicial
branch itself),’ but ‘to safeguard the branch’s independence from
its two competitors.’”113 There is a fine line between judicial
misconduct and simple legal error.114 While the “mere legal
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 107 (quoting the Georgia Supreme Court’s
opinion in a judicial disciplinary case in which it recognized that for many litigants, “trial
judges ‘are the judicial system’”).
113. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing
Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1248 (2004) (citing
McBryde v. Comm. to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct & Disability Ords., 264 F.3d 52, 65 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)).
114. See generally id.

4 MILLER.MAN.FIN. COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/13/21 2:50 PM

566

Vol. 74:3

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

error” rule typically shields judges from disciplinary action based
on one erroneous decision, “most cases in which judicial error [is]
elevated to the level of judicial misconduct involve[] more than
one example of legal error, and a pattern is one of the identified
exceptions to the ‘mere legal error’ rule.”115 Additionally, “[a]n
intentional failure to follow the law, even with a benign motive,
constitutes bad faith and consequently judicial misconduct.”116
While recognizing the importance of balancing the interest
of judicial independence with the need for accountability in cases
of judicial misconduct, New York’s highest court rationally
articulated that “the judiciary, the Bar, and the public are better
served when an established course of misconduct is appropriately
redressed and an unfit incumbent is removed from the Bench.”117
Judges need not concern themselves that a “mere oversight[] or
misreading[] of the law” will result in sanction for legal error.118
Instead, judges must simply “comply with clear due process
requirements and avoid bullying and patently unfair conduct.”119
The interests of judicial independence are sufficiently
safeguarded by the “mere legal error” rule, while the rule’s
exceptions make it possible “to hold judges accountable for
decisions that are clearly contrary to law, that were reached
without following the procedures that confer legitimacy and
credence upon judicial actions, that represent an exercise of
discretion motivated by bad faith, or that reflect repeated legal
error that cannot be attributed to an honest mistake.”120
One under-utilized avenue for recourse is filing a complaint
with Arkansas’s JDDC. While the Commission can choose to
open an investigation and issue punishment against any judge in
Arkansas on its own,121 the Commission’s members typically
have full-time jobs, and they cannot know what is going on in
115. Id. at 1263.
116. Id. at 1268.
117. In re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. 1998).
118. Gray, supra note 113, at 1280 (adding that judicial independence is not threatened
simply because “the possibility of discipline for legal error may induce . . . second thoughts
before judicial decision-making”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A) (2013).
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every courtroom in Arkansas if they are not made aware. Because
a judge who has immunity has not been held liable in a court of
law, the ethical complaint process is a way of putting a judge “on
notice,” so to speak, for his or her bad behavior.122
In 2014, the Commission admonished a district court judge
in Craighead County for instituting an illegal fee of $35.00 that
was levied “against certain defendants, for changing a plea from
‘not guilty’ to ‘guilty.’”123 While the Letter of Admonishment
put the judge on notice, the voters had the final word when he
subsequently lost reelection in 2016.124 Complaints may be made
to the Commission anonymously or with the complainant’s name
attached,125 so attorneys, prosecutors, and public defenders who
witness unlawful behavior in the courtroom can make a report
without fear of retaliation. While anyone can make a complaint,
the average citizen is likely not aware of this avenue for recourse.
Therefore, attorneys should more frequently utilize this remedial
measure to put judges on notice, so if their behavior continues,
the punishment will further escalate.
B. Enumerating Specific Factors for Consideration in
Arkansas’s Statute
Arkansas’s applicable statute, as it stands, requires that a
judge must consider:
(A) The financial resources of the defendant and the burden
that payment of restitution will impose with regard to
another obligation of the defendant;
(B) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on another condition to be fixed by the
court; and
(C) The rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment
of restitution and the method of payment.126

122. See id. at 8(D).
123. Press Release, supra note 54, at 1.
124. Keith Blackman, BALLOTPEDIA, [https://perma.cc/RFQ6-GUYA] (last visited
Jan. 29, 2021).
125. ARK. JUD. DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY COMM’N r. 8(A).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2)(A)-(C) (2015).
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Currently, the statute—on its face—seems adequate. However,
as stated above, the statute’s lack of specificity leaves too much
ambiguity and room for interpretation as to what exactly is
required.127 Implementation is the issue.
The statute should instead require specific inquiries. These
requirements need not even go beyond what questions a person
would generally ask to determine someone’s net worth. The court
should first determine the individual’s anticipated monthly
income. Next, the court should establish whether the individual
has any dependents relying on their monthly income. On a similar
note, the court should ascertain the individual’s monthly living
expenses (i.e., monthly housing cost, the average cost of utilities
per month, groceries, etc.). An individual should not have to miss
a rent payment or forego running water for themselves and their
families to prioritize, for example, a speeding ticket.
Additionally, the court may inquire into whether an individual
possesses any liquid assets.
If the statute were to enumerate specific factors for review,
there would be significantly less grey area when analyzing a
person’s realistic ability to pay and on what schedule. Because
there are so many small local courts across the state of Arkansas,
it can be difficult to ensure each court is adhering to the same set
of legal procedures and upholding society’s expectation of ethics
in the judiciary. In reducing statutory ambiguity, the legislature
could positively effect change in a concrete and cognizable way.
C. Improving Record-Keeping, Transparency, and
Accountability
Another obstacle for justice—particularly in rural
communities—is the lack of adequate record-keeping.128 This is
a problem because many times, defendants “have no way to track
the total debt owed or ensure their payments are properly applied
to their outstanding debt[s].”129 And while community service is

127. See supra text accompanying notes 5-10.
128. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 3.
129. Id.
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typically a stated alternative to paying fines and fees,130 poor
record-keeping creates a possible scenario in which a person
completes their community service time, frequently taking time
away from work or other obligations to do so, only to learn later
that there is no such record of their completion of community
service, forcing them to start over.
Furthermore, community service is not a legitimate
alternative in many cases. For example, according to court filings
in Mahoney:
individuals must make arrangements with the local police or
other authorities in the town where the conviction occurred
. . . [and t]hey may be denied the opportunity to work at the
discretion of other municipal officials for any reason,
including that there is no work available that day, not enough
work available, or that no one is available to administer it.131

One plaintiff tried three times to no avail to complete community
service, and because the judge suspended his license, he had to
walk “to the police station in below-freezing weather only to be
told that it was too cold to work that day.”132 Unfortunately,
community service is not always a reliable alternative to payment.
Additionally, the Mahoney plaintiffs alleged numerous
instances in which they corresponded with the clerk of court to
make a partial payment, obtain an extension, or explain their
inability to pay, but were nonetheless arrested for failure to pay.133
When a sloppy administrative error on the part of the State can
result in jail time, an issue clearly exists. For example, the “Beebe
Department [in White County] serves a community of just 8,000
people[,]” yet over a span of two years, the judge issued “more
than 4,000 warrants for failure to pay fines . . . in the Beebe
Department alone.”134 To promote uniformity and give people
the confidence that record-keeping accurately reflects agreedupon extensions, community service, and any other relevant
130. CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, A BETTER ALTERNATIVE TO FINES AND FEES?
COMMUNITY SERVICE MANDATES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/G8NE-A728].
131. Complaint—Class Action Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 11, at 17-18.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 19-20.
134. Id. at 20.
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information, there must be an updated system to promote
accountability and transparency within the courts. An online
system in which individuals can check their outstanding balances,
make required payments, confirm payment due dates, track their
community service, and upload relevant financial information
would be considerably more practical than record-keeping by
hand at the courthouse.
V. HOW THE SYSTEM STAGNATES ARKANSAS’S
ECONOMY
The anti-tax lobby told voters they would get something for
nothing—the state or municipality would tighten its belt a little, it
would collect big money from low-level offenders, and everything
would be fine. This hurt not only the poor. In state after state the
dismantling of the tax base crippled public education and
damaged the futures of children across lines of income, hurting
many more children than just those who live in poverty.135
A system in which people are cyclically jailed because of
their inability to pay fines and fees is doomed to result in a netnegative economic outcome.136 While government officials often
perceive fines and fees as an attractive alternative to raising taxes,
they are less profitable than they may initially appear.
A. Cost of Arkansas’s County Jails
Pulaski County, the most populous county in the state with
nearly 400,000 residents,137 spent a staggering $27,123,125.68 on
its county jail in 2017.138 Calhoun County, the least populated
county in the state with 4,739 residents,139 spent $417,986.22 on

135. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at xvi.
136. See Carl Takei, WTF? Our Tax Dollars Are Being Spent to Jail a Vet for Being
Poor, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (May 28, 2014), [https://perma.cc/J9GN-8L9X].
137. Arkansas Counties by Population, ARK. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT,
[https://perma.cc/GRT7-PB8F] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
138. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., LOCAL GOVERNMENT INMATE COST REPORT (2017),
[https://perma.cc/A98Z-EUTD].
139. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
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a county jail that only holds twenty-two inmates.140 Washington
County, the state’s third most populous county,141 spends over
$19 million on its county jail,142 with smaller counties like
Poinsett (population 22,965)143 spending almost $1.5 million on
its county jail.144 Craighead County (population 111,231)145
spent nearly $9 million on its county jail in 2017.146 According
to the Association of Arkansas Counties’ report, the average
verified cost-per-day across the state to house one inmate is
$71.48.147
The amount of money Arkansas’s counties are expending on
jails has steadily risen over the last twenty years, with the
Sebastian County jail budget increasing by 53%, over $3 million,
from 2006 to 2019.148 When viewing these numbers, one should
consider the context that, nationally, Arkansas ranks 48th in
Public Health, 41st in Education, 43rd in Infrastructure, 48th in
Crime and Corrections, and 47th in Public Safety.149 Clearly, the
increased spending on jails is not leading to an increase in public
safety. In a 2020 report authored by Human Rights Watch, the
recommendations of how to effectively improve public safety
included investing in education to advance the quality of schools,
“stop[ping] enforcing laws in ways that effectively criminalize
people for their poverty[,]” investing in initiatives that provide
training and employment, providing “sufficient and adequate
health care,” and “[v]astly reduc[ing] pretrial incarceration so that
only those accused of serious crimes and found to pose a specific
danger to others can be held in custody.”150
Arkansas’s ranking in these indicators should be a wake-up
call that the State’s current investments are not productive. From
140. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
141. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
142. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
143. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
144. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
145. Arkansas Counties by Population, supra note 137.
146. ASS’N OF ARK. CTYS., supra note 138.
147. Id.
148. Saccente, supra note 65.
149. Arkansas: #44 in Overall Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
[https://perma.cc/5LZ6-LV2J] (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
150. A Roadmap for Re-imagining Public Safety in the United States, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/WW2X-63CR].
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the personal narratives in this Comment, one can deduce that this
cycle of never-ending, court-imposed fines and fees only
contributes to the larger problem. The Brennan Center for Justice
has rightfully pointed out that because “the burden of fees and
fines falls largely on the poor” it is “much like a regressive tax”
with “mounting balances [that] underscore [their] finding that
fees and fines are an unreliable source of government revenue.”151
The report further notes that, “[j]ailing those unable to pay fees
and fines is especially costly—sometimes as much as 115 percent
of the amount collected—and generates no revenue[,]” pointing
out that this “practice is not just unconstitutional but also
irrational.”152
B. Fines and Fees as a Revenue Generator
Across the country, states and localities use fines and fees to
generate revenue.153 While revenue generation might sound good
in theory, an accurate cost-benefit analysis typically reveals that
fines and fees are not so profitable in reality. An in-depth study
of “the costs for state and local governments to enforce and collect
fees and fines” revealed massive waste, illustrating that “[t]he net
gain might be far less than [states] have imagined, [and] the losses
far more damaging.”154 New Mexico’s Bernalillo County is the
perfect example as it is “operat[ing] at a loss in this regard,
spending more than $1.17 per dollar it raises in revenue from fees
and fines.”155 However, the actual loss is impossible to calculate
as the study did not “take into account many of the counties’
investments in this work, like the time and staffing spent on

151. MENENDEZ ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
152. Id.
153. RON DEUTSCH & CARA LONG CORRA, FISCAL POLICY INST., FINES AND FEES:
RAISING REVENUE AT THE COMMUNITY’S EXPENSE 1 (2020), [https://perma.cc/K5Z8RX6W].
154. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Matthew Menendez, Fees, Fines and Ability to Pay, HILL
(Feb. 10, 2020, 1:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/9TU2-CURS] (explaining how “[t]he IRS
spends one-third of a penny for every dollar that it collects in taxes[,]” while in the Texas
and New Mexico counties studied, “the governments spend more than 41 cents of every
dollar of revenue they raise to collect the fees and fines they impose in jail costs and in-court
proceedings alone”).
155. Id.
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enforcing warrants and suspending driver’s licenses for
nonpayment of debts.”156
Although I could not account for all the costs associated with
collecting fines and fees in Arkansas, I was able to determine
what percentage of each county’s revenue came from fines and
fees in 2019. Using each county’s most recent financial audit,157
I divided the county’s annual revenue generated from municipal
fines and fees by the county’s total annual revenue to determine
the percentage of total revenue generated by fines and fees for
each county. Below, Figure 1 serves as a visual illustration of my
findings.158 The x-axis lists the counties in order from least to
greatest in terms of percentage of total revenue generated through
fines and fees in the county.

Percentage of County's Revenue

Figure 1: Percentage of Arkansas Counties'
Revenues Generated from Fines & Fees
25.0%
20.0%
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73

Arkansas's 75 Counties

156. Id.
157. County audits for each fiscal year can be accessed on the Arkansas’s Legislative
Audit website. See Search Audits, ARK. LEGIS. AUDIT, [https://perma.cc/DLB3-GGDC]
(last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
158. In addition to being available by search of the 2019 audits on the Arkansas Audit
website, the documents, as well as excel sheets supporting the findings depicted on Figure 1
are on file with the author.
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, the rate at which counties are
depending on revenue from fines and fees varies. In larger
counties, the percentage is lower because of the high rate of
property tax revenue. However, when federal aid and state aid
are not accounted for as “revenues,” the percentage grows
significantly in some counties. Additionally, a conflict of interest
arises when counties project an anticipated amount of revenue in
this category. When an amount is projected in the county’s
budget and is considered unearned revenue, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and judges alike are put into situations
where their interest in accruing that unearned revenue can conflict
with an equal and impartial application of the law.159
Anne Kim, Vice President of Domestic Policy at the
Progressive Policy Institute,160 explains in her piece for
Governing that “[b]ecause the burden of these penalties falls
disproportionately on people who can’t afford to pay,
jurisdictions collect far less than expected and waste resources
chasing down payments that won’t materialize.”161 Further, “as
many as one-fourth of local inmates were in jail for nonpayment
of fines and fees” in some jurisdictions, and “[i]n addition to its
direct expenses, incarceration—even short stints in jail—can lead
to costly outcomes, including unemployment, dependence on
public benefits and greater risk of crime.”162 Because these
revenues come at such a high cost both financially and socially,163
each county should work to decrease its reliance on this revenue
159. See Fines, Fees, and Financial Burdens, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
[https://perma.cc/2E2F-RHHC] (last visited Apr. 3, 2021) (explaining that many places use
fines and fees to fund court systems and local governments creating an inherent conflict of
interest); see, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through Fines,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), [https://perma.cc/M2TK-UTQC] (discussing an issue that arose
in Nevada when tickets and fines revenue fell short of what the state legislature projected in
its two-year budget, resulting in shortfalls of $700,000 in year one and $1.4 million in year
two).
160. Anne Kim: Columnist, GOVERNING, [https://perma.cc/3MBZ-2NEW] (last visited
Apr. 20, 2021).
161. Anne Kim, When Cities Rely on Fines and Fees, Everybody Loses, GOVERNING
(Aug. 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4SD-CCUE].
162. Id.
163. See id. (referencing “[a] 2014 study of Alabama court costs” which found that
“collection rates [were] under 10 percent on average—despite countless hours spent by staff
pursuing payment”).
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source. In doing so, counties could stop wasting money on fine
collection efforts and incarcerating people who cannot afford to
pay, allowing the citizens of Arkansas to put their money back
into our state’s economy instead of dragging around the ball and
chain of legal financial obligations for weeks, months, or in many
cases, years.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lawsuits have forced debtors’ prisons out of business in
increasing numbers, mostly in specific counties and
municipalities, but there are more venues to be tackled.164
Even though the United States Supreme Court, state
legislatures, and the vast majority of legal scholars are in
agreement that debtors’ prisons are both unethical and
unconstitutional, people in Arkansas and across America are still
jailed every day simply because they cannot pay the legal
financial burdens that they face. Regardless of statutes and case
law that seemingly ban this practice, it is clear that these
safeguards have fallen far short of ensuring poverty is not
criminalized.
Whether or not one may personally empathize with the
victims of this system, it is in everyone’s best interest to reform
it. Not only does jailing poor people have no positive impact on
their ability to pay their legal financial obligations, but it also
almost always has the opposite effect—frequently leading to
unemployment, additional debt, and less money circulating in our
economy to support Arkansas’s businesses. The State itself
would benefit from reforming this system too. As it stands now,
the system of fines and fees collections is a drain on taxpayer
dollars, does not effectively reduce or deter crime, and stagnates
our state’s economy.

164. EDELMAN, supra note 1, at 28.
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DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES: ARKANSAS’S
GRAVE FAILURE TO HONOR ITS
CONSTITUENTS’ POSTMORTEM QUASIPROPERTY RIGHT
McKenna Moore*
[A] single death is a tragedy, a million deaths are a
statistic.1
I. AT DEATH’S DOOR: AN INTRODUCTION
It is doubtful that Hulon Rupert Austin woke up on the day
of March 7, 1986 and expected it to be his last.2 March 7 was a
typical day—a workday—that started with a simple drive to a job
site with his co-worker.3 A day that began so unremarkably ended
with his co-worker looking up from where he was working to see
“Austin lying on the ground.”4
Following Austin’s death, the local coroner from Cleveland
County, Arkansas, arrived at the scene.5 According to the
coroner’s notes on the death certificate, his death was attributable
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Managing Editor of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author extends four thank yous to the people that
made this comment possible. First, the author thanks her faculty advisor, Professor Steve
Clowney, University of Arkansas School of Law, her Note and Comment Editor, Brady
Brown, J.D. 2021, her Articles Editor, Sarah Smith, J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas
School of Law, 2022, and the entire 2021-2022 class of Staff Editors. Without their patience,
knowledge, and humor, this comment would still be nonsensical doodles on a page. Second,
the author thanks Josie Bates. Her unwavering love and support made even the most difficult
parts of the writing process feel like magic. Third, and most importantly, the author thanks
her parents, Mike Moore and Susan Moore, and her older brother, Derek Moore. They have
spent their entire lives cheering the author on; in turn, she dedicates this comment to them.
1. JOHN TIRMAN, THE DEATHS OF OTHERS: THE FATE OF CIVILIANS IN AMERICA’S
WARS 316 (Dave McBride ed., 2011) (quoting Joseph Stalin).
2. See Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782 S.W.2d 585,
586 (1990).
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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to myocardial infarction6—the medical terminology for a heart
attack.7 Although the term used by the coroner seems indicative
of medical training, that could not be further from the reality that
unfolded for Austin’s family.8 In the wake of his death, Austin’s
widow attempted to file a claim based on his death at work;
however, the Workers’ Compensation Commission “concluded
that there was insufficient credible evidence proving the decedent
suffered a compensable injury.”9 While a legal battle regarding
the compensability of the injury itself seems conventional, the
real issue within this case has nothing to do with the type of injury
at all—in fact, that argument is an impossible feat considering
that the coroner “admitted that he merely guessed” as to how
Austin died.10 In reality, the coroner had “no medical school
training, and had [only taken] an emergency medical technician
course.”11 Even worse, the coroner did not even attempt an
educated guess—instead, he chose “not [to] examine [Austin]’s
medical records, or talk with his treating physician or his wife
prior to making his determination as to the cause of death.”12
Left with no choice, the Arkansas Court of Appeals opined
that, “[s]ince there [was] no clear evidence as to the cause of death
. . . we would have to engage in speculation and conjecture which
is not a substitute for credible evidence, no matter how
plausible.”13 The lack of training and care that the coroner
wielded severely wounded this case’s trajectory and the
possibility of fairness for Austin’s surviving spouse.14 In the end,
his widow received no compensation from his death on the job;

6. Id.
7. Heart Attack (Myocardial Infarction), HARVARD MED. SCH. (Feb. 14, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/2DD9-LFCY].
8. See generally Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 61, 782 S.W.2d at 586 (emphasis added).
11. Id. It is paramount for a “medical examiner or coroner [to] use all information
available to make a determination about the death. This may include information from his
or her own investigation, police reports, staff investigations, and discussions with the family
and friends of the decedent.” Medical Examiners’ and Coroners’ Handbook on Death
Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 21
(Apr. 2003), [https://perma.cc/8UBL-U494] (emphasis added).
12. Austin, 30 Ark. App. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 586.
13. Id. at 62, 782 S.W.2d at 587.
14. See id.
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more importantly, however, the coroner’s lack of a proper
investigation into Austin’s death failed her more than any court
case could.15
This case presents an obvious question. How could a
coroner—a job that has so much to do with medical
comprehension—require so little training?16 However, the real
question is—and should be—much broader: how is it that
Arkansas has allowed this severe miscarriage of justice for
Arkansan families of the deceased?17 Because, while the lack of
training required by coroners in Arkansas may appear like a
minutia of an issue, the reality is far, far grimmer.18
While it is a bleak reality, it is also an uncomplicated one—
uniquely rooted in essential quasi-property principles.19
Although the details of what precisely a “quasi-property” right
entails are discussed at length later, at its most basic level, two
truths exist and must prevail for Arkansans to see any justice in
future death investigations within the state.20 First, Arkansas
must recognize and reconcile that it is severely underdeveloped
and underregulated in its approach to death investigation—
specifically, Arkansas has yet to abandon the outdated coroner
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.21
Secondly, Arkansas must be vigilant in treating each dead
constituent with the utmost care and skill owed to them because
of the quasi-property right in the dead body that “vests in the
nearest relatives of the deceased.”22 Those two truths together
equal one crucial takeaway: it is a simple quasi-property right,
vested in the decedent’s family, that requires a higher standard

15. See id.
16. See discussion infra Section II.C.
17. The ability for a medical examiner or a coroner to provide a deceased’s family with
a proper cause of death has an importance that should not be understated—”[t]his
information has many uses related to the settlement of the estate and provides family
members’ closure, peace of mind, and documentation . . . .” Medical Examiners’ and
Coroners’ Handbook on Death Registration and Fetal Death Reporting, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 11, at 2.
18. See discussion infra Section II.C.
19. See discussion infra Section II.A.
20. See discussion infra Section II.A.
21. See infra Part III.
22. Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999).
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out of the professionals who investigate and postulate about
deaths in the Natural State.23
Issues abound in this sphere of policy for Arkansas;
however, the solution is quite simple.24 Arkansas must modernize
its regulation of the issues that truly make a difference in the lives
and deaths of its constituents.25 Namely, Arkansas should honor
its constituents’ postmortem quasi-property right by requiring a
higher level of educational and experiential standards—standards
that are achieved through abandoning the outdated coroner
system in favor of a modern medical examiner system.26
Hulon Rupert Austin was likely one of many Arkansans that
died that day in March of 1986.27 However, to his family and the
people that knew him, he was likely anything but a number.28
While numbers are salient, numbers are also easy to glaze over.29
For instance, in 2017, 2,813,503 people died across the United
States.30 Of those deaths, 32,606 were Arkansans.31 In simply
reading those numbers, it is easy to feel that glassy-eyed
expression fog over the face. That is an entirely natural and
human response in feeling unable to comprehend or internalize
such high numbers.32 “[P]sychologists who have studied
genocides and mass disasters” noticed that “[s]omething happens
in the brain when fatalities reach such high numbers . . . [t]he
causalities become like a mountain of corpses that has grown so
large it becomes difficult to focus on the individual bodies.”33

23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See generally Austin v. Highway 15 Water Users Ass’n, 30 Ark. App. 60, 61, 782
S.W.2d 585, 586 (1990).
28. Id.
29. See generally Jiaquan Xu et al., Mortality in the United States, 2018, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2020), [https://perma.cc/64DZ-3UWN].
30. Id.
31. Resident Deaths Due to Leading Causes, By Sex: Arkansas, 2017, ARK. DEP’T OF
HEALTH (March 4, 2019, 10:06 AM), [https://perma.cc/YST2-C7AA].
32. William Wan & Brittany Shammas, Why Americans Are Numb to the Staggering
Coronavirus Death Toll, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2020, 12:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/748T8BXN].
33. Id.
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Perhaps “[w]ithout [the] visual, physical manifestations of deaths,
the alarm bells in our heads fail to ring . . . .”34
However, legislators in Arkansas have a duty not to treat
those deaths as just simple numbers. Instead, each death
represents a person, a family, a lifetime, and a loss. Legislators
must work for the families of the deceased and bring those
families any ounce of peace that the legislative monolith can
bestow. Namely, surviving family and friends of the decedent
deserve competent coroners as the first line of peace.
The solution to this problem is easily implementable.35
However, it requires a fundamental belief that each death is not a
number; each death represents a mountain of pain and sorrow for
the affected family, friends, and loved ones. Death is not an
experience that Arkansas—or any state for that matter—can
afford to treat like a statistic. A person’s death is worth far more
than a number. Arkansas legislators should act like it.
II. TALES FROM THE CRYPT: EXHUMING THE
HISTORY OF THE CORONER AND THE QUASIPROPERTY RIGHT IN DEAD BODIES
The collision of the coroner role and the quasi-property right
vested in dead bodies is a phenomenon that only occurred after
centuries upon centuries of history and transformation.36
However, each part—the coroner role and the quasi-property
right—independently went through a sort of macabre
metamorphosis.37 Because of that historic independence and
modern harmony, it is necessary to dissect and appreciate each
concept for its own importance before understanding how they
reconcile as one cause.38 Consequently, the following literary
journey is organized into first, setting the stage for how a quasiproperty right in dead bodies came to exist,39 and second,
untangling the history and dissolution of the coroner role.40
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
See infra Part III.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
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However, before either of those can occur, an understanding of
what precisely a “quasi-property” right even means is
imperative.41
A. Over My Dead Body: Unraveling the Meaning
Behind “Quasi-Property”
Before unraveling the history of the quasi-property right in
dead bodies, a knowledge of what a “quasi-property” right
provides for the individual that wields it is a necessity.
Accordingly, it is essential to begin with the most paramount
actuality about a quasi-property right: it truly has little to do with
property at all—at least, not “in the ordinary sense of that
word.”42 Rather, “[t]he concept of quasi-property [was] an
ingenious invention by the U.S. courts to help a deserving
plaintiff.”43 As one court brazenly asserted, this right “is
something [that] evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and
that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are
being protected under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a
lawyer.”44
The interests that fell under this magic “quasi-property”
umbrella were ones that “resembled property rights in their
functioning even when they weren’t property rights, or, strictly
speaking, ownership interests.”45 This distinction is imperative
when understanding what exactly a quasi-property right in a body
really even provides for the decedent’s family—this is not some
grotesque, real ownership over a dead body.46 Instead, the
purpose behind this right—when it is related to human
remains47—is intrinsically linked to a court’s motivation “to
41. See discussion infra Section II.A.
42. Remigius Nnamdi Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the Challenge of Property:
Rethinking Property Rights in Dead Bodies, Body Parts, and Traditional Knowledge 60
(Nov. 2004) (SJD thesis, University of Toronto) (ProQuest) (emphasis added).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 60 n.151 (quoting State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986)).
45. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite Property, 160
PENN. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2012).
46. See id.
47. A quasi-property right is not a right limited to the disposition of human remains;
another example of a field of law that utilizes this terminology would be in recent trademark
law. Specifically, the concept of trademark dilution uses quasi-property rights for reputation.
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protect the ‘personal feelings’ or ‘sentiment and propriety’ of the
next of kin . . . .”48
While this right might seem quite fluffy and difficult to pin
down, the reality is that a quasi-property right in dead bodies is
still somewhat inextricably linked to the general idea of
property.49 Looking broadly at the concept of property, “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual’s rights in property
against deprivation by the state without due process.”50 An
individual that alleges that he or she “has been deprived of a
property right possesses a civil cause of action under section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act.”51 Accordingly, “in order to assert a
section 1983 claim, a party must establish two elements: (1) that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law; and (2) that the deprivation was of a right,
privilege or immunity guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.”52 However, “[t]he issue of whether an interest
conforms to a ‘property’ right for purposes of a section 1983 suit
is a matter of state law”—ultimately meaning that “state laws
define the rights and obligations which guide a court’s analysis in
determining the existence of a ‘property’ interest.”53
While Arkansas’s adoption of the quasi-property right in
dead bodies endures discussion later,54 the broad notion of
statehood power in assessing property rights shines a light on the
motivation of allotting this right in the first place—giving
standing to deserving plaintiffs.55 Ultimately, the bottom line of
Id. at 1897. In which, “reputation is protected through a heavily circumscribed exclusionary
framework that is tailored to the centrality of perception[.]” Id. at 1898. Thus, by utilizing
a quasi-property right, this “allows trademark to retain its roots in the ideas of deceit and
unfair competition without abandoning the idea of exclusionary protection altogether.” Id.
48. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1895.
49. See generally Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in
the Human Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 434
(1992).
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 433 (emphasis added).
54. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
55. REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PROPERTY;
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION 60 (Sheila
McLean, ed. 2007) [hereinafter NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY
PARTS, AND GENETIC INFORMATION].
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property comes down to only a few things: “the rights of
possession, exclusion, use, [] disposition, the right to enjoy fruits
or profits, and the right of destruction.”56 In property lingo,
scholars often refer to this as some variation of having the
“sufficient number of [] ‘twigs’ in the property bundle . . . .”57
However, the principal twig in that bundle for human remains is
exclusion, and without it, deserving plaintiffs have little room for
recourse.58 By pairing human remains recourse to the body of
property law through the quasi-property loophole, courts have
effectively allowed the quasi-property right “to simulate
property’s exclusionary framework within limited settings.”59
Those limited settings include “the plaintiff’s status in relation to
the deceased and the nature of the defendant’s actions.”60
Whereas ordinary property interests frequently find their
base in tangible assets, quasi-property interests find their base in
the relationship between the parties involved; thus, courts react
directly “to the relationship between the parties rather than just to
their interaction through a tangible object.”61 Coined as
“[r]elational [i]nterests,” there are three primary triggers that
qualify a relationship as one worth invoking a quasi-property
right: “[1] the status of the parties vis-à-vis each other, [2] the
unique environment or context within which they interact, [and 3]
the nature—wrongful or otherwise—of one party’s actions.”62 As
for the first trigger—the status of the parties—the importance lies
in the “settings where the law emphasizes the parties’ status [and]
the fact that the parties’ objective/relative positions mandate that
they pay greater attention to the manner in which they obtain and

56. Patrick J. Mulqueen, “Only Dust Remains[?]”: The 9/11 Memorial Litigation and
the Reach of Quasi-Property Rights, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 253 (2012) (quoting Erik S.
Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[‘s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 549
(1990)).
57. Id. (quoting Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous
Organs: Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 37, 43 (2002)).
58. See generally Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1892.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1900.
61. Id. at 1902.
62. See generally id. at 1901-02.
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use certain resources.”63 Similarly, for the second trigger, “the
environment within which the parties interact over the resource is
one that is especially sensitive and deserving of protection.”64 For
the final, main trigger, courts actively choose “to impose liability
on the defendant by tailoring the law’s exclusionary framework
to the conduct that they seek to censure.”65
With all of these triggers considered, it is clear that quasiproperty may, at times, be difficult to pin down.66 However, it is
also a vital avenue in providing recourse for plaintiffs who have
endured a wrong in a uniquely terrible way—through some
violation of a deceased loved one.67 Regarded by some as a sort
of legal magic trick, quasi-property rights should not be
considered some work of fiction—quasi-property rights provide
real protection to real plaintiffs.68 Ultimately, many of the
intricate quasi-property law questions are new and unsettled;
however, the journey quasi-property took to fruition was
centuries in the making.69
B. Till Death Do Us Part: The Origins of the
Quasi-Property Right Vested in Dead Bodies
When discussing, understanding, or arguing about any law
or regulation, the common-sense approach often includes looking
at the modern regulation versus its bygone counterpart.70
However, when attempting to have those same interactions with
the body of law that pertains to death or human remains,
relegating or sorting laws into the past versus the present becomes
63. Balganesh, supra note 45, at 1903.
64. Id. at 1904 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 1905.
66. See id. at 1906.
67. See generally NWABUEZE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEAD BODIES, BODY PARTS,
AND GENETIC INFORMATION, supra note 55, at 60.
68. See id. at 59.
69. See Mulqueen, supra note 56, at 255.
70. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L. J. 451, 460 (2019)
(stating that “[a]n easy benchmark . . . is to compare the new law to the old law.”); Brenda
R. Mayrack, Note, The Implications of State ex. rel. Thomas v. Schwarz for Wisconsin
Sentencing Policy after Truth-In-Sentencing II, WIS. L. REV. 181, 222 (2008) (comparing
old versus new sentencing guidelines); Samuel C. Ullman, An Overview of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 61 FLA. B. J. 13, 15-16 (1987) (comparing old versus new tax code regulations).
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relatively impossible; notably, the label of “modern law” for the
law regarding human remains is a bit of an oxymoron.71
Separating the traditional history of the law regarding human
remains from its caricatured present would strip it of all the
significance and substance that shaped it for centuries.72
Consequently, an understanding of the law regarding human
remains requires an appreciation of its journey to modernity—for
disassembling it would leave it void of the soul, theology, and
humanity that it has attempted to pass on from generation to
generation.73
The inception of the legal field regarding dead bodies has a
unique opening chapter to its story compared to many other legal
traditions.74 Namely, “it is not principally derived from English
common law.”75 Instead of English common law dictating the
laws or regulations, “[f]or nearly a millennium, English law
recognized that the Church of England had theological and
secular jurisdiction over human remains.”76 Therefore, “[w]hile
the common law courts had jurisdiction over property, the
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction concerning human remains
. . . .”77 Consequently, those theological roots left remnants of
tradition, value, and process that percolated through time
throughout the United States.78
Looking deeper and more specifically into why the English
common law remained largely silent on human remains
regulation, this phenomenon is likely attributable to the deafening
voice the Bible carried into this realm of issues.79 For instance,
the Old Testament included extensive language regarding the
importance that the familial role played for the decedent.80 This

71. See generally TANYA MARSH, THE LAW OF HUMAN REMAINS 3 (2016)
[hereinafter MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS].
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at ix.
75. Id.
76. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at ix.
77. Scarmon, supra note 49, at 437.
78. See MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 4.
79. See id.
80. See id. Specifically, “[i]n Genesis, this principal is reiterated through the story of
Abraham’s family. After his wife Sarah died, Abraham purchased a tomb in Canaan. When
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concept of familial importance in the vein of dead bodies is
evident through the English common law practice of granting “the
heirs of the decedent . . . the right to protect the monuments,
tombstones, and burial shrouds of the decedent [while] the
Church took possession of the body after it was buried in the
church grounds.”81
That the Church of England took possession over the body
of the deceased is an important fact to note when understanding
that the Church owned the burial grounds in fee-simple.82 Even
though the Church did not technically own the body itself—
instead, owning the burial ground—“the Church took
‘possession’ of the body after burial and protected it so long as it
remained in consecrated ground.”83
This idea that the
“ecclesiastical courts provided a remedy against disturbers of the
dead” became a pervasive root system for the modern professions
tasked with death care and investigation.84
1. A Nail in the Coffin: Modernity’s Departure from the
Law’s Theological Inception
To get to modern-day America’s take on a quasi-property
right vested in dead bodies, it is important to note that early
American settlers struggled immensely to balance theology and
the separation of church and state.85 This careful balancing act
compelled early American courts to “sift through the doctrines,
principles, and values of English ecclesiastical and common law
and determine which could be adapted for use in a country with
greater cultural and religious diversity than England . . . .”86
To fix that jagged notion, “[c]ourts of general jurisdiction
replaced the delineated system that governed burials in
Abraham’s grandson Jacob approached the end of his life, he instructed his sons” to bury
him with his family in his homeland. Id.
81. Khushbu Solanki, Buried, Cremated, Defleshed by Buzzards? Religiously
Motivated Excarnatory Funeral Practices Are Not Abuse of Corpse, 18 RUTGERS J. L. &
RELIGION 350, 363 (2017).
82. Id.
83. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5 (emphasis added).
84. Solanki, supra note 81, at 363.
85. MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS, supra note 71, at 5.
86. Id. at 6.
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England.”87 This decision came after American courts, “[l]acking
ecclesiastic influence and disliking the potential injustice that the
[previous] system created,” decided to allow “a decedent’s
relatives [to] have an interest in the body for burial and interment
purposes.”88 However, it was not until the United States Supreme
Court decision in Beatty v. Kurtz that the Court affirmed state
courts’ power to create and maintain laws and regulations
regarding human remains.89
In the landmark decision of Beatty, the dispute itself was a
simple land ownership disagreement.90 One party had formerly
“platted an addition to Georgetown, indicating on the plat that a
particular parcel was for the use of the German Lutheran
Church.”91 However, after many years of use, the church became
exceedingly dilapidated.92 Seeing this under-usage of the plat, the
original owners of the land the church sat upon claimed that the
original land grant was a “defeasible fee” and reentered the land
“to prepare it for redevelopment.”93 In response, “[t]he Lutherans
filed a quiet title action that ended up in the Supreme Court.”94
This disagreement appears like a very straightforward land
controversy. However, there was one major issue: the plat
contained a cemetery, and—not only that—the original owners’
quest for “redevelopment” caused them to tear down
tombstones.95 Justice Story wrote a passionate opinion against
the original landowners and included the Court’s belief that the
acts of the original landowners were not “mere private trespass”
but were “a public nuisance, going to the irreparable injury of the

87. Denay L. Wilding Knope, Over My Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions
Complicate the Constitutional Dilemma of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169,
176 (2009).
88. Id.
89. See generally Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566 (1829); MARSH, HUMAN REMAINS,
supra note 71, at 6.
90. Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in
Burial Places, 30 PROB. & PROP. 59, 61 (2016) [hereinafter Marsh, Dirt and Death]; see also
Beatty, 27 U.S. at 579-80.
91. Marsh, Dirt and Death, supra note 90, at 61.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Georgetown congregation of Lutherans.”96 Although this case is
landmark in its affirmation of a state’s rights in regulating human
remains, it is also landmark in setting a distinct tone for human
remains law going forward—the legal protection of the
decedent’s surviving family because of “piety or love.”97
Since that time, laws and regulations relating to death in the
United States have primarily been a movement regulated by state
courts; specifically, this movement grew from a duo of court
cases out of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.98 From Rhode
Island’s 1872 decision, the court held plainly “that while a dead
body is not property in the strict sense of the common law, it is a
quasi property, over which the relatives of the deceased have
rights which the courts will protect.”99 Similarly, in 1904, the
Pennsylvania decision opined that, while “there is a legally
recognized right of custody, control, and disposition . . . it would
be more accurate to say that the law recognizes property in a
corpse, but property subject to a trust.”100 Thus, the age of quasiproperty law applying to corpses was born—shaping how the
states view and handle dead bodies into the modern era.101
Importantly, the quasi-property element inherent in a deceased
individual’s body is a field of law that affects every single
constituent in any state.102 However, the way that a constituent’s
specific state dictates their laws gravely affects the quasi-property
rights and guarantees that every individual should enjoy.103
Importantly, the lenses of theology, history, and early
national trends are some of the most zoomed out lenses of human
remains law.104 Only looking through such broad lenses allows
for the quirks and confusions that have settled amongst the fifty

96. Marsh, Dirt and Death, supra note 90, at 61 (quoting Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. 566,
584 (1829)).
97. Id. (quoting Beatty, 27 U.S. at 585).
98. Knope, supra note 87, at 176.
99. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 227 (R.I. 1872); Knope,
supra note 87, at 176.
100. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904) (emphasis added); Knope, supra
note 87, at 176.
101. See generally Knope, supra note 87, at 176.
102. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
103. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
104. See discussion supra Sections II.A., II.B.
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states to evade the critical eye.105 While those quirks and
confusions may seem merely like the footnote of a trend, they
indicate much more than that. In the laws regulating coroners, it
is important to remember that each of those hiccups directly
affects every single constituent in each state—regardless of
gender, age, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or economic class.
Death affects every single person.
Without zooming in, one can miss the real injustices and
issues faced by actual constituents, instead, just viewing them as
mere numbers as part of a more significant trend. For such an
important issue that affects every person at one of the most pivotal
and emotional points in their lives—the death of a loved one—
the states need to get it right, and the actual interests of the people
it affects need to be at the forefront of any decision. Each state’s
decisions in this area of law needs tuning with the constituents in
mind.106 Accordingly, zooming in to look at how Arkansas
approaches quasi-property and coroner law has the important
effect of bringing real-life problems to the forefront—hopefully
encouraging the solving of problems and the easing of mind for
families of the deceased.107
2. One Foot in the Grave: Arkansas’s Take on Postmortem
Quasi-Property Rights
In Arkansas, the regulations surrounding and addressing
coroners contain an inherent duality: the severe under regulation
of coroners against the backdrop of a seemingly generous quasiproperty right in dead bodies.108 The 1999 decision by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Travelers Insurance Company v.
Smith is a landmark decision for Arkansans’ quasi-property right
in the bodies of their deceased loved ones.109 For the first time,
Arkansas officially recognized that there exists “[a] quasi-

105. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
106. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
107. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
108. See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text; Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark.
81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999).
109. 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.
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property right in dead bodies [that] vests in the nearest relatives
of the deceased, arising out of their duty to bury their dead.”110
This important property right becomes increasingly notable
when considering professions that deal directly with the families
of deceased individuals—namely because that very same case
held that an insurance company acts as an agent for said family
members.111 The court stated that “it should have been clear . . .
that [the insurance company’s] action or inaction would impact
the family.”112 Therefore, when a family trusts an insurance
company with making major decisions in the care of a deceased
individual, that insurance company has a particular duty to act in
accordance with that family’s wishes.113 Specifically, because an
agent of another party must “act on the principal’s behalf and be
subject to the principal’s control,” they are bound by the
principal’s wishes—here, that principal being the nearest relatives
of the deceased.114
Additionally, the Travelers Insurance Company decision
reiterates that “one who intentionally, recklessly, or negligently
withholds the body of a dead person or prevents its proper
interment or cremation is subject to liability of the family of the
deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”115
Therefore, by these stated standards, Arkansas appears to hold
insurance companies to a high degree of ethical requirements
regarding the decision-making in the treatment and care of the
deceased.116 Specifically, in Travelers Insurance Company, the
family of the deceased endured a five-day delay in the embalming
process of its family member.117 Due to this “delay in the
embalming process and the deterioration of the body, the body
was not deemed presentable for an open casket funeral.”118 If that
110. Id.
111. Id. at 93-94, 991 S.W.2d at 598.
112. Id. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99.
113. See Holly v. State, 2017 Ark. 201, at 22, 520 S.W.3d 677, 691 (stating “that the
two essential elements of an agency relationship are (1) that an agent have the authority to
act for the principal and (2) that the agent act on the principal’s behalf and be subject to the
principal’s control.”).
114. Id.
115. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594.
118. Id.
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alone had not been enough of a slap in the face to the family, the
funeral home also attempted to charge it for the refrigeration
required in “keeping the body for five additional days prior to
embalming.”119 In the end, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict
of $60,000.00 in damages ($20,000.00 for each of the
plaintiffs).120
While the case of that family pertains specifically to
insurance companies,121 coroners are not and should not be off the
hook from these standards of duty in Arkansas. Although the
duties owed by a coroner are far more abstract,122 the recognition
of their existence is imperative—in fact, “[t]he first attempt to
bring a constitutional challenge regarding” the quasi-property
right in a dead body versus a coroner was a case out of Arkansas:
Fuller v. Marx.123 Although the plaintiff initially lost this case in
the district court, the Eighth Circuit noted that the loss pertained
to a previous belief in Arkansas that a quasi-property right in a
dead body bestowed upon the family of the deceased did not
exist.124 Clearly, fifteen years later, the tide has continued its shift
with Travelers Insurance Company.125 Accordingly, a shift of the
tide in a duty owed by coroners to the families of the deceased
should follow suit.
A notion of similar regard found consideration in Waeschle
v. Dragovic—a 2008 case out of Michigan.126 In that case, the
court found that the plaintiff had a “constitutional right to notice
that she did not receive [decedent]’s brain” after the coroner never
notified her of such alterations.127 The court came to this
conclusion through the belief that “next-of-kin have a cognizable
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for violation of the right
to a deceased relative’s body.”128 This chain of thinking is nearly
119. Id.
120. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 87, 991 S.W.2d at 594.
121. Id. at 90, 991 S.W.2d at 596.
122. See infra Section II.C.
123. 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Knope, supra note 87, at 190.
124. Fuller, 724 F.2d at 719; Knope, supra note 87, at 190.
125. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.
126. Knope, supra note 87, at 199.
127. Id. at 200 (quoting Waeschle v. Dragovic, No. 08-10393, 2008 WL 4372636, at
*7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2008)).
128. Id.
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a mirror image of the decision of the court in Travelers Insurance
Company—holding that—due to the insurance company’s poor
choices—“it should have been clear . . . that [the insurance
company’s] actions or inaction would impact the family” and
violate the key duty between the parties.129
Although there is currently no black and white obligation by
coroners owed to families in Arkansas, a conclusion of such
magnitude is not beyond the scope of feasibility for the existing
case precedent.130 Instead, a conclusion that coroners do owe
some duty of care and skill to the families would serve as a natural
conclusion for the direction in which the court in Travelers
Insurance Company already set its sights.131 While this likely
might be a controversial claim to some, requiring a duty out of
coroners can only serve Arkansans with more respect and
dignity—which they deserve during a time already filled with
intense grief.
The Travelers Insurance Company case perfectly
encapsulates a clear moral compass for the State of Arkansas in
the area of coroner regulation.132 However, in referencing later
discussion, the peculiarly low standards that the State then turns
around and holds its coroners to are embarrassingly low and void
of said moral compass.133 Because of that disconnect, the cases
that deal with coroners appear as residual damage control for what
could simply be commonly cured by higher standards and
education.134 Due to those lax regulations on the actual people
that carry out these human remains laws that the State purportedly
holds in such high regard, it is easy to conclude that said lax
regulations inherently violate the State’s moral compass.135
However, those issues endure discussion at length later.136 For
129. Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 94, 991 S.W.2d at 598-99.
130. See generally id. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595 (stating that “[a] quasi-property right
in dead bodies vests in the nearest relatives of the deceased . . . .”); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d
717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff lost under old rule in which there was a
lack of property rights vested in a dead body’s organs).
131. See generally Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.
132. See generally id. at 92-93, 991 S.W.2d at 597-98.
133. See infra Section II.C.
134. See infra Section II.C.
135. See infra Section II.C.
136. See infra Section II.C.
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now, it is essential to recognize the lack of clarity at which
Arkansas’s laws—on a surface level—care for the rights and
respect of the bodies of the deceased.137 This clarity is important
because it will serve as a backdrop for the lack of care and respect
lazily required from the coroners that actually investigate the
deceased individuals.138
C. As Long as We Both Shall Live: The Origin
and Dissolution of the Coroner Role in
Favor of the Medical Examiner
The history behind the coroner’s role is an important
consideration as part of this conversation. In its humble
beginnings, the position of coroner was one that the United States
took from England’s tradition, “just as they took over the sheriff
and the jury system.”139 Originally called “crowners,” these
bygone coroners “were knights appointed by the king of England
to investigate deaths in which the crown had a property
interest.”140 Thus, from the very beginning of the coroner story,
the idea of property and death investigation intermingled.141
Using property as their motivation in investigating an
unexplained death, “crowners used crude medical and legal
knowledge to make fact based determinations regarding
questioned deaths, [and] were, in a sense, death investigation
experts.”142
As this original “crowner” system began to dissipate,
England replaced it with what modern America would recognize
as a coroner.143 While death investigation remained the
cornerstone of the coroner’s role in the post-”crowner” age, a
significant difference existed between the two times: how the
137. See infra Section II.C.
138. See infra Section II.C.
139. Lawrence M. Friedman & Paul W. Davies, California Death Trip, 36 IND. L. REV.
17, 18 (2003).
140. Robert D. Felder, A Coroner System in Crisis: The Scandals and Struggles
Plaguing Louisiana Death Investigation, 69 LA. L. REV. 627, 631-32 (2009) (emphasis
added).
141. See generally id. at 632.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
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community chose the coroner.144 For crowners, a king appointed
them; for the new coroner system, a community elected them.145
By electing this new age of death investigators, novel problems
presented themselves for the crown that the coroners served and
the people that the coroners investigated.146
One of these paramount, new problems occurred due to the
shifting motivations that the new age of coroners wrought.147
Namely, the appointment of crowners by a king, due to their skill
and ability in performing investigations, was starkly different
compared to the new election system of coroners—in which, “the
knights who specialized in death investigation were replaced by
powerful political figures with little to no expertise in the
field.”148 Additionally, a similar problem unfolded regarding
power imbalances.149
This problem occurred “[b]ecause
[coroners] wielded the power to seize property from citizens,
[and] many coroners began using their power for self-serving
interests.”150 Ultimately, “[i]t was this [election] system, one
based on political interests in property rather than science, which
crossed the Atlantic Ocean and thereafter influenced death
investigations in the American colonies.”151
Through that original metamorphosis, the modern American
coroner was born; however, to many Americans, the actual duties
that belong to a coroner may be somewhat of a mystery.152 After
all, “[i]n today’s world of highly glamorized forensic science
144. Id. at 632-33.
145. Felder, supra note 140, at 631-32.
146. Id. at 632.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Felder, supra note 140, at 632.
151. Id.
152. Out of all the duties and responsibilities that fall under the coroner role, there is a
glaring quirk that seems fitting for the likes of a Wild West film—in Arkansas, the coroner
is responsible for the arrest of a sheriff. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-511 (1947). While it
seems like this should be an archaic and untouched protocol, this duty came to pass as
recently as 2016. Tom Sissom, Arkansas Law Gives Coroners Authority Over Jails, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2016, 1:17 AM), [https://perma.cc/4UCS-3M2P]. In
response to the 2016 arrest of Benton County Sheriff Kelly Cradduck, the Benton County
coroner was summoned by local prosecutors to dust off this odd protocol. Id. This legislative
oddity is further proof that the Arkansas legislature should revitalize this bygone system.
See discussion infra Part III.
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dramas . . . the public has developed grave misconceptions about
what realistically can be accomplished and what is statutorily
required in the performance of a forensic death investigation.”153
Therefore, to sober any preconceived notions regarding what a
coroner does, it is important to look directly at the source: state
law—specifically, under Arkansas state law, the powers and
duties of a coroner include that, after a death is reported, “he or
she shall conduct an investigation concerning the circumstances
surrounding the death of an individual and gather and review
background information, including, but not limited to, medical
information and any other information which may be helpful in
determining the cause and manner of death.”154 This job
description might be shocking to some due to a key lacking
attribute that is commonly—and incorrectly—attributed to
coroners: conducting autopsies.155 Without it, the Arkansas
statute could simply be describing Nancy Drew in any of her
famous adventures.156
Although those in the coroner role do not conduct the actual
autopsy itself, they have a crucial role in tipping off whether there
is a need for an autopsy or death investigation at all.157 For
instance, coroners are the first line of defense in noticing
indicators of toxicology concerns for the deceased; therefore,
“[w]hen the proper and uniform technique and procedure [is]
invoked in the collection, testing, and custody of toxicologic
specimens, the conclusions of a death investigator’s autopsy
report can have great scientific weight in a court of law.”158 On
the opposite side of the coin, “individuals without a medical
background may be more likely to miss subtle signs and fail to
order toxicological testing.”159 Consequently, once “signs are

153. Felder, supra note 140, at 627.
154. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-301 (1993).
155. § 14-15-301.
156. § 14-15-301; Nancy Drew Series, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, [https://perma.cc/EA32F887].
157. Andrea R. Tischler, Speaking for the Dead: A Call for Nationwide Coroner
Reform, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 553, 559 (2004).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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missed and tests are not done properly in the beginning” of an
investigation, “the mistake will generally never be detected.”160
The former chief medical examiner in Virginia, Marcella
Fierro, opined that an “autopsy is the cornerstone of death
investigation”; therefore, if a coroner believes “a death isn’t
recognized as being suspicious . . . [then] it’s buried or cremated,
whatever the family wishes, never to rise again.”161 Most
ominously, she stated that “[m]ost errors are buried.”162
Ultimately, the panel, in which Marcella Fierro herself sat, stated
that “coroners [are] the weak[est] link.”163 Simply put, “on their
best day, if [coroners] do not have the training, the skills, the
infrastructure, the facility, [and] the access to forensic science,
they can’t do a good job.”164
Toxicology is just one example of these grave dangers that
states face when deciding on the education and training required
for their coroners.165 An even more sour reality unveils itself in
the courtroom; in which, some courts have held that coroners’
testimony is completely inadmissible or only admissible if they
“possess[] the necessary experiential qualifications.”166 The fact
that some coroners would not even be able to have those
experiential qualifications should be disheartening to the
constituents for which those coroners serve.167 Because of the
gravity of such an important role, it should not be a partisan or
difficult choice to make when requiring more out of some of the
state’s most important investigators. However, the current
landscape of what states require out of this class of individuals
tells an increasingly different story.168
While the coroner’s position is one of longstanding heritage,
the coroner position has also stood the test of time in many states;

160. Id. at 559–60.
161. Sandra Bartlett, Coroners Don’t Need Degrees to Determine Death, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Feb. 2, 2011, 12:06 PM), [https://perma.cc/B8NJ-A5UB].
162. Id.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559.
166. Id. at 561.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 187–97.
168. See infra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
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however, many states changed or eliminated the role entirely.169
For instance, “Massachusetts abolished the position in 1877, and
created the post of ‘medical examiner’”—a position requiring a
medical degree.170 Importantly, in addition to having some sort
of medical certification or degree, the term “medical examiner”
also generally denotes that the position is appointed—not
elected.171
In 1915, New York and Rhode Island followed
Massachusetts and took similar steps.172 Starting then and
moving into the 1990s, the states unleashed a domino effect in
which “most states had either gotten rid of the coroner altogether,
and replaced this office with a medical examiner, or with a mixed
system of some sort—both a medical examiner and a coroner; or
a system in which some counties had coroners, and others had
medical examiners.”173 Because of this hybrid system, the
educational standards required for either coroners or medical
examiners fell into a sort of disarray.174
In response to this confusion, a “panel [was] created by the
National Academy of Sciences” that worked to “point[] out the
lack of mandatory standards for autopsies and the absence of
oversight into the performance of coroners and medical
examiners.”175 After this effort by the panel, it opined that “the
goal of every state should be to move away from a coroner
system, which is not based on medicine, and instead hire board
certified forensic pathologists and put them to work as medical
examiners.”176 With all of these varying answers to the future of
the coroner tradition, it is natural that the degree of education
required for these important officials is the key issue that is under
fire on a national scale.177
169. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18.
170. Id.
171. Carl Parrott, Comparing Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: Advantages
and Disadvantages of the Coroner System, INST. OF MED. (US) COMM. FOR THE WORKSHOP
ON THE MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION (2003), [https://perma.cc/YUR8-PF79].
172. Friedman & Davies, supra note 139, at 18.
173. Id.; see also Bartlett, supra note 161.
174. See Bartlett, supra note 161.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See id.
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The hardest pill to swallow for this education conundrum is
that, nationally, “most coroners are laypersons elected for
specified terms, and few have had any formal medical or legal
training.”178 For a profession tasked with such an integral part of
the death investigation process, “[p]ersons who have held the
position of coroner include sheriff’s deputies, school bus drivers,
tow truck operators, gas station attendants, tavern owners,
accountants, and even jewelry salesmen.”179 This is not to say
that perhaps these individuals were not well-intentioned members
of their local communities hoping to serve the best they could in
that role; however, it needs mentioning that jobs with such a high
degree of importance and opportunity to cause irreparable harm
to a family or an investigation should require an equally pressing
degree of specialized knowledge and training.
While it is true that “[i]n most states, elected coroners are
not required to be physicians or forensic pathologists,” there are
many other states that provide extensive qualifications or
trainings required to fill these posts.180 Naturally, some states,
including Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Ohio, require that
coroners be physicians.181 While that high requirement is a rarity
in the national trend, the other conditions across many of the
states are still quite weighty.182
For instance, in West Virginia, “[a] county medical examiner
shall be medically trained and licensed by the state of West
Virginia as a physician, registered nurse, paramedic, emergency
medical technician or a physician assistant, [and] be certified in
the practice of medicolegal death investigation.”183 In Alabama,
a person cannot qualify to serve as a coroner “[u]nless he or she
[h]as at least 24 months of previous service as a county coroner
or deputy coroner in the state.”184 Similarly, in Texas, “[t]o the
greatest extent possible, the medical examiner shall be appointed
from persons having training and experience in pathology,
178. Tischler, supra note 157, at 559.
179. Id.
180. Coroner Training Requirements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Jan. 15, 2015), [https://perma.cc/4KJ9-ELEQ].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id.
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toxicology, histology, and other medico-legal sciences.”185 West
Virginia, Alabama, and Texas serve as examples of only sixteen
states with laws on the books requiring any level of education for
this crucial investigatory role186—a horrifying figure that needs
substantial upheaval on a national scale.
However, focusing in on Arkansas, each of its seventy-five
counties have their own coroners, with seventy-three of those
counties electing those positions.187 The qualifications for
serving as coroner: being eighteen years of age and not being a
felon.188 If those factors were not jarring enough, the training
after being elected to the job is even bleaker.189 While Arkansas
“offered free death investigation training” for coroners starting in
2015, only twenty counties completed it as of 2016.190 As one
coroner from Van Buren County crassly put it, “[y]ou’re not
going to get no cooperation to take off from your full-time job to
go do something that’s kind of free and not required.”191
The picture for coroners got slightly sweeter in 2019 when
the Arkansas General Assembly passed a law that “requir[ed] the
certification [of] deputy coroners.”192 The training in question: a
minuscule certification course.193 Specifically, under Arkansas
law, coroners and deputy coroners have to complete a training
“that consists of no less than sixteen (16) hours [and no] more
than forty (40) hours of instruction.”194 For a quick reference,
“[m]edical school takes 4 years to complete, but to become a
doctor [students] also spend 3-7 years in residency.”195 In
contrast, the course that Arkansas requires “includes basics about
death investigation, state laws and statutes, crime scene
185. Coroner Training Requirements, supra note 180.
186. Id.
187. A Look Into Becoming an Arkansas Coroner, FOX16 (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:57 AM),
[https://perma.cc/C635-PWXK].
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Tracy Neal, Certification Mandatory for Deputy Coroners, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Feb. 17, 2020, 1:03 AM), [https://perma.cc/RM23-FVKW].
193. Id.
194. ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-308 (2021).
195. What to Expect in Medical School, PRINCETON REV., [https://perma.cc/WHR59WZV].
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investigations and how to make proper death notifications
. . . .”196
Due to the inherent and paramount importance of a death
investigator like a coroner or a medical examiner, Arkansans
clearly deserve more than hardly trained professionals. The
quasi-property right endowed to constituents who are close
relatives of the deceased should provide a concrete duty for
coroners to act with a certain level of respect and skill on behalf
of those families.197 A decision that coroners owe some duty of
care and skill to the families of the deceased should act as a
natural conclusion for the direction that the court in Travelers
Insurance Company already chose.198 It is time for Arkansas to
protect its constituents from lazy legislation and regulation over
some of the state’s most important investigators.
III. KICKING THE BUCKET: THE SOLUTION TO
ARKANSAS’S GRAVE MISTAKE
The solution to Arkansas’s broken system is not a difficult
one, but it is a grave one. In their current state, Arkansas’s
coroner regulations fail their constituents at almost every step of
the way.199 From the moment a person dies, the local coroner’s
office likely lacks the breadth of training necessary to deliver a
quality report on the cause of death.200 Even worse, the office
may not have enough education to recognize the need for a further
autopsy request.201 These each seem like significant issues, and
they are. However, their gravity does not require an equally grave
realm of regulation. Simple regulations can make a world of
difference for future generations of constituents who pass away.
Stated plainly, Arkansas’s current coroner system does not
provide the necessary experiential or educational components
imperative for death investigators to properly postulate about the
causes of death within the state.202 Accordingly, under the current
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Neal, supra note 192.
See Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999).
Id.
See supra Section II.C.
See A Look into Becoming an Arkansas Coroner, supra note 187.
See Neal, supra note 192.
See supra Section II.C.
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regime, Arkansas coroners inherently fail the duty of care and
skill arguably owed to families of the deceased under the
precedent set in Travelers Insurance Company.203 There is a clear
solution to this failure: switching to a medical examiner system
that requires the appointment of a physician.
The medical examiner system was recommended by the
panel created by the National Academy of Sciences in 2009,204
and there are currently “16 states and the District of Columbia”
that abide by that system—of which “[m]edical examiners are
appointed to their position and [are] almost always . . .
physicians.”205 By eliminating the coroner system, requiring the
appointment—not election—of medical examiners, and
mandating that the position be for physicians only, the state would
greatly benefit its constituents by providing adequate
investigations into their deaths by specialized health
professionals.206
It may seem easy to dismiss this idea due to a possible
misconception that Arkansas’s lower population density provides
for a lower need for investigations into suspicious deaths.207
However, that assumption could not be further from the truth for
the Natural State. In reality, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) ranked Arkansas ninth out of all the states in
homicide mortality.208 Additionally, in 2017, Arkansas held
almost double the national average rate for firearm deaths—
sitting at 20.3 while the national rate sits at 12.0.209 Finally, if
those statistics were not jarring enough, in 2017, Arkansas ranked
ninth in the United States for suicide deaths—deaths that often
203. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.
204. Bartlett, supra note 161.
205. Id.
206. See supra Section II.C.
207. See Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
[https://perma.cc/5M2E-4T6D] (last visited Feb. 16, 2021); Stats of the State of Arkansas,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, [https://perma.cc/838B-ZF9S] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018); Samuel Stebbins, Dangerous States: Which States Have the Highest Rates
of Violent Crime and Most Murders, USA TODAY, [https://perma.cc/5Z7U-KPDN] (Jan. 13,
2020, 8:51 AM).
208. Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
supra note 207.
209. Stats of the State of Arkansas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
supra note 207.
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require investigation for cause or suspicion.210 Most recently, in
2020, USA Today ranked Arkansas as the fourth most dangerous
state in the country.211 These statistics prove one central point:
Arkansas cannot consider itself a state exempt from requiring
extensive medical knowledge and training for some of its most
critical investigative workers due to any fantasy that it is
somehow a state that experiences low rates of suspicious
deaths.212
In contrast, an apt critique in moving towards a medicalexaminer-only approach would come from the fact that Arkansas
ranks thirty-third in active physicians within the state.213
However, this is an exceedingly easy argument to overcome
based on the reality that Arkansas—utterly separate from the
medical examiner question—needs the generation of more
physician interest in the state regarding regular healthcare for its
constituents.214 Although the University of Arkansas Medical
School (“UAMS”) “is among the top 10 programs in the country
in graduating primary care specialists,” the issue is that “[b]y
2030, [the state will] need almost 500 additional . . . physicians
just to meet the needs of the state, and [the state is] just not
graduating enough to meet that need . . . .”215 Therefore, having
more doctors in the state is not a need for just a single issue; it is
a crucial need for various issues that constituents will face in the
near future. It is in the legislature’s best interest for those it serves
to generate more appeal in—not only being a doctor—but being
a doctor in Arkansas.
To solve this important issue regarding physicians—
specifically for medical examiner positions—funding will likely
play an important role in generating that interest.216 While
210. Id.
211. Stebbins, supra note 207.
212. See Homicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
supra note 207; Stats of the State of Arkansas, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, supra note 207; Stebbins, supra note 207.
213. Professionally Active Physicians, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 2021),
[https://perma.cc/ZUV7-455V].
214. Denise Middleton, Why is Arkansas Still Facing a Primary Care Physician
Shortage?, THV 11, [https://perma.cc/FD6K-VQF7] (Feb. 28, 2019, 10:12 PM).
215. Id.
216. See Bartlett, supra note 161.
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funding is a challenging and grid-locking question for every state
legislature, it is time for Arkansas to put its money where its
mouth is: purportedly caring about deceased Arkansans and the
families they leave behind. Arkansas must ditch the coroner
system in favor of a modernized medical examiner position—
therefore finally equipping this crucial role to fulfill an arguable
duty of care and skill to the families of the deceased.217
IV. BITE THE DUST: A CONCLUSION
Throughout all of this history, law, and transformation, one
takeaway is blatantly apparent: Arkansas fails to fulfill the quasiproperty right in dead bodies—affirmed and afforded to
Arkansans in Travelers Insurance Company—and favors illtrained and ill-equipped individuals as the leaders of death
investigations within the state.218 This failure has percolated
throughout centuries of history and transformation that has left
the current coroner role in the shell of a position that it is now:
unable to fulfill a dire and important need in owing some duty of
skill or care to families throughout the death investigation
process.219
There is no question that there is no clear duty by coroners
owed to families in Arkansas; however, a conclusion that
coroners do owe some duty is an obvious and natural conclusion
for the direction that the court already laid out in Travelers
Insurance Company.220 By continuing the bygone system of
electing coroners who often fail to possess the skills or education
that would be proper for a job of such scientific magnitude,
Arkansas is allowing death investigations to take a backseat to
political showmanship.221
Arkansas can no longer hide behind laws that do little in
protecting families who are inevitably in some of the worst days
they will experience in life.222 The quasi-property right inherent
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Travelers Ins. v. Smith, 338 Ark. 81, 89, 991 S.W.2d 591, 595 (1999).
Id.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
A Look into Becoming an Arkansas Coroner, supra note 187.
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in a dead body vested in the nearest family of the deceased must
be honored.223 Without it, families will continue to suffer at the
hands of those that lack proper education—failing in the endeavor
of properly serving constituents, properly investigating deaths,
and properly providing peace of mind for families throughout that
process.224 Accordingly, Arkansas must ditch the coroner system
in favor of a modernized medical examiner role.225 The
legislature cannot afford to treat each Arkansans’ death as a
number—each number represents a lifetime. Arkansas should not
say “till death do us part” with its current regulations—Arkansans
are more than a number. The legislature should act like it.

223. See Travelers Ins., 338 Ark. at 89, 991 S.W.2d at 595.
224. See supra Section II.C.
225. See supra Section II.C.
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